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While political choices are rarely isolated or simultaneous, the vast majority 
of empirical models in political science assume they are.  This dissertation examines 
the dynamic interactions over time between individuals and their micro-environment, 
in which a single factor both influences, and is influenced by, the act of voting.  
These dynamic interactions occur in a surprisingly broad swathe of the current 
literature on American voting behavior, as implicit but unexamined elements of four 
major research traditions.  When these interactions are present, they establish 
feedback cycles that pose both theoretical and statistical challenges if not analyzed 
appropriately.  Researchers ignoring these cycles tend to underestimate long term 
influences on voting behavior, make unrealistic assumptions about changes in voting 
behavior over time, and produce biased results under certain conditions. 
  
I propose a methodology that can successfully identify and model these 
interactions: employing simulation models to represent dynamic interactions in an 
intuitive format, and using optimization techniques to conduct parameter estimation 
and hypothesis testing against empirical data.  To guide the development of these 
simulation models, I outline a theoretical framework of the major pathways by which 
dynamic interactions can influence voting behavior. 
I then present two applications of this methodology, to study the dynamic 
impacts on voting of political mobilization, and of social conformity over time.  In 
both cases, the models receive strong statistical support, in benchmark tests against 
existing econometric models and against empirical data on voting behavior.  Both 
mobilization and social conformity have unstudied indirect impacts that can lead to an 
additional 1.7% to 4% increase in voter turnout beyond existing models.  Targeted 
use of peer pressure can lead to even more significant increases in turnout – up to a 
30% increase among otherwise indecisive voters.  In the long term, targeted 
mobilization can create cadres of repeatedly-mobilized activists, which raises 
questions about whether political campaigns effectively use their mobilization funds 
to build their parties in the long term.  These two simulation models also provide a 
foundation for a host of new research questions, ranging from the impact of high-
intensity get-out-the-vote drives on future mobilization efforts, to the effects of an 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Overview 
In each political decision, from voting to protesting in the streets, an individual’s 
options and incentives are shaped by a long history of prior actions and relationships.  
The result is a dynamic micro-context of political behavior – in which the residues of 
prior experiences and of interactions with one’s political environment shape current and 
future decision making.  Yet, while political choices are rarely isolated or simultaneous, 
the vast majority of formal and empirical models in political science assume they are.  
The notion that past experiences affect current political decisions is nothing new to 
political science, but political scientists have been hamstrung by a lack of data and 
methodological tools.  As a result, few parsimonious, empirically tested models of the 
dynamics of political behavior exist.  
While no simple solution exists to the data problems and methodological 
challenges that have confronted other researchers, I offer an approach to study dynamic 
political behavior that can ease these constraints, in exchange for a moderate increase in 
methodological complexity.  In certain cases, dynamic processes can be better understood 
using existing data and econometric techniques, carefully applied.  For the more 
challenging cases, a three stage process renders them tractable: using a theoretical 
framework to help identify and elaborate models of specific dynamic processes, 





the models into novel, testable, hypotheses via simulation modeling.  Instead of 
attempting to develop a unified dynamic model of all political participation, I illustrate 
how this approach can help us elaborate, contextualize, and empirically test highly 
specific models of particular dynamic processes.  The approach can be applied to 
dynamics occurring in a broad range of political behaviors without relying on gross 
generalizations or departing from the rigors of empirical testing. 
I examine national voting behavior in the United States, and two particular 
processes that affect it: the interaction between political mobilizers and individual voters, 
and the interaction between voters and their social network via social conformity 
pressures.  In each case, the core research question is: 
 
“How do cycles of interaction, with political mobilizers or with one’s social 
network, change voting behavior from what is predicted by existing, single stage 
models?” 
 
The central hypothesis is that positive feedback loops exist that have significant 
short and long term effects unless balanced by opposing processes. In the short term, 
these loops establish mechanisms by which mobilization and social influence indirectly 
increase voter participation, above and beyond their direct impact on turnout.  In the long 
term, however, these loops can lead to increasingly narrow participation as previously 
active individuals are recruited or nudged to participate more than their peers.  In the case 
of mobilization, the hypothesized feedback mechanism occurs through the mobilizers’ 





mechanism occurs when individuals’ increased (or decreased) participation shapes their 
peers’ “descriptive norms”, i.e., their understanding of “normal” turnout behavior to 
which they try to conform.  In both cases a web of other interrelated feedback processes 
exist: increasing, decreasing, and channeling political participation over time. Clear 
effects of the dynamics of mobilization and of peer pressure can nevertheless be isolated 
and meaningfully studied, and can inform a broader discussion of the system’s dynamics.  
The goal of the research is two-fold: to provide new substantive and empirical 
insights into the impact of mobilization and peer pressure on voting behavior, and to 
make a methodological contribution by demonstrating how tools developed in 
computational social science, system dynamics, and econometrics can be usefully applied 
to study a broader range of dynamic interactions between individuals and their micro-
environment.  
 
Why Dynamics Matter 
In itself, the observation that political participation is shaped by complex 
interactions over time, and that existing models of political behavior do not capture all of 
these interaction, is trivial.  After all, useful models are generally simplifications of an 
irrepressibly complex reality.  The more interesting issue for political scientists is 
whether modeling dynamic interactions can provide sufficient improvement in accuracy 
and theoretical insight to warrant the effort.  There are significant methodological and 
theoretical reasons for believing that this is the case.   





specifically, when a dynamic interaction is present between the act of voting itself and 
factors influencing the decision to vote which can change endogenously over time.  
Unless careful attention is paid to the dynamic interaction, biased results occur when 
complex interactions are misspecified,  estimation of the decision-making process will 
underestimate the long-term impact of these endogenous factors, and unrealistic 
assumptions can be made about the secular growth of voting behavior over time. 
 
When the Problem Occurs:  Dynamic Interactions 
The decision to vote is shaped by a host of personal and environmental factors, 
ranging from one’s early life socialization, to information about the election, to the 
weather.  When one or more of these factors can both influence voting and be influenced 
by it, i.e., when causality runs in both directions, then empirical analysis is challenging.  I 
am concerned with a particular type of dual-causality, in which there is a clearly defined 
cycle over time between the individual’s decision to vote and a factor that influences the 
decision to vote – which, for ease of reference, I call “dynamic (voting) interactions”.  
These dynamic interactions are actually quite common, if implicit and unexamined, in 
contemporary models of voting behavior.  In Chapter 2, I analyze major research 
traditions in voting behavior and draw out these implicit dynamic interactions; to 
introduce the point here, however, I’ll brieflly reference the literature on voter 
mobilization.  
Researchers studying voter mobilization have generally addressed two distinct 
questions – the impact mobilization has on voting, and who is targeted for mobilization.  





strident arguments that political mobilization drives voter participation.  Abramson and 
Claggett’s (2001) and Goldstein and Ridout’s (2002) more recent works on voting 
behavior present methodological advancements, but find substantively the same role for 
mobilization.1  A growing tide of experimental literature (e.g., Green and Gerber 2004; 
Nickerson 2008) also verifies the impact of certain forms of mobilization on turnout, both 
on directly targeted individuals and their households.  On the second question, 
researchers have found that at any given moment, mobilizers consider many of the same 
factors that determine whether an individual participates at all – including education, 
race, prior participation (e.g., Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).  Brady, Schlozman and 
Verba (1999) develop this concept as “rational prospecting”.   
Most importantly for this discussion, two separate lines of analysis have shown 
that campaign mobilization affects voting behavior, and that campaigners take into 
account the prior participation of individuals when they select whom to mobilize.  
Bringing these two sets of analyses together, a dynamic interaction results.  Figure 1, 
below, illustrates the nucleus of this interaction over two election cycles. 
 
 
Figure 1: A simple, two election model of the role of mobilization on participation 
 
                                                 
1 Goldstein and Ridout (2002) critique Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) on some of their more expansive 
claims about voter turnout in the US, but their findings on the role of mobilization and efficacy are similar.  













Issue 1:  Estimating Long Term Impacts on Voting Behavior 
The central problem of understanding dynamic interactions is a problem of 
interpretation and theory;  the statistical estimation of a dynamic interaction such as voter 
mobilization can provide an answer that is mathemetically correct, but does not 
incorporate all of the factors that are theoretically relevant.  Specifically, reserchers 
generally estimate the marginal impact of mobilization on voting behavior as the 
marginal change in the probability of voting due to a unit change in mobilization in the 
same year.  However, from the perspective of a political party investing in mobilizing 
voters, the relevant impact is broader – the party will influence both the current election 
and future elections with its current-year investment.  That indirect, subsequent-election, 
impact is often missing from the interpretation of current models.  
This indirect impact can be seen by considering the effect of prior mobilization on 
current participation, and a simple manipulation of standard equations used to estimate 
voting behavior and mobilization.  The first step is to take a stylized analysis of voting 
and mobilization, and structure it to highlight the dynamic interaction.2  Without loss of 
generality,  one can model voting behavior as a function of mobilization, prior voting 
history, plus “everything else”.  Prior voting history is especially important.  Numerous 
authors have included prior voting history as a control for other factors influencing 
current mobilization, often for practical reasons of serial autocorrelation, and with 
theoretical underpinnings such as habit formation (Gerber, Green and Shachar 2003) and 
self-efficacy (Finkel 1985).   
                                                 
2 A more detailed analysis, using a range of examples from the current literature on voting is conducted in 





The stylized model of voting can be written as: 
Pt = f(α0 + α1Mt + α2Xt + α3Pt-1) 
 
Where Pt  is participation at time t, Mt  is mobilization at time t, Pt-1 is 
participation at time t-1, and Xt  covers all other factors of interest that influence 
participation such as income, education,  and the competitiveness of the election.  
Similarly, mobilization can be depicted as a function of prior participation, plus 
everything else: 
 Mt = g(β0 + β 1Pt-1 + β 2Yt  ) 
 
Where Yt covers all other factors of interest that influence mobilization, such as 
party affiliation, income, gender and electoral district.3   
For simplicity of presentation, assume that the mobilization and participation 
functions are both linear.  The voter participation function can then be re-written as: 
Pt = α0 + α1[β0 + β 1Pt-1+ β 2Yt ] + α2Xt + α3Pt-1 
 
Figure 2, on the next page, illustrates these parameters.  
 
                                                 
3 Note – I do not include a lagged dependent variable for mobilization, for two reasons. First, this stylized 
model is drawn from existing research on mobilization – other researchers do not appear to use a LDV for 
mobilization in their work – and I will make an argument about the structure of current models based on 
this relationship. Second, I assume that campaigns re-evaluate how to contact each year, rather than re-use 
the same outdated list of targeted voters.  This is both theoretically reasonable, and avoids problems of 






Figure 2: A two-election model of mobilization and participation, with exogenous factors 
 
The direct impact of current mobilization on current participation is given by 
α1Mt.  Since α1β 1Pt-1 and α3Pt-1 are perfectly collinear, Mt and Pt-1 are partially collinear, 
and the estimation process will be inefficient with inappropriately high standard errors.  
However, this does not introduce bias (barring other statistical problems such as omitted, 
correlated variables), and statistical estimation would lead to an accurate assessment of 
α1, the marginal impact of mobilization on voting behavior. 
The indirect impact of prior mobilization on current participation can be seen by 
breaking Pt-1 into its component parts.  The voter participation function can then be re-
written as: 
           Pt = α0 + α1[β0 + β1[α0 + α1Mt-1 + α2Xt-1 + α3Pt-2] + β2Yt  ] + α2Xt + α3[α0 + 
α1Mt-1 + α2Xt-1 + α3Pt-2] 
 
In which, prior-year mobilization Mt-1, influences current participation, Pt, via two 
routes.  First, prior mobilization affects prior participation, which affects current 




























terms of implicit habit formation or improved feelings of self-efficacy.  In this case, 
mobilization improves the chances of voting, which builds an internal voting habit (or 
self-efficacy) that carries over into the next election.   
Second, prior-year mobilization affects current participation by changing the 
decision criteria of the political parties themselves.  Mobilization improves the chance of 
voting, which is recorded in the voter files that political parties use to target individuals 
for future mobilization.  The consequences of this feedback process are significant, both 
theoretically and mathematically, and are discussed below; for now however, this process 
serves as another route by which prior-year mobilization influences current-year voting 
behavior.   
In the simple linear model, these two indirect impacts can be expressed as:4 
α 1[β 1 [α 1M t-1 ]],   the indirect impact of prior mobilization on participation via current 
                                                 
4 Taking the model further into subsequent years, we can expect that this effect rapidly decays over time, as 
is often the case with first-order serial auto-correlation models.  Given the core participation and 
mobilization functions (lagged): 
     Pt-2 =  α0 + α1Mt-2 + α2Xt-2 + α3Pt-3 
     Mt-1 = β0 + β 1Yt-1  + β 2Pt-2 
Then, 
     Mt-1 = β0 + β 1Yt-1  + β 2[α0 + α1Mt-2 + α2Xt-2 + α3Pt-3] 
     Pt = α0 + α1[β0 + β 1Yt  + β 2[α0 + α1[β0 + β 1Yt-1  + β 2Pt-2] + α2Xt-1 + α3Pt-2]] + α2Xt + α3[α0 + α1[β0 + β 1Yt-1  
+ β 2Pt-2] + α2Xt-1 + α3Pt-2] 
     Pt = α0 + α1[β0 + β 1Yt  + β 2[α0 + α1[β0 + β 1Yt-1  + β 2[α0 + α1Mt-2 + α2Xt-2 + α3Pt-3]] + α2Xt-1 + α3[α0 + 
α1Mt-2 + α2Xt-2 + α3Pt-3]]] + α2Xt + α3[α0 + α1[β0 + β 1Yt-1  + β 2[α0 + α1Mt-2 + α2Xt-2 + α3Pt-3]] + α2Xt-1 + α3[α0 
+ α1Mt-2 + α2Xt-2 + α3Pt-3]] 
     Pt = α0 + α1β0 + α1β1Yt  + α1β2α0 + α1β2α1β0 + α1β2α1β 1Yt-1  + α1β2α1β2α0 + α1β2α1β2α1Mt-2 + α1β2α1β2α2Xt-2 
+ α1β2α1β 2α3Pt-3 + α1β2α2Xt-1 + α1β2α3α0 + α1β2α3α1Mt-2 + α1β2α3α2Xt-2 + α1β2α3α3Pt-3 + α2Xt + α3α0 + α3α1β0 
+ α3α1β 1Yt-1  + α3α1β2α0 + α3α1β2α1Mt-2 + α3α1β2α2Xt-2 + α3α1β2α3Pt-3 + α3α2Xt-1 + α3α3α0 + α3α3α1Mt-2 + 
α3α3α2Xt-2 + α3α3α3Pt-3 
 




2 α3β2 + α1
2α3β2+ α1α3
2).  Since voting and mobilization are 
binary, and the maximum value of each is 1 (putting aside the fact that we are using a linear model for 
simplicity of presentation), then we would expect the estimated coefficients for voting and mobilization, 
α1…3 and β1…3to be less than one.  Each multiplication of those coefficients, such as α1
3β2
2, would rapidly 
approach zero, and indicate no effect on future voting behavior.  In other words, for practical purposes this 
type of indirect effect of mobilization is likely to be irrelevant beyond the next election, if a model with a 





mobilization, and α 3[α 1M t-1 ],  the indirect impact of prior mobilization on participation 
via prior participation. 
Other authors have discussed the implications of serially correlated models on 
future time periods (e.g., Beck and Katz 2004); the mathematics is nothing new.  
However, this general statistical lesson does not appear to be considered in the specific 
context of dynamic voter interactions, leading to only a partial picture of the relevant 
influence of mobilization on voter behavior.  From the perspective of a political party, the 
importance of mobilization may be more than its marginal impact on participation, α1.  
As an investment, it affects subsequent years of voter behavior as well.  More subtly, it 
affects the political party’s own process of mobilization in the future, which I analyze in 
detail later.  These indirect impacts are present in current models of mobilization, but 
unless attention is paid to them, they are neither analyzed nor interpreted correctly.  This 
relationship is not limited to the specific case of mobilization and voting, however; in 
Chapter 2, I discuss how these indirect impacts are quite common in voting behavior 
research, including in models of political information, resource mobilization, and social 
networks, and in Chapter 5 I develop a detailed model of dynamic interactions via social 
networks.   
Assuming that other statistical problems are not present, then these indirect 
impacts do not require any additional data to estimate – if one can estimate the impact of 
current mobilization and prior participation on current participation, and the impact of 
prior participation on current mobilization, then these indirect impacts “come along for 
                                                                                                                                                 






the ride”, as it were.  If one can correctly estimate direct impacts, one can estimate 
indirect impacts.   
Unfortunately, there appear to be a set of cases in which the statistical 
assumptions underlying the core models, of mobilization behavior and voter turnout, are 
violated when dynamic interactions are present, and estimating the direct impacts are 
problematic.   
 
Issue 2: Unrealistic Assumptions and Feedback Loops 
When researchers study two components of a dynamic interaction in isolation, 
such as mobilization and voting behavior, the result is often that a feedback loop is 
(unintentionally) ignored between the two variables, which leads to wildly unrealistic 
predictions.  In order to align the model with empirical reality, more nuanced 
assumptions are often required. In Chapter 3, I describe feedback processes in general, 
and how they can occur across a broad swathe of the voting literature; for now, let us 
focus on the specific example of mobilization and voting.   
Recalling the stylized model above: 
Pt = f(α0 + α1Mt + α2Xt + α3Pt-1) 
Mt = g(β0 + β1Yt  + β2Pt-1) 
 
Two problems arise.  First, when dynamic interactions are present, the functional 
form used in most voting models is not appropriate for processes that occur over more 
than two time periods. Consider what can happen to this stylized model over multiple 





binary, consider P and M as percentages of the overall population, i.e., P and M are 
continuous variables over [0,1] representing the percent of people who are voting and 
mobilized, respectively.  To make the analysis clearer, also assume that mobilization and 
voting behavior are linear functions.  Put aside for the moment the substantive meaning 
of each term, which I will discuss shortly, and trace the mathematical implications of 
these functions:                                                                                Table 1: A Simple Process 
Pt = α0 + α1Mt + α2Xt + α3Pt-1 
Mt = β0 + β1Yt  + β2Pt-1 
As an example, in period 1, assume that Po and Mo are 
0.5.  Assume further that all coefficients 0.3, X and Y are 
constant at 1.  Table 1 traces P and M over time.  In the 
absence of any other factors, these equations and parameters 
would predict that P (participation) and M (mobilization) 
increase over time to include the majority of the population.  Clearly this is unrealistic.  
The reason this unrealistic result occurs is that the stylized model of participation 
and mobilization, a generalization of the existing literature on mobilization (e.g., 
Abramson and Claggett 2001), is similar to the well-known first-order autoregressive 
process, AR(1).5    The AR(1) process, and related processes without such well-mapped 
mathematical interpretations (including processes that are closer to the logit models and 
                                                 
5 The stylized model differs from an AR(1) process on two accounts:  in an AR(1) process f() and g() 
would be linear, whereas in contemporary political science models they are often some derivative of a logit 
function, and P and M are binary, whereas AR(1) processes are continuous.  The table presented on the 
right is a case where the stylized model is constrained so that it lines up exactly with an AR(1) process.  
The implications of these two changes – linear vs. logit functional forms and binary vs. continuous 
variables, is discussed below. 
Time P  M 
0 0.50 0.50 
1 0.78 0.63 
2 0.87 0.70 
3 0.90 0.72 
4 0.91 0.72 
5 0.91 0.73 
6 0.91 0.73 
7 0.91 0.73 
8 0.91 0.73 
9 0.91 0.73 





other functional forms used in political science), have long been studied in the System 
Dynamics literature as feedback loops.   
In Chapter 3, I provide a System Dynamics interpretation of this stylized model, 
and examine the behavior of the original functional form (with a logit, rather than linear, 
functional form, and a binary dependent variable).  In brief however, with AR(1) and 
similar processes, we would expect a system with this type of feedback loop either to 
grow rapidly, fall rapidly, or asymptotically approach a steady-state value.6  This 
behavior arises simply because of the selected functional form employed in most political 
science analyses of these dynamic interactions, and is unrelated to any substantive 
meaning we may want to apply to the variables.  
The obvious solution to this problem is to argue that the true process(es) 
underlying voting behavior use a different functional form, such as one in which there are 
limits placed on the feedback present in dynamic interactions.  In the case of 
mobilization, there are good theoretical reasons to place limits on that growth, and the 
substantive implications of a simple feedback loop are untenable.  Rosenstone and 
Hansen’s mobilization model (1993), for example, explains mobilization as a function of 
the characteristics of individual voters.  In that model, if the population were suddenly to 
become more attractive to mobilizers, then mobilization would shoot up and campaigns 
would contact significantly more people.  That is unrealistic.  Instead, mobilizers have a 
limited budget to spend on mobilization and pick “the best” voters according to some 
                                                 
6 In this case, these two equations simplify down to Pt = (α0 + α1β0 + α1β1Yt  + α2Xt) + Pt-1(α3 + α1β2).  
Assuming that Xt  and Yt are constant (as in the demonstration above), and |α3 + α1β2| < 1, then the system 
will approach its steady state of (α0 + α1β0 + α1β1Yt  + α2Xt) / (1 -  (α3 + α1β2)).  When |α3 + α1β2| > 1 the 





criteria.  The same logic can apply for other dynamic interactions, such as between voters 
and the amount of political information they have.  While politicians dump a seemingly 
infinite amount of money into TV ads and mailings, there is an upper limit on how much 
political information and stimulation the public can receive to prompt them to vote.  
Resource constraints such as these provide a theoretically meaningful, and 
mathematically effective, means to limit positive feedback loops, and are analyzed in 
further detail in Chapter 3.   
While various methods exist to handle feedback loops and model a more realistic 
and theoretically grounded understanding of dynamic interactions, they come at a cost – 
complexity.  It is difficult, for example, to estimate a time-varying upper limit on the 
number of people mobilized (the dependent variable) with a standard logit model.  
Moreover, this complexity can break the standard assumptions of stationarity that 
underlie time-series models used by political scientists.  This is one example of the 
statistical challenges that face modelers of dynamic interactions. 
 
Issue 3:  Statistical Challenges in Modeling Dynamic Interactions 
The previous two sections assumed that we knew and could reliably measure the 
key determinants of voting and mobilization that were either theoretically important to 
the model or needed to be controlled for and the functional relationship between all of the 
variables.  If that were not the case, then dynamic interactions would violate standard 
econometric assumptions used in modeling voting behavior.  Attempting to model them 
without the appropriate temporal component delivers misleading models and inaccurate 





In general, if temporal dynamics are misspecified in statistical models, the results 
will be biased coefficient estimates, often by a large factor (de Boef and Keele 2008).  
While econometric techniques exist to handle a wide range of autoregressive processes 
(Hendry 1995), one challenge is that researchers must have some prior knowledge of the 
process’s structure, and its temporal scale (Shellman 2004) to estimate them correctly.  
Moreover, these techniques assume stationarity, i.e. that the joint probability distribution 
of the data generating process does not change over time or space.7  Non-stationary 
processes would be misestimated. Compounding these statistical problems are 
widespread problems in gathering appropriate panel data, ranging from data on individual 
voting behavior to other political behaviors such as social protest. 
In the specific context of research on voting in American political science, these 
challenges are commonplace.  The determinants of voting behavior are often modeled 
with static and cross-sectional data – demographic characteristics, characteristics of the 
election under study, etc.  The paramount data source used by American political 
scientists, the ANES, has limited time series information on voting.  Even less data is 
available on voting and mobilization over time, or on social influence and voting over 
time.8  As noted above, where time-series cross-sectional data is used, often modelers 
include a lagged dependent variable, or autoregressive error term, to account for 
historical (but stationary) effects (Beck and Katz 2004).  These models contain excellent 
insights into political behavior, and provide accurate results if the underlying processes 
                                                 
7 And the process is not readily convertible into a stationary process via detrending, time-specific fixed 
effects, etc.   
8 Many researchers fall back on the Verba et al.’s (1995) cross sectional mobilization data, or Huckfeldt 





have no enduring impact beyond single-stage lags or very specific processes of decay.  
They also lead one to wonder what would happen if more complex dynamic interactions 
were possible, beyond second-order autocorrelation and into non-stationary processes.  
Chong’s (1991) model of collective action provides one intriguing example, where 
difference equations are used to explicitly trace the time path of a system.  Other 
innovative examples include Box-Steffensmeier and Lin (1996), Marwell and Oliver 
(1993), and Lohmann (1994; 2000), largely outside of the domain of voting behavior. 
Estimation methods are available that can handle these nuanced models, while 
still providing accurate estimations and predictions.  Fully developing this method, and 
demonstrating its applicability to a wide range of voting models in political science, 
constitutes a significant portion of the chapters ahead.  
 
Chapter Outline  
The subsequent chapters are structured as follows:   In Chapter 2, I briefly review 
the study of voting behavior in political science, and demonstrate how dynamic processes 
are quite common – either implicitly or explicitly.  I discuss how the long-run dynamic 
interactions that are likely to occur in each model raise serious methodological and 
substantive concerns for a set of existing econometric results.  
In Chapter 3, I present a general theoretical model that facilitates the 
identification and study of dynamic political interactions.  In the elaboration of the 
model, I show how major theoretical traditions in the study of political behavior can be 





model to outline a three-stage process of identifying, estimating, and testing dynamic 
models of political behavior.  
Next, in Chapter 4, I develop theoretical and econometric model of the dynamics 
of mobilization, drawing upon and extending the existing literature.  I test the model 
against a panel dataset on voting and mobilization, the 1990-2 ANES panel, and then 
provide novel predictions about the formation of cadres of mobilized activists over time. 
In Chapter 5, I repeat the process of theoretical specification and testing with a 
new target: the influence of multiple cycles of peer pressure on voting behavior.  As with 
mobilization, I present a detailed theoretical and econometric model, which incorporates 
the direct and indirect effects of peer pressure. I test them on two datasets collected by 
Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995, 2000).   
Finally, in Chapter 6, I review the research presented and discuss the implications 
of the work on our understanding of dynamic political behavior.  I conclude by 
discussing a range of new avenues for research, including the use of a computer 
simulation as a platform for developing and testing novel models of dynamic political 







Chapter 2: Theoretical Background 
 
Introduction: A Dynamic Blind Spot 
The goal of this chapter is twofold:  to demonstrate that dynamic interactions are 
an implicit, but surprisingly common, part of many models of voting behavior, and to 
discuss in detail why these dynamic interactions are important.   
To illustrate the first point, I examine the central premises of four different 
research traditions in the voting behavior literature, and identify dynamic interactions that 
shape the underlying behavior.  In most cases, the dynamic interactions are not directly 
considered by researchers.  Instead, voting behavior is usually modeled in political 
science research with immediate, temporally isolated impacts on voting.  For example, 
mobilization has been shown to affect turnout in the current election, but has not been 
studied in terms of future elections; social pressure has been shown to affect current 
turnout, but not (yet) future behavior.   
The current focus on contemporaneous factors fits the tools and data available to 
political scientists: the ready availability of cross-sectional, nationally representative 
surveys of voter participation from the ANES, and the lack of rich alternative datasets. 
This has facilitated a strong focus on individual determinants of political participation, 
eschewing historical and contextual influences.  Moreover, most econometric techniques 
used in political science are designed for static data, or for time series cross-sectional data 





influence over those periods.  The resulting models feature the isolated individual 
buffeted by turnout influences at the moment of the voting decision; time is collapsed 
into a set of unrelated snapshots, each of which is explained by its contemporaneous 
factors.  
The field is not devoid of empirical analysis of political behavior over time, of 
course.  The most common technique researchers employ is to control for potentially 
confounding historical influences by adding time-lagged variables to otherwise static 
models.  This approach provides a clearer snapshot at each point in time, but fails to 
connect those snapshots with a temporal story.  It treats history and temporal interaction 
as a nuisance to be removed from the model, and not a core part of the model itself.  In 
contrast, a budding literature has explicitly sought to examine one form of dynamic 
change in individual level voting – via the formation of habits (e.g., Green and Shachar 
2000, Aldrich et al. 2008).  This literature is very promising, and shows how a direct 
focus on dynamic interactions, instead of treating them as a problem to be controlled, can 
provide new insights; however, the approach is still new and faces a number of logical 
and methodological problems that will be discussed below.  
With each of these four research traditions, I take a novel approach – I focus on 
the temporal interaction itself, and momentarily put aside the contemporaneous 
explanatory variables that are usually studied.  I then generate a stylized model for each 
research tradition, in which the temporal component is brought to the fore.  From this 
new perspective, I argue that one can gain insight into the dynamic interactions at work in 
each research tradition, as well as better understanding, and more accurately estimating, 





To illustrate the second point, that dynamic interactions are worth the effort to 
examine, I build on the initial summary given in Chapter 1 that introduced three major 
statistical challenges.  A priori, relying on a-temporal models, tools, and data should not 
necessarily be a problem – by removing confounding influences researchers might be 
developing clearer, more parsimonious but still accurate models of political behavior.  In 
practice, however, this particular simplification poses serious challenges.  In the sections 
below, I describe in detail why these tools and assumptions are inappropriate for dynamic 
political behaviors such as voting, and how their use leads unwittingly to theoretically 
circumscribed models and biased estimation, even of their non-dynamic variables.   
 
Temporal Dynamics within the Existing Voting Behavior Literature  
As one author puts it: “Almost every possible explanation [of voting behavior] 
seems to have been explored: ranging from the more conventional rational choice, 
sociological, and psychological explanations, to more exotic explanations like rainfall or 
genetic variation (van Ham and Smets 2010, p1).”   Excellent summaries of this literature 
exist, including Niemi et al.  (2010); instead of rehashing the overall literature, in this 
section I will examine the existing literature and demonstrate how it can be reexamined 
from the perspective of dynamic interactions. 
The major research traditions in voting behavior, the Michigan “social-
psychological model” (Campbell et al. 1960), the Columbia School (Berelson et al. 1954; 
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), and Rational Choice (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981), each 





ongoing social pressure, and economic costs and benefits.  Additional, less prominent 
traditions such as Expressive Choice (Schuessler 2000), Resource Mobilization 
(McCarthy and Zald 2001), Civic Volunteerism (Verba et al. 1995), Institutional 
Mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), and habit formation (Gerber et al. 2003), 
further enrich the debate with other factors that drive turnout, including personal 
expression, civic skills, and an internal sense of political efficacy.   
In each tradition, a simple question can be used to identify underlying dynamic 
interactions between the individual and his or her micro-environment: why would factors 
that influence turnout change over time?  I argue that in these models, a key determinant 
of turnout is, in turn, partially affected by the act of turnout itself.9  There is a cycle of 
interaction, in which the individual responds to his or her decision-making environment, 
and the decision-making environment updates based on the individual’s experiences, 
which in turns affects future pressures on the individual and so forth.   
These dynamic interactions often lurk beneath the surface of existing research, 
surfacing in the authors’ notes for future research, and in anecdotal discussions of other 
confounding factors.  Because of challenges in data collection, theoretical elaboration, 
and econometric tools, the interactions are rarely brought to light during the model 
building and empirical testing phases of research.  I seek to haul them out for review.  I 
show that despite their diverse theoretical origins, there are striking similarities among 
these processes. The dynamic interaction between the voter-as-decision-maker and the 
                                                 
9 That is, a theoretically interesting determinant of turnout is part of a dynamic interaction. I do not mean to 
state the obvious:  that current participation is strongly correlated with prior participation.  Rather, a 
meaningful factor such as peer pressure or personal political engagement changes over time.  This factor 





micro-context of that decision can be identified and studied for its effects.  This analysis 
can provide insight both into political behavior generally and into their specific host 
models.   
In the four subsequent sections of this chapter, I examine four different research 
traditions from the voting behavior literature.  I first review their core theoretical 
arguments.  Then, I discuss dynamic elements of the models, that the authors either 
explicitly analyze or that one can readily envision in the process being studied.  Finally, I 
present stylized econometric versions of the core theoretical arguments, in which the 
dynamic elements are highlighted.   
 
Rational Choice and Voting Behavior  
Core Theoretical Argument 
Rational choice models of voting behavior are quite diverse, and range from 
attempts to explain overall voter turnout (“strong rational choice”) to less ambitious work 
to explain marginal changes in turnout (“weak rational choice”).  At the core of both 
approaches is the belief that policy outcomes are of paramount importance to the voter, 
and that economic costs and benefits shape that choice.  In the former category, Downs 
(1957) first popularized the central problem of rational turnout – assuming that an 
individual cares only about the political outcome of an election, would the costs outweigh 
the benefits?   Costs include such factors as the time required to vote, and the effort to 
learn about the candidates and their policy positions in order to decide how to vote.  
Benefits entail the expected value of voting, in terms of the difference in policy positions 





probability that the individual’s act of voting would be decisive over the outcome.  
Unfortunately, the probability that the individual could influence the election is so 
minuscule as to forestall any participation at all (Tullock 1967; Brennan and Buchanan 
1984).  The costs of participation, no matter how small, would arguably outweigh the 
benefits in a “strong” rational choice model.   
While individuals could rely on heuristics and daily experience (Popkin 1991) to 
decrease costs, Downs and others turned to non-economic considerations, such as the 
desire to maintain democracy or to fulfill a civic duty, to explain participation (Downs 
195710; Blais 2000).  This move prompted critiques of non-falsifiability (Green and 
Shapiro 1996) and led other scholars to give up the search for a comprehensive model of 
turnout, and instead examine marginal changes in turnout due to marginal changes in 
costs and benefits (Aldrich 1993).  This less demanding rational choice approach has had 
greater empirical success (Teixeira 1992, Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), in examining 
the impact of weekend voting, registration procedures, and decreased information and 
turnout costs via mobilization.   
Recent work from a rational choice perspective has sought to magnify the voter’s 
benefit from voting by examining the indirect effects of participation on others. While the 
probability that a single individual will determine an election is negligible, the individual 
may see their action (or discussion of the action) as having an influence on other voters. 
The total benefit that a potential voter perceives for voting is thus much larger, and more 
likely to overcome the costs of action.  Authors such as Fowler and Kam (2007) show 
                                                 






how incorporating group-oriented and altruistic preferences into a rational choice voting 
model can boost predicted participation in this way.    
 
Dynamic Interactions 
In both “strong” and “weak” rational choice models, dynamic interactions can be 
found in the calculation of costs and benefits as individuals become more experienced 
with voting.  For example, the costs of participation, particularly information costs, are 
likely to decrease with experience: the act of voting teaches the person where to go to 
vote, where to park, how to get time off from work, etc.  Prior experience also increases 
information about the benefits of voting: before each election, active voters are targeted 
for pamphlets, calls, and even in-person visits by volunteers to inform (and persuade) 
about the election.  In each case, the individual’s currently available information is 
shaped by prior participation, and itself shapes future participation.   
While alternative mechanisms could be considered, it seems unlikely that lower 
information costs would discourage future participation in a systematic manner (except 
in exceptional circumstances of widespread disillusionment, etc.).  Instead, a simple 
positive feedback cycle can be identified – in which prior participation is likely to 
increase future participation, from a rational choice perspective.  This impact is likely to 
be nonlinear, as the value a voter places on new information may to be subject to 
diminishing marginal returns, and be contingent on personal events (such as moving 







Sample Econometric Model, Incorporating Dynamic Interactions 
A wide diversity of rational choice models exists, and it would do the field a 
disservice to attempt to extract a “summary model” from this diversity.  For my purposes, 
I will highlight one well developed model, the Civic Volunteerism Model of Verba, 
Schlozman and Brady (1995, 2000) that employs a “weak” rational choice approach:  it 
uses a non-rational choice framework to explain base levels of turnout, but uses rational 
calculations to explain marginal changes.  In their model, the authors focus on three 
factors that determine political participation:  motivations (benefits), resources and 
political engagement11 (costs and constraints) and mobilization (presented as a mix of 
benefits and costs).   
When the authors analyzed the empirical performance of these concepts (Verba et 
al. 1995, 2000), they found that narrow definitions of benefits as personal economic value 
fail to find strong empirical support. However, broader a definition of benefits that 
included social and civic benefits was supported.  These findings are in line with work on 
civic duty and voting (Blais 2000), as well as the role of altruism in voting (Fowler and 
Kam 2007, Rotemberg 2009).  I will focus on two factors that found support in their 
model:  personal resources and political engagement. 
The authors found strong support across a range of political behaviors, including 
voting,12 that increasing resources and political engagement increases participation on the 
                                                 
11 The basic version of the model focuses on resources (time, money, skill), but their full analysis in Verba 
et al (1995) devotes considerable time to the interaction between resources and engagement (information, 
efficacy, interest, partisanship), which are of more interest here in a discussion of rational choice models.   
12 The relative importance of various factors varied considerably across the three forms of behavior studied. 
Voting was driven by income, political interest, political information, the sense of political efficacy, and 





margin.  They note that some resources are set by inflexible socio-economic 
characteristics (e.g., education, income), but others are built up through the act of 
participation itself (e.g., political information, self-confidence, and a sense of efficacy).  
In fact, they warn about the difficulties in estimating the impact of factors such as 
political information because of “ambiguity of causal direction”. They anecdotally 
describe a potentially confounding dynamic cycle of interaction over time, but do not 
analyze that cycle in their empirical work.  Their model provides an excellent platform 
from which to analyze those underexplored dynamics of participation, and to show the 
dangers in failing to do so.  
Verba et al. (1995) employ a linear, additive relationship between voting and its 
determinants (demographic and contextual factors).  Whereas other non-linear or non-
additive relationships could be considered, and are considered by subsequent researchers, 
their model fits the common use of OLS regression at the time.  They formalized their 
theoretical model as follows (Verba et al. 1995, p358): 
 
Probability of Voting (Pr_Vote) =  Bo + B1 Education +  B2 Vocabulary + B3 Income  
+ B4 Job_Level + B5 Voluntary_Organization_Affiliation + B6  Religious_Attendance 
+ B7 Civic_Skills + B8 Political_Interest+ B9 Political_Information+ B10 Efficacy  
+ B11 Partisanship + B12 Eligiblity_To_Vote 
 
In their comments in the text, they sketched out additional functions that 
determine political interest, information, and efficacy over time. Each of these is, in part, 






For the moment, I will leave them in a greatly simplified form: 
       Political_Interesti,t  = f(Votei,1..t-1, Political_Interesti,t-1, ?) 
Political_Informationi,t  = f(Votei,1..t-1, Political_Informationi,t-1 ,?) 
Political_Efficacyi,t  = f(Votei,1..t-1, Political_Efficacyi,t-1, ?) 
 
Combining these two sets of functions, we have a dynamic interaction:  the act of 
voting is both determined by, and helps determine, levels of political interest, 
information, and efficacy.13    
In highlighting these dynamic interactions, I do not mean to critique the 
groundbreaking work of Verba et al. (1995) or other rational choice scholars.  Instead, as 
I mentioned at the start of this chapter, my first goal is to show how such dynamic 
interactions are common throughout the literature on voting behavior.  For good reasons 
of econometric limitations, data availability, and theoretical parsimony, these dynamic 
interactions are rarely analyzed in the literature.  Later on, I will argue that in many cases 
these interactions provide valuable insight, and that there are new techniques to overcome 
econometric and data challenges, while retaining parsimonious models.  Before pursuing 
that argument however, I will return to the task at hand: identifying these dynamic 
interactions in the existing literature.  
 
                                                 
13 While the Civic Volunteerism model uses a decision theoretic framework, and aligns well with the 
econometric analysis conducted later in this dissertation, there is no reason to assume that a game theoretic 






Social Interaction: Columbia School and Beyond 
Core Theoretical Argument 
Intuitively, social relationships play an important role in political behavior, from 
shaping political opinions to spurring participation.  Since the 1950s, the preponderance 
of political science research has examined the isolated individual, and how personal 
characteristics shape political behavior.  Nevertheless, political scientists are 
rediscovering the social logic of politics, with a host of interdisciplinary research centers, 
publications, and conferences examining the topic, building on the initial work of 
Berelson et al. (1954), or the “Columbia School” of sociologists.14  Berelson and his 
colleagues examined the social influence arising from major societal cleavages: religious, 
ethnic, and class-based. They posited that individuals often interacted with others of the 
same group and followed the cues of political leaders of the same group, and voted 
accordingly.  Individuals who were cross-pressured would show instability in their 
political preferences, and, as expounded upon by later authors, may be less likely to 
participate in order to avoid social conflict (e.g. Mutz 2002). 
Since the early work by Berelson et al. (1954), researchers have focused on two 
characterizations of the social environment: the intentional political discussion an 
individual has within their social network, and the day-to-day often unintentional 
interactions an individual has with people and expressions of their political beliefs (via 
lawn signs, bumper stickers, etc.).  The latter, more established, approach can be found in 
the work of Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995), who found empirical evidence that casual 
                                                 
14 While started in sociology, this approach has also been taken up by American political scientists and 





political observations shape the decision to participate – as more neighbors participate, so 
do you.  Cho and Rudolph (2008) provide a more recent analysis, in which casual 
observations shape participation, via a spatial autocorrelation model of diffusion.  
Campbell (2006) argues that individuals absorb norms of civic and political participation, 
largely based on whether consensus (within a homogeneous population) or conflict 
(within a heterogeneous population) prevails in their environment.  Participation, when it 
occurs, can also be strongly clustered, as Cho (2003) shows for political contributions by 
ethnic minorities.  Other scholars have examined the role of regional political 
heterogeneity, including Alesina and La Ferrara (2000), who posit that individuals prefer 
interacting with others who are similar, and tend to withdraw from community interaction 
(and political participation) when confronted with diversity.  Similarly, Mutz (2002) 
argues that a conflicted social environment leads to lower participation via political 
ambivalence and conflicting social accountability pressures.15  Putnam’s work on social 
capital (1995a; 1995b; 2000) also argues for a strong influence of everyday interactions 
via formal organizations. 
Research on the influence of personal social networks on voting has blossomed 
more recently, as new technologies from sociology and computational social science have 
crossed over into political science.  For example, a series of formal models of social 
networks have provided significant insight into the particular conditions under which 
social networks influence individual political participation.  Siegel (2009) analyzes the 
formal characteristics of plausible social networks, looking at how an individual’s 
                                                 
15 Kotler-Berkowitz (2005) finds the opposite, using a model of information and opportunities for 





network responds to changes in the number of interconnections.  He demonstrates how 
the structure of the network influences the manner in which social interactions shape 
participation; without specific knowledge of the network structure, the causal impact of a 
general “social network” cannot be forecasted.  Fowler’s (2005) research using social 
network data from Huckfeldt and Sprague’s field studies (1995, 2000) similarly finds that 
network characteristics have a non-linear, contingent impact on political participation.  
McClurg (2003) counters Putnam’s findings on social capital with evidence that informal, 
politically oriented, discussion has a major impact on participation instead of generic 
involvement in formal organizations.  These formal models and observational studies of 
social network data are also supported by innovative field experiments, such as 
Nickerson (2008), in which household members influence each other’s votes directly. 
Three challenges arise with the social influences literature, however.  First, while 
researchers in the field agree that social influences exist, they disagree on which 
particular forms of influence are active and find conflicting evidence as to their 
importance.  This disagreement is most clearly seen in the literature on the political 
heterogeneity of an individuals’ social context; as noted above, authors have found that 
heterogeneity increases, decreases, or fails to influence political participation.  A second 
problem arises in the causal value of social influence explanations.  Social influence is 
necessarily an incomplete explanation – members of one’s social network (or 
community) had to have garnered their own political views somewhere.  This problem is 
similar to that noted by Lichbach (1995) in his discussion of community-oriented 
solutions to the collective action problem: norms have to come from somewhere.  A third, 





updated.  Empirical models of social influence do not appear to have explicitly captured 
the fact that social interactions are both determinants of political participation, and 
themselves determined by it.16  As is the case with rational choice models of voting, no 
researchers appear to have conducted empirical analyses of the multi-cycle influence that 
social interactions have on political participation.   
 
Dynamic Interactions 
If one accepts the core argument from both research traditions that social 
influence is a causal factor determining turnout, then each could be readily extended to 
show feedback cycles over time.  The social network tradition (e.g., Fowler 2005), 
establishes one simple feedback loop:  person A converses with person B, potentially 
influencing person B’s turnout (and preference) according to an imitation probability.17  
B then converses with C, potentially influencing C’s turnout, C then converses with A, 
potentially influencing A’s turnout, etc.  While rarely discussed in the literature directly, 
the logic of these models implies reversibility – C can converse with A, affecting turnout 
in the future, and setting up a feedback loop.  I will analyze the theoretical and empirical 
implications of this particular cycle at length in Chapter 5. 
The literature on social influence also demonstrates a positive feedback cycle 
caused by peer-group selection: individuals tend to self-segregate, withdrawing from 
contentious relationships where possible (e.g. Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987).  This also 
                                                 
16 Fowler (2005) provides key insights into such a model, by examining the knock-on effects of political 
participation through a population.  However, he does not examine the ramifications of multiple cycles of 
participation over time. 





creates a feedback cycle: individuals who participate (or not) will tend to discuss politics 
with likeminded individuals in the future; those likeminded individuals reinforce 
expectations (or not) to vote, which increases participation, etc., and the future incentive 
to seek out likeminded individuals.  It may also lead, subtly, to changes in overall social 
linkages, as people become better friends of those with whom they interact politically.18    
Similarly, work on impersonal social influence also implies the same type of 
positive feedback cycle.  Huckfeldt and Sprague’s early work (1995) and more recent 
work with explicitly spatial models (Cho 2008) show that localized participation 
encourages more participation.  Assuming that individuals who are motivated to 
participate in one election are more likely to express their intentions in the future through 
lawn signs or public conversation, and that individuals are relatively unlikely to move to 
opposing neighborhoods in the interim between elections, then local impersonal 
interactions shape future, as well as current, participation by changing the political 
expressions of the entire neighborhood.  The expected outcome would be what Cho and 
others have observed:  concentrated pockets of participation, and of non-participation.   
This positive feedback cycle can be logically separated from the disagreements 
within the social influence literature, for example on the role of heterogeneity.  As noted 
above, in the literature on political discussion, there is disagreement on the effects of 
heterogeneity on participation: a heterogeneous political environment could highlight the 
stakes, and increase participation (Kotler-Berkowitz 2005), or discourage participation 
Mutz (2002).  For our purposes, the key factor is not the impact of heterogeneity on 
                                                 
18 This effect is likely to be slight for voting, however, as it is a short-duration, intentionally non-disruptive 





participation, but of participation on heterogeneity.  It seems relatively unlikely that 
participation would increase the future heterogeneity of discussion.19,20    
 
Sample Econometric Model, Incorporating Dynamic Interactions 
As with voting behavior research in the rational choice tradition, a plethora of 
models has been developed for social interactions and voting.  For my purposes however, 
a sample model can suffice to illustrate how dynamic interactions can be explicitly 
modeled.  For example, consider the political discussion model of Mutz (2002).  In that 
paper, she provides empirical tests of this model: 
 
Pr_Vote  =  probit(Bo + B1 Political_Network_Diversity  
+  B2 Frequency_Political_Discussion + B3 Political_Network_Size  
+ B4 Overall_Political_Interest + B5 Education + B6  Partisanship + B7 Age 
+ B8 Income+ B9 Race+ B10 Gender) 
 
A simple extension into dynamic interactions occurs when one additional piece is 
added:  the individuals can change their political discussion networks to avoid conflict 
over time.  As noted above, this factor has been discussed and substantiated separately in 
the literature, but does not appear to have been explicitly combined with a model of 
                                                 
19 Unless it leads to polarized individuals seeking out political combatants – which would nevertheless 
trigger a positive cycle of (combative) political discussion and turnout over time. 
20 Another potential exception to this positive feedback cycle exists in people reacting negatively to social 
pressure – being less likely to participate via social psychological “reactance” (though again, our concern is 
with the impact of participation on pressure, and not vice versa).  The limited work in political science on 
reactance and social pressure for electoral mobilization (Mann 2010) indicates that reactance is not a major 





political discussion and voting.  As with the dynamic analysis of the Civic Voluntarism 
Model, I will leave this equation in a stylized form at the moment: 
 
Political_Network_Diversityi,t  = f(Votei,1..t-1, Votei..k (k!=i),1..t-1, Political_Network_Diversityi,t-1 ,?) 
 
The result is a feedback loop, in which the act of voting is both a function of, and 
helps to determine, the diversity of one’s political interactions.   
 
Mobilization and Participation 
Core Theoretical Argument 
An assortment of theoretically diverse researchers has examined the direct impact 
that one person can have on another individual’s participation by asking them to 
participate – i.e. mobilization.  This factor was briefly discussed in Chapter 1, and a quick 
summary should suffice to place cycles of mobilization in the same context as other 
feedback loops discussed in this chapter.  
Strong evidence exists for the causal impact of direct mobilization across a range 
of political behaviors, including voting, political volunteering (Verba et al. 1995), and 
recruitment into dissident organizations.  Each individual can signal her intention to 
participate, modifying other people’s beliefs about the likelihood of political success 
(Lohmann 1994; Schelling 1971; Fowler and Smirnov 2003).  Household members may 
also influence the expectations and norms of behavior for others in their household 
(Nickerson 2008).   





cited in Chapter 1 and found in the work of Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), Verba et al. 
(1995), Abramson and Claggett’s (2001) and Goldstein and Ridout’s (2002), and Green 
and Gerber (2004).  In addition to the strong findings demonstrating the impact of 
mobilization on turnout, a separate set of research findings analyze the impact of turnout, 
and various predictors of turnout, on mobilization.  Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) argue 
that those who are mobilized are simply those who are most likely to answer, in part due 
to previous turnout (i.e., that organizers are strategic).  Verba et al. (2000) argue 
similarly: “rational prospectors would…want to maximize the probability that the people 
they ask to get involved will be high in participation potential…Firstly, and most 
obviously, the recruiter would want to know whether an individual has been active in the 
past (p. 256-7).”    They find solid support for this argument, especially when recruitment 
occurs by someone who directly knows the target.   
 
Dynamic Interactions 
Extending models of mobilization and participation into dynamic interactions 
over time simply entails putting the two sides of the literature together – the impact of 
mobilization on turnout, and the impact of turnout on mobilization – as demonstrated in 
Chapter 1.  If these two components are correct, a positive feedback cycle exists between 
the two.  Researchers have noted this likely cyclic effect in passing, but have yet to 
analyze it empirically.  For example, Abramson and Claggett (2001) warn:  “Since past 
recruitment efforts may have induced past participation, the total effect of recruitment, 
past and present, on current participation may be larger (p. 913).”  That cycle, they note, 





Sample Econometric Model, Incorporating Dynamic Interactions 
I analyze the theoretical and empirical implications of this particular cycle in 
depth in Chapter 4, but a brief analysis can help further the more general discussion of 
the dynamics of participation at this stage.  Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993, p273) 
seminal work of mobilization’s impact on turnout provides a good basis for that 
discussion:21 
 
Pr_Vote = probit(Bo + B1 Income +  B2 Education + B3 Unemployment + B4 Age  
+ B5 Efficacy + B6 Partisanship + B7 Candidate_Support  
+ B8 Years_In_Community+ B9 Church_Attendance + B10 Homeowner  
+ B11 Employed + B12 Closeness_Of_Election + B13 Registration_Restrictions  
+ B14 Gender + B15 South+ B16 Race + B17 Mobilized_By_Party) 
 
While Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), and other authors, do provide clear 
specifications of the likely impact of turnout on mobilization, in keeping with the earlier 
presentations, I will temporarily leave that equation in a generic form: 
 
Mobilized_By_Partyi,t  = f(Votei,1..t-1,?)       where  ∂ Mobilized_By_Partyi i,t / ∂ Votei,1..t-1 > 0 
 
Once again, this stylized form highlights a simple feedback loop between voting 
and a factor that partially determine it:  mobilization. 
 
                                                 





Personal Voting History, Habit, and Internal Efficacy 
Core Theoretical Argument (including Dynamic Interactions) 
While strong empirical results indicate that prior turnout is a major predictor of 
future turnout, relatively little theoretical development has occurred to explain this 
regularity until recently.  Numerous researchers employ lagged participation as a control 
variable to remove confounding influences in the analyses, but otherwise do not consider 
the theoretical meaning of this control variable (e.g., Abramson and Claggett 2001).  
Previously, a detailed examination of turnout history would have required multi-year 
panel data, which is expensive to collect and rarely representative.  However, with the 
spread of field experiments, researchers have now begun to posit and test theories about 
participation as a habit – in which the mere act of participation leads to future 
participation (Gerber et al. 2003; Green and Shachar 2000).22   This literature provides a 
rare example in which the cyclic interaction of an individual-as-decision maker and the 
micro-context of that decision (here, internal habits and tendencies) have been discussed.  
A second, less common, example of cyclic interactions in the voting literature 
occurs in Finkel’s work on efficacy (1985).  Finkel argues that individual political 
participation and belief in political efficacy are reciprocal; each reinforces the other.  
Previous authors had demonstrated that an individual’s belief in the government’s 
responsiveness to the public (“external efficacy”) and in their personal capacity to affect 
policy change (“internal efficacy”) increase the probability that the individual will 
                                                 
22 The theoretical work on participation history as a habit is distinct from the significant theoretical 
apparatus developed on early socialization.  From Campbell et al. (1960), to Campbell (2006), and Green, 
Palmquist, and Schickler (2002), scholars have examined how experiences during one’s formative years 
leave a lasting impression on one’s political decision making process.  Again, this larger literature on how 
parents and the social environment of youth shape life-long participation is outside of the scope of this 





participate politically.  He finds that increased electoral participation is associated with a 
subsequently increased belief in the “external efficacy” of participation, after controlling 
for prior belief, but participation is not found to increase an individual’s belief in 
“internal efficacy”.  As expected from prior research, he verifies that perceived political 
efficacy increases the probability of participation.   
Connecting the two streams of research, in the habit literature, researchers 
recognize that “habit” may merely be a proxy for other factors that change in the person’s 
environment.  For example, Gerber et al. (2003) offer four hypotheses about the 
formation of habits:   
• voting alters psychological factors in the voter, encouraging future turnout, 
citing Finkel (1985) on efficacy, or a possible increase in one’s sense of duty; 
• voting increases future outreach and information from the parties, similar to 
the discussion on political information and mobilization, above; 
• voting changes “conative attitudes”, or positive and negative feelings about 
the act itself, citing Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), 
• voting subtly changes the self-identity of voters, coming to regard voting as 
something that “people like me do on election day”, and similar to 
Schuessler’s (2000) model of Expressive Choice. 
 
Each of these underlying processes could generate positive feedback cycles, as 







Sample Econometric Model, Incorporating Dynamic Interactions 
Gerber et al. (2003) provide one model of habit, though other similar varieties 
exist in the literature.  Their econometric model is (p547): 
 
Pr_Vote = two_stage_least_squares(Bo + B1 Number_Of_Individuals_In_Household  
+  B2 Voting_Ward + B3 Age + B4 Age
2 + B5 Registered_MajorParty_Voter  
+ B6 Treatment_To_Induce_Voting + B7 Voted_In_Previous_Midterm_Election 
+ B8 Voted_In_Previous_General_Election) 
 
In each case, the underlying mechanisms of habit – such as self-efficacy, 
“conative attitudes” or self-expression – form a cycle in which they both influence and 
are influenced by the act of voting.  
 
The Odd Man Out:  the Michigan School approach 
Starting with Campbell et al. (1960) researchers in the Michigan School tradition 
have argued that individuals have an enduring personal attachment to a political party.  
Early socialization creates that attachment, which drives future political participation.23   
A vast literature expounds upon the Michigan School perspective (see Niemi and 
Weisberg (2010) for a summary; see Green et al. (2002) for a recent expansion).   
The Michigan School tradition was long dominant in American political science, 
but unlike the range of other models reviewed here, does not appear to have an easy 
extension into dynamic interactions.  This should not be surprising, since the core model 
                                                 
23 The Michigan school considers both the act of turnout, and, especially, which party individuals support.  





focuses on an unchanging affiliation over time.  Nevertheless, countless researchers have 
“added on” to the social-psychological model with additional factors that are more 
suggestive of dynamic changes, and can be analyzed within this framework.  These 
additions, which cover a hodge-podge of variables (including prior participation, civic 
skills and efficacy) have been covered in other sections of this chapter; see Niemi and 
Weisberg (2010) for a description of these models. 
 
An Aside, on Political Intermediaries 
While rarely addressed in the American political behavior literature, another 
pathway exists by which individuals could influence their own and each other’s future 
participation: via the intermediary of political institutions and policies.  Individual and 
collective political action leaves a legacy of political institutions, which can be 
supportive, hostile, or simply uninterested in the aims and methods of future political 
participants. Rational choice institutionalism (see Weingast 2002) examines the 
formation of these institutions and how they shape the options and incentives confronting 
political actors.  For example, North and Weingast (1989) describe how the institution of 
checks upon the King’s power changed in the political structure of 17th century Britain 
and allowed the government to credibly commit to property rights.  The political 
opportunity structure (POS) tradition in political sociology also discusses in detail how 
structural changes shape individual and group dissent.   
Unfortunately, these studies all lack one vital piece: a clear understanding of how 
individuals, precisely, influence political outcomes. As Lichbach points out (1995), the 





simplified production function is well known, especially in majoritarian democracies.  
Once proportional representation systems (Lijphart 1999; Powell 2000), checks and 
balances, and other veto players are also considered, it rapidly becomes difficult to trace 
the precise impact that an individual voter has on political outcomes.24  Where less 
complex third party institutions are considered, these relationships and their development 
over time can bear fruit.  In cases where the production function is not well specified, 
relatively little work has been done on how one’s own participation influences that of 
others via intermediary institutions.   
Since the focus of this work is on the individual’s dynamic micro-context, I will 
conclude the discussion of political intermediaries here, but note that political 
intermediaries could provide an interesting avenue for future research.   
 
                                                 
24 If there were, opposing activists would exploit it, deadlock would result, and the function would no 
longer be meaningful.  The one exception, where empirical regularity has been found is between dissent 
and repression:  more dissent leads to more repression (Davenport et al. 2005). Unfortunately, the degree, 





Why Bother: The Challenges of Non-Dynamic Models of Dynamic Processes 
The previous section demonstrated how four research traditions in American 
political science involve implicit or explicit dynamic processes. Here, I revisit the 
obvious question asked in Chapter 1: does that matter? 
 
Revisiting the Methodological Issues of Models that Ignore Dynamic Interactions 
In Chapter 1, I discussed three primary reasons why models that have underlying 
dynamic processes, but do not analyze them explicitly, are problematic:  
1. The long term impact of an independent variable on voting behavior will be 
underestimated if its indirect (and time-delayed) role is not explicitly analyzed.  
2. The functional forms most often used to model voting behavior and its 
determinants create unrealistic projections of long term behavior, when dynamic 
interactions are present. They could predict (in isolation of other factors) that the 
voting population would grow to include all people, no one, or asymptotically 
approach a steady-state level of participation without a clear theoretical 
interpretation. 
3. If the underlying temporal dynamics are incorrectly specified, or if they 
incorporate complex functional forms that violate assumptions of stationarity, 
then the commonplace statistical tools used to estimate the models will provide 







In the following sections, I examine additional implications of these challenges, 
and lay the foundation for a potential solution. 
 
Additional Implications of these Methodological Challenges 
The three methodological challenges listed above do not mean that no work can 
be done in the area, nor ever could.  It is fully possible that a clever and highly skilled 
methodologist could build a model that was testable against its null hypothesis using 
existing means. However, a related two-fold issue arises: 
First, even if high quality panel data on the interaction between voting behavior 
and the political environment were available, proper dynamic econometric techniques are 
beyond the reach of all but a narrow segment of the political science community.  For the 
rest of us, there is no effective counter argument, i.e., the resulting model could only be 
tested against other methodologically clever applications of the current tools. The 
resulting discourse may be insightful, diverse, and ultimately lead to an accurate 
depiction of the world.  Or it may not.  We will not know.  The effect of this 
methodological challenge is to weed out theories on methodological grounds, and not on 
theoretical ones.  To an extent, this must always occur – some level of methodological 
rigor is required to apply empirical rigor to the theoretical models. In this case, only a 
handful of commonly accepted models of dynamic political behavior over time exist, 
though many authors discuss dynamics theoretically.  That fact should provide us with a 
hint that this methodological barrier is more difficult to overcome, in practice, than those 
that exist in other areas of empirical political science. 





dangers of applying current methodological tools are vast even for the most clever and 
skilled.  If the underlying model is incorrectly specified, not only will the econometric 
results be spurious, but researchers may not know there is a problem. Except in certain 
noteworthy cases (autocorrelation tests), we do not have good tools to warn us of danger.  
The problem is not that the current tools aren’t up to the task; sometimes, they are.  
Instead, they cannot reliably say when the theorist is wrong across the range of potential 
exotic dynamic models, and provide an imperfect signal about the value of their 
application.  The common counter argument is that we can generate other theories to 
provide alternative explanations. As noted above, these theories face other, 
methodological criteria that lead them to mount a less than stellar offense.   
Moreover, work in computational social science, and, separately, in comparative 
political science and political sociology, indicate that the dynamics of political behavior 
are likely to be far more complex than these techniques can handle.  As will be discussed 
shortly, computational social science models regularly find that political behavior is a 
contingent, path-dependent (and non-stationary) phenomenon.  Existing methodological 
techniques would falter, at least without significant theoretical elaboration of the 
underlying non-stationary dynamic process. Researchers need to elicit new observable 
implications that are amenable to empirical testing or to perform clever transformations 
of the process into a stationary one (e.g., second and higher order Markov 
representations).  How then can we distinguish between appropriate uses of our limited, 
but still powerful, econometric tools for studying dynamic processes, and inappropriate 
cases?   The problem is one of understanding the process, and not the use of sophisticated 





dynamic interactions, and it is understanding that we lack.  This challenge, a lack of 
theoretical work to help understand dynamic political interactions, is linked to another set 
of theoretical problem with static models.  
 
Other Theoretical Challenges with Static Models of Dynamic Processes 
Turning our attention temporarily from voting behavior to the study of political 
conflict, dynamic interactions have been extensively studied in two interrelated fields – 
the qualitative, comparative, case-study study tradition and the political-opportunity-
structure (POS) tradition in political sociology.  In the former, dynamic interactions over 
time are a fundamental, if at times implicit, part of the “story” to be told; events unfold 
over time, and often they are contingent upon earlier events, with a level of complexity 
and nuance that is unlikely to be captured by existing econometric models.  In the latter, 
there is often an explicit discussion of cycles of contention and the contingent nature of 
political events on prior political events.  Tilly and Tarrow (2006), for example, reject 
simple (and statistically tractable) cause-effect relationships in contentious politics, 
drawing explicit contrast with statistical approaches, “in contentious politics, no complex 
outcome ever results from the operation of a single causal process (p31).”    
In both literatures, researchers look for the particular combination of mechanisms 
and pivotal events driving a particular historical outcome.  The models built from these 
approaches are far more open ended, and less structured than common models of voting 
behavior.  The approach provides relief for some of the myopia of statistical and formal 
modeling – by allowing for the discussion of events that any commonsense description of 





formal or statistical models. Soule (1997) provides a useful example, in which tactics 
used by political protesters evolved over time in a highly-contingent, non-linear (and 
non-stationary) fashion.   
Similar lessons about historical contingency, complex emergent behavior, and 
non-stationary processes arise from the computational social science literature.  
Computational social scientists such as Scott Page, Leigh Tesfatsion, and Cathleen 
Carley use a variety of computer-based approaches to directly simulate social processes 
and study their dynamics, without reliance on closed form mathematical solutions or 
statistical models.  For example, Miller and Page (2007) describe dynamic models of 
political parties jockeying for power. Dean et al. (2000) provide an early model of the 
Anasazi, in which simple household settlement rules generated compelling macro-
patterns of behavior that fit the historical record.  Learning from such experiences, 
computational social scientists have critiqued the theoretical consequences of existing 
econometric and formal modeling tools – the loss of theoretical flexibility, the inability to 
model complex processes, and the lack of a shared language among researchers to discuss 
such processes.25  
While the contentious politics, political case study, and computational social 
science literatures rarely model the dynamics of voting behavior, they can inspire similar 
critiques of existing voting studies.  In the previous sections, I have drawn out particular 
cases in which dynamic interactions lurk within major models of voting behavior; 
numerous others could be envisioned, especially if the door were opened to develop 
                                                 
25 See de Marchi (2005) and Miller and Page (2007) for two excellent reviews of the limitations of 
traditional methods, and the new theoretical frontiers opened up by computational tools such as dynamic 





entirely new models of such interactions.  Yet, addressing these dynamic complexities, 
and showing that they are worth the trouble, is not so straightforward. 
 
Three Potential Methodological Answers 
Three related methodological approaches appear promising to develop 
comprehensible, generalizable, dynamic models.  The first is to accept the statistical and 
data limitations of modeling dynamics, and approach complex dynamics like an 
unobservable inner process.  Start with a conceptual model of a dynamic process, and 
provide a detailed mathematical operationalization (a la Chong 1991 or Lohmann 1994).  
Then, determine the range of implications, and select new, testable implications for 
which the available methodological tools and data are sufficient.  The validity of the 
model is then based on the empirical testing of these observable implications.  This path 
is certainly not novel; it is central to many scientific endeavors.  It warrants a mention 
though, lest the pessimistic discussion above seem to imply that well-earned wisdom 
about dynamic processes from these models is irrelevant.  It requires an explicit 
awareness of the limitations of current statistical methods, and that care to be taken not to 
blindly use methods that are inappropriate for the hypothesized process (de Boef and 
Keele 2008). 
Second, researchers can approach the modeling of dynamic processes as a 
deductive exercise, in which (unlike many dynamic models) the assumptions are simple, 
easily understood, and readily accepted.  The value placed on the model’s outcomes, as 
non-intuitive and as difficult to test uniquely as they may be, is thus based on the validity 





thought experiments on segregation and on auditorium seating provide examples of these 
clear, fascinating, models built on first principles.   
A third approach would be to concentrate on the structure of the dynamic process, 
and look for regularities across dynamic processes.  The output would be dynamic 
mechanisms similar to those employed in game theoretic models (credible commitment, 
principal agent models, etc.) that can be readily understood and reused in other 
substantive contexts.  Tilly and Tarrow (2006) have embarked on a similar path, but have 
failed to provide the connective tissue and insight on how particular mechanisms produce 
observable, testable outcomes.  In the case of the protest movements, for example, 
potentially generalizable dynamic processes would include the dynamic interaction 
between movements and governments as they of learn each other’s’ capabilities and shift 
tactics (building on Lichbach 1987; Moore 1998), and mobilization appeals change over 
time as prior successes draw in diverse pools of activists, changing the targeting and 
message of future mobilization appeals. 
In the latter two cases, simulation modeling can help the discovery and modeling 
process, but does not provide a panacea.  Rather than delve into a full analysis of the 
value and limitations of simulation modeling (see Miller and Page 2007), a few 
comments can be made.  The great practical weakness of simulation models of dynamics 
is their methodological strength – the flexibility to model arbitrary complex processes.  
Researchers have too often been tempted into embracing the complexity of the processes 
they seek to understand – and generating models for whom the observable implications 
are unclear, the assumptions are too numerous or too arbitrary to be widely accepted, or 





models that fail to provide any of the three potential solutions to complexity proposed 
above.  In Operations Research, a long tradition of simulation modeling has provided 
practical, widely accepted solutions to narrow problems such as queuing behavior and 
building egress.  In part, they have succeeded because of their narrow, practical focus, 
with self-imposed constraints.  As Robert Frost is reported to have said "the self-imposed 
restrictions of meter in form and of coherence in content work to a poet's advantage; they 
liberate him from the experimentalist's burden—the perpetual search for new forms and 
alternative structures (PoetryFoundation.org 2012).”    In confronting the wide open space 
of complex dynamic processes, perhaps a few self-imposed restrictions can help modelers 
find their own form of coherence. 
 
A Proposed Solution 
To meet these methodological and theoretical challenges, I offer a three-stage 
approach to studying the dynamic interactions between an individual political participant 
and her micro-context.  First, use a simple theoretical framework to help identify 
particular dynamic processes, and contextualize them so that potential interactions and 
confounding influences can be found.  This framework draws directly from the existing 
literature on political behavior in American political science, but has strong parallels to 
research in contentious politics.  The framework also provides an initial set of concepts 
with which to discuss particular processes of interest, drawing especially on the complex 
adaptive systems literature.  Second, develop a concrete statistical model of the specific 
process of interest, building on existing non-dynamic models and testing its empirical 





modeling.   
The resulting simulation model is freed from the constraints of autoregressive 
stationarity, but still grounded in existing, well-known models, and made amenable to 
empirical testing and falsification.  The aim is not to find a single, comprehensive model 
to “cover” all political dynamics, but rather to build up a set of methodological tools, 
theoretical concepts, and substantive findings that can support further research into 
specific dynamic interactions.  In the subsequent chapters of this dissertation, I develop 
this theoretical framework and a methodology (Chapter 3) to identify and test regularities 
across dynamic processes.  I then provide two specific econometric and simulation 
models of dynamic interaction (voter mobilization in Chapter 4 and peer pressure in 






Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework and Methodology 
 
In the previous Chapter, I discussed how four major research traditions in the 
study of American voting behavior implicitly or explicitly incorporate dynamic 
interactions between the voter-as-decision-maker and the micro-context of that decision 
over time.  I also discussed how these dynamic interactions pose challenges for statistical 
estimation, and began to propose a solution: the careful use of simulations to open the 
doors to the explicit modeling, estimation, and application of dynamic processes.   
As I touched upon briefly at the end of that Chapter, simulation models are not a 
perfect tool, and many modelers have gone astray by generating complex models of 
political behavior that are difficult to empirically test or to benchmark against the existing 
literature (Leombruni and Richardi 2005).  To avoid that unfortunate outcome, I believe 
that it behooves the simulation modeler to understand well the existing literature, and 
start new modeling efforts with well-developed, and well-substantiated, empirical 
models.   
In this Chapter, I further analyze the four sample models with dynamic 
interactions from Chapter 2.  I demonstrate how one can identify their core dynamic 
processes, and learn from the System Dynamics literature about what to expect from 
these mathematical forms, regardless of the substantive interpretations one hopes to apply 
to them.  Next, I return to the substance of the voting models, and consider three 
pathways of dynamic interaction that recur in the literature.  In the final section, I use 





dynamic voter interactions – to develop a methodology by which researchers can 
rigorously study dynamic interactions among voters and the micro-context of their 
decision-making.  
 
The Dynamic Updating of Existing Voter Models  
As a first step, Table 2 summarizes each of the models of voting behavior that 
served as examples in the previous chapter.  
 
Table 2: Sample Voting Behavior Models 





Pr_Vote  =  Bo + B1 Vocabulary + B2 Income + B3  
Religious_Attendance+ B4 Political_Interest + B5 






Pr_Vote  = probit(Bo + B1 Political_Network_Diversity +  B2 
Frequency_Political_Discussion + B3 Political_Network_Size 
+ B4 Overall_Political_Interest + B5 Education + B6  
Partisanship+ B7 Age + B8 Income+ B9 Race+ B10 Gender) 
Political Network 
Diversity 
Mobilization  Pr_Vote = probit(Bo + B1 Income +  B2 Education + B3 
Unemployment + B4 Age + B5 Efficacy + B6 Partisanship + B7 
Candidate_Support + B8 Years_In_Community+ B9 
Church_Attendance + B10 Homeowner + B11 Employed + B12 
Closeness_Of_Election + B13 Registration_Restrictions + B14 
Gender + B15 South+ B16 Race + B17 Mobilized_By_Party) 
Mobilized By 
Party 
Habit Pr_Vote = two_stage_least_squares(Bo + B1 
Number_Of_Individuals_In_Household +  B2 Voting_Ward + 
B3 Age + B4 Age
2 + B5 Registered_MajorParty_Voter + B6 
Treatment_To_Induce_Voting + B7 
Voted_In_Previous_Midterm_Election + B8 
Voted_In_Previous_General_Election) 
History of Voting 
 
In each case, the model can be reorganized in terms of factors that update over 
time because of participation itself and “everything else”.  For example, mobilization is 





and unemployment status also may change over a particular individual’s lifetime, they 
are very unlikely to change because of prior political participation.  Such variables are 
exogenous to the dynamic participation process, while mobilization is endogenous.  In 
cases where the researchers employed more than one potentially endogenous variable, 
such as Rosenstone and Hansen’s use of (potentially endogenous) political efficacy as a 
control variable for mobilization, I focus on the single, primary variable for purposes of 
analytical clarity.  I will return to the role of multiple overlapping interactions later on.   
In Chapter 1, I presented a stylized mobilization model, and organized it in terms 
of mobilization, prior participation, and other exogenous factors.  Here, I will apply a 
slightly more nuanced analysis to mobilization and to each of the other three research 
traditions.  If we reorganize the mobilization function given in Table 2 around the 
dynamic updating process, and adding in subscripts to show differences over individuals 
and time, the mobilization function becomes: 
 
Pr_Votei,t = probit(Bo + B1 Ci + B2 Xi,t + B3 Mobilized_By_Partyi,t)   where B3 > 0 
 
Where Ci represents the various variables that are effectively constant over the 
period of study for a given person (e.g., education), and Xi,t represents exogenous 
variables that may vary over time – but in a manner unrelated to mobilization or prior 
voting behavior (e.g., age, income).  In addition to the impact of mobilization on turnout, 







In the previous chapter, it was left intentionally vague: 
 
Mobilized_By_Partyi,t  = f(Votei,1..t-1,?)    where  ∂ Mobilized_By_Partyi i,t / ∂ Votei,1..t-1 > 0 
 
For analytical clarity, I will again focus on a single historical, endogenous 
determinant of mobilization: voting in the last election cycle. We can then rewrite the 
mobilization equations as: 
 
Mobilized_By_Partyi,t  = f(Votei, t-1, Ci, Xi,t)   where  ∂ Mobilized_By_Partyi i,t / ∂ Votei,t-1 > 0 
 
Where we assume (or appropriately expand) the vectors Ci and Xi,t to cover all of 
the additional non-endogenous variables used to explain both mobilization and 
participation.  The mobilization function provides the other half of the positive feedback 
cycle discussed in the previous chapter, i.e., the equation for how the individual’s micro-
context for decision making updates over time.  Each of the other feedback equations can 
be similarly reorganized.  Table 3 provides the new versions.   
Table 3: Voting Behavior Models Reorganized to Highlight Temporal Variable 
Model Voting Equation Update Equation 
CVM (Weak 
Rat. Choice) 
Pr_Vote  =  Bo + B1 Ci + B2 Xi,t + B3 
Political_Information 
Political Informationi,t  = 
f(Votei, t-1, Ci, Xi,t) 
Political 
Agreement 
Pr_Vote  = probit(Bo + B1 Ci + B2 Xi,t + B3 
Political_Network_Homogeneity) 
Political Network 
Homogeneityi,t  = f(Votei, t-
1, Ci, Xi,t) 
Mobilization  Pr_Votei,t = probit(Bo + B1 Ci + B2 Xi,t + B3 
Mobilized_By_Partyi,t) 
Mobilized_By_Partyi,t  = 
f(Votei, t-1, Ci, Xi,t) 
Habit Pr_Vote = 2SLS(Bo + B1 Ci + B2 Xi,t + B3 
Voted_In_Previous_Election) 
 
Voted In Previous Election 
= Votei, t-1 
 





(2002) model, political diversity, from “political disagreement” to “political agreement”, 
to standardize the functions further.  Now, in each function, the key endogenous variable 
has been found empirically to have a positive impact on voting behavior (B3 > 0), and 
prior voting behavior has been found or has been posited to have a positive impact on that 
endogenous variable, either directly or through an intermediary factor (i.e., 
∂Mobilized_By_Partyi i,t / ∂Votei,t-1 > 0). 
These four systems of equations can be simplified further into the following 
stylized version, adding a straightforward interpretation of how the probability of voting 
translates into actual vote behavior: 
 
Pr_Vote  = g(Bo + B1 Ci + B2 Xi,t + B3 ui,t)  where ∂Votei,t / ∂ui,t > 0 
ui,t  = f(Votei, t-1, Ci, Xi,t)    where ∂ui,t / ∂Votei,t-1 > 0 
Votei, t-1 =  1 if random(0,1) > = Pr_Vote i, t-1  and 0 if  random(0,1) < Pr_Vote i, t-1 
 
Where ui,t  represents the endogenous variable that updates over time.  
 
This system of equations is a simple positive feedback cycle, establishing what is 
called in the System Dynamics literature a “causal loop”.  In fact, a cursory review of this 
model from a System Dynamics perspective quickly yields the conclusion that the current 
model is woefully insufficient.  For those with familiarity with the relevant mathematics, 
the problem is clear, and the next section can be skipped.  For everyone else, it is 
worthwhile to step through the analysis to understand not only the problem, but how to 





Analyzing the Sample Model from a System Dynamics Perspective 
In reorganizing each of the sample models, I have intentionally focused attention 
on the dynamic aspects of voting behavior – illustrating the “causal loops” by which 
current voting decisions can influence future voting decisions.  The structure of such 
loops, as distinct from their substantive meaning and context, has been well studied in the 
System Dynamics field.  Before diving into the lessons from this literature, a brief 
introduction to System Dynamics is warranted.   
System Dynamics is an interdisciplinary approach to studying complex, dynamic 
problems (Forrester 1961).  It studies the relationships between entities in a system to 
understand how the structure of those relationships influences the behavior of those 
entities within the system.26 Systems Dynamics modeling is particularly common in the 
Operations Research and Management Science communities, where it is used to model 
business processes, such as take up rates of new products or inventory levels at a 
warehouse, and ecological problems such as resource dependency and extinction.  
Development of a System Dynamics model often starts with identification of the 
essential quantities (stocks) in the system, and the relationships by which those quantities 
increase or decrease over time (flows).  These stocks and flows are formalized as a set of 
interrelated, non-linear equations (generally differential equations).  As with any other 
modeling technique, the researcher seeks to exclude extraneous information and provide 
a parsimonious model that reproduces the behavior of interest.  The system of equations 
is then encapsulated in a simulation package such as VenSim or DYNAMO.  The model 
                                                 





is then calibrated to real world data, and simulations are executed to study behavior of the 
model under diverse scenarios and to further test the applicability of the model against its 
observable implications.27 The method is especially useful where non-linear relationships 
and circular causality (causal loops) are present; simpler linear modeling and equation 
solving find often such conditions are intractable.   
Historically, System Dynamics simulation models were calibrated by hand, but in 
the last decade new techniques have been developed to perform automatic calibration and 
confidence interval estimation in a manner very similar to maximum likelihood 
estimation of econometric equations (Oliva 2003).  As part of the study of System 
Dynamics, researchers have identified commonly recurring elements such as positive and 
negative feedback loops, delays and smoothing, and behaviors such as oscillating 
processes, goal seeking behavior, and S-shaped growth over time, caused by thse 
common structures.  The common elements and behaviors are driven by the system 
structures themselves, and provide a general toolbox for understanding new problems. 
They provide tools to understand the behavior of systems, abstracted away from 
substantive meaning of the systems themselves.28   
 
                                                 
27 Like all simulation models, the output of Systems Dynamics models is a set of logical implications from 
their assumptions.  Automated tools then allow for the comprehensive exploration of those logical 
implications and for testing against the applicability (not “accuracy”) of those assumptions and 
implications against the real world.  
28 The differential or difference equations underlying a system dynamics model could also be analyzed 
using other tools, such as dynamical systems theory, or Markov models (though requiring a stronger set of 
assumptions).  I find that the particular representations and terms used in System Dynamics well illustrate 
the problems of dynamic interactions in voting behavior – but I do not mean to imply that other analyses of 
the same underlying systems of equations would not be appropriate. While there are clearly important 
differences between the techniques, there is no a priori reason barring a dynamical systems approach when 






System Dynamics Versions of Existing Voting Behavior Models 
I will demonstrate the value of the System Dynamics approach for studying 
dynamic political interactions by converting one of the sample econometric models, the 
Civic Volunteerism Model, into a System Dynamics one.  For ease of representation, and 
to avoid the complexities of probabilistic individual-level models (e.g., Mosekilde and 
Rasmussen 1983), I will consider how the Civic Volunteerism Model would predict the 
aggregate level of voter turnout in the United States, given its members’ skills, resources 
and level of engagement in politics.   
Start with the main Civic Volunteerism equation above, in which we consolidated 
the independent variables into Political Information, constant personal characteristics (C), 
and everything else (X).  The impact of political information on turnout was given 
previously as: 
 
Pr_Vote  =  Bo + B1 Ci + B2 Xi,t + B3 Political_Information 
 
We can approximate this individual-level equation at the societal level by 
calculating the expected percentage of people voting in each election.  If we assume that 
the exogenous variables Xi,t  do not vary systematically over time for a given person, and 
that each population is homogenous, then the simplified aggregate equation is:29 
  Percent_Of_Peoeple_Votingt = C + B1 Average_Political_Information_Per_Persont 
                                                 
29 The assumption of non-time-varying characteristics is a reasonable assumption for many of the variables 
used by Verba et al. (1995) such as education.  This is potentially invalid for income and job_level, 






For the moment, the assumption of homogenous populations is a very strong one.  
Later on, I will address this assumption by studying heterogeneity across populations 
(since the individuals within the populations are independent of each other in this model, 
the expected result is the same), and show that the core findings are invariant to the 
assumption that C is homogenous.   
In terms of the impact that voting has on Political Information, I will start with a 
simple linear relationship – each additional voting experience teaches participants more 
about the voting process, marginally decreasing costs, and thus marginally increasing the 
probability of continued future voting. Voting this builds a stock of experience, which 
provides political information and voting in the future: 










In this simple model, the stock of experience is cumulative, and does not decay 
over time.    
This system of two equations, implemented in the System Dynamics package 
VenSim, is illustrated in Figure 2 on the next page, where C is represented as the 
“population’s exogenous characteristics”, and B1 is the “coefficient of political 
information”. 
                                                                                                                                                 
characteristics not varying in i) is not a realistic one, naturally – and it useful here to demonstrate the 
approach and is required for tractable System Dynamics modeling.  It will be relaxed later when I apply a 















Once expressed as a System Dynamics simulation, we can systemically study the 
behavior of this model for different characteristics of the population (C). For example, 
fixing B1 at 0.1, and providing the starting conditions of  
 
Average_Political_Information_Per_Voter0 = 0  
 
Then systematically varying the exogenous characteristics of the populations, c, we can 
plot how the probability of voting in each successive election changes over time across a 




Figure 2: System Dynamics Representation of the  

















Each line represents a simulated population, which varies according to the single 
parameter, C (the exogenous, non-time varying default vote propensity).  The results are 
clear even for this simple test:  the percent of people voting increases over time, except in 
one special case.  I.e., no matter what the inherent propensity of individuals is to vote, the 
feedback loop of political information comes to dominate their behavior.  Given 
sufficient time, each population will increase to 100% participation.   
The one case in which it does not dominate is the line at the bottom – in which the 
initial propensity to vote is zero, and thus no one ever tries, never increases their political 
information, and thus never changes over time.   
 
Figure 3: Simulation Results for Aggregated Political Information Model, across 





I selected the society-level civic volunteerism model, and its political information 
feedback loop, because it was structured in a manner that allowed for easy demonstration 
of this problem with a minimum of algebraic manipulation.  However, similarly 
problematic outcomes are produced by each of the models discussed above.   
Moving from the political information model to Mutz’s (2002) political 
agreement model, a new set of behaviors occurs.  While numerous alternative 
operationalizations of the political agreement model could be developed, here I explore 
one stylized variant; this model is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 5.  First, we 
replace the linear relationship with a probit function, as given in the sample Political 
Agreement model above.  Second, we rename “Average Political Information Per 
Person” to the “Effect Of Prior Participation”, to reflect a more general interpretation of 
the model.  Third, we cap the maximum effect of prior participation using a logistic 
curve, as fits the concept of “political homogeneity” used in the political agreement 
model.  The stylized cycle is: 
 
Percent_Of_Peoeple_Votingt = probit (C + B1 EffectOfPriorParticipation t) 










Figure 4, on the next page, demonstrates sample paths through this cycle.30  
                                                 
30 Since the probit model has a different effective range than the prior linear one (in which linear values 
were directly interpreted as percentages), additional parameters affect the shape of these curves. With these 
parameters, the function is Percent_Of_Peoeple_Votingt = probit (scale * (offset + C + B1 














As before, the effect of prior participation steadily grows over time until the cap 
on maximal impact is reached.  Depending on the initial conditions of the model, either: 
a) the population reaches full participation or b) the population significantly increases 
participation over time due to the feedback process alone -- and without any additional 
perturbation or change in the electoral environment. While the first case is more 
dramatic, both are clearly unrealistic.  The particular shape of the curve and magnitude of 
the effect depends on the parameters of the model – but the potential for significant error 
in predicting voting behavior remains. 
The mobilization model is discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.  However, a 
brief comment can be made for both the mobilization and habit models.  In one 
operationalization employed in the literature, the feedback cycle is presented as a simple, 
single-step influence: the last cycle’s participation affects current mobilization/habit, and 
current mobilization/habit affects current participation.   
 





This model is a first-order serial autocorrelation model, various specifications of 
which are well studied in the literature: 
Percent_Of_Peoeple_Votingt = f(C, EffectOfPriorParticipation t) 
EffectOfPriorParticipation t  = Percent_Of_Peoeple_Votingt-1  
 
Where the voting function, f, is linear, and no other time-varying parameters are 
considered, then this model either a) rapidly explodes into full participation, or b) implies 
that each year of participation is shaped by not only last cycle’s participation, but all prior 
years of participation (with decreasing force).  In the latter case, the cumulative impact of 
a single year of participation is greater than the parameter B1 would indicate, and needs to 
be carefully analyzed.  In the case of non-linear voting functions (as are now the norm in 
the literature), or when authors expand from a first-order model into moving averages or 
other multi-year relationships, then the dynamics and interpretations of these models 
rapidly become very difficult.  In each case, however, there is a core question: what does 
it mean theoretically, and empirically, to have a positive feedback cycle in the model, and 
how can the complexities of the model be rigorously studied? 
 
The Problem with Positive Feedback 
As noted above, for those familiar with feedback dynamics or AR(1) processes, 
these odd behaviors – unconstrained rapid growth or rapid growth up to a constraint – are 
not a particularly surprising result.  System Dynamics models such as these are well 
studied and documented.  An unbalanced feedback loop, i.e., one that is not somehow 





feedback mechanism is limited in magnitude, as with the upper cap on political 
homogeneity above, it will eventually meet its maximum output – ignoring all other 
variations in the system (i.e., heterogeneity among voters).  Moreover, the initial starting 
point and the particular parameters of the growth are less relevant than the structure, 
namely, that explosive growth may eventually occur no matter what, given enough time.   
The more surprising result is that this fact, well known in System Dynamics, has 
not been explored further (and resolved) in the voting behavior literature, even when 
habit, prior participation or internal efficacy has been explicitly modeled in econometric 
research, each of which sets up a positive feedback loop.  Similarly, it appears not to have 
been covered in the limited theoretical discussion of mobilization’s impact on turnout.  
Clearly there is a theoretical piece missing in the model, since, as any observer of 
American elections knows, turnout is not growing over time to include the entire 
population or to a predetermined maximum amount.  Individuals are not steadily 
increasing their intentions to vote (or strength of habit, or feelings of self-efficacy, etc.) 
over time. 
Voting behavior researchers are neither foolish nor blind; research into dynamic 
interactions is only starting to develop, with excellent experimental work occurring in the 
field of voting habits, in particular. For most researchers, dynamics are simply not part of 
the picture – or when they are, they are considered only to “control” for their effects on 
contemporaneous variables.  Rather, these results show the value of thinking in terms of 
dynamic systems.  In particular, by intentionally highlighting the dynamic aspects, we 
can abstract away from the substantive (and theoretical) specifics, and learn from the 





understandings of political behavior.  For example, further lessons can be drawn from 
even this simple test case. 
 
Handling Positive Feedback 
In each of the four models considered, positive feedback establishes secular 
growth in voting behavior over time.  This is clearly unrealistic.  There appear to be three 
ways out of this problem in terms of voting: 
 
1. Balance the positive feedback cycle at the individual level.  At the level of each 
individual voter, there may be countervailing forces that stop a person’s voting 
behavior from increasing over time due to increasing efficacy, habit, mobilization, 
political information, or social influence.  One possibility is that everything decays 
over time – interest in politics, habits, etc.  People become distracted or disinterested.  
Other individual level constraints include scarce attention or time for political 
activity. 
 
2. Balance the positive feedback cycle at the societal level. One obvious factor is 
aging of the population – while each person’s experience over time could push them 
to be more active as they gain experience, the population as a whole constantly loses 
active voters and gains new (potential) voters with no prior experience, i.e., the 
system has an outlet to avoid this extreme behavior.31  Similarly, internal migration 
                                                 
31 It does not limit the unrealistic and unconstrained growth in propensity to vote within each individual’s 





from people buying new houses and changing jobs can disrupt existing habits, one’s 
sense of confidence in knowing how to go about voting, etc.  Immigration can also 
play a role if the incoming population has a lower average turnout rate (see 
McDonald and Popkin 2001).  Other societal constraints include resource constraints 
for voter mobilization – as is discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
3. Show that no positive feedback cycle is relevant in practice, either because the 
initial magnitude of the impact itself is minimal, or the maximal impact over time is 
inconsequential.  Given the strong empirical results found for each of the four models 
of voting behavior examined above, this is not likely to be the case.   
 
The System Dynamics literature indicates that balancing process can avoid 
explosive growth from a positive feedback cycle, provides mathematical insight (beyond 
the scope of this discussion) the how each cycle and balancing process would function in 
practice.  Which form of balancing that occurs in practice is not an analytical matter, 
though, but rather a theoretical one.  There is unlikely to be any overarching mechanism 
that will always resolve this issue and make dynamic political participation models more 
realistic; instead, each dynamic model must be constructed, and tested, on a case by case 
basis; I will delve into that process in more detail shortly.  First, however, regardless of 
how feedback plays out in any given model, its existence raises further methodological 
concerns, and reason to mistrust current econometric results, even for ostensibly static 






Methodological Implications of System Structure 
If any feedback loops are in place, and even if nothing else more complex is 
involved, then System Dynamics research provides additional insight into the 
methodological challenges of estimating dynamic models of voting behavior, discussed 
in Chapters 1 and 2.32  In short, most current econometric techniques used for voting 
behavior assume the separability of the independent variables, and a strict, single, causal 
link between independent and dependent variables.  That is not the case when (one or 
more) feedback loops are present.  There are omitted variables causally linking the 
independent variables (but not fully explaining them – hence substituting them is 
insufficient and adding them into the model would cause serious multi-collinearity 
problems), and there is bidirectional causality, over time.  Autocorrelation tools can 
thankfully handle the econometric problems when the underlying structure is known (or 
correctly guessed).  However, knowing the autocorrelative relationships is challenging – 
and the System Dynamics framework given here helps to identify those relationships and 
place them at the core of the analysis, instead of relegating them to nuisance parameters 
or interference to be minimized using technical tricks. 
Second, when some form of balancing is in place, an additional complexity arises.  
By limiting the impact of a given variable such as habit under certain scenarios, the 
balancing process breaks the common assumption about universal domain implicit in 
many econometric models.  The voting habit may have little impact in certain scenarios 
                                                 
32 Unless the true empirical relationship is a simple one, such as first-order autocorrelation. In that case, the 
problem is one of interpretation, rather than estimation – since robust techniques have been developed to 
estimate in the presence of those factors.  The interpretation problem, namely handling the enduring effects 
of prior participation across multiple cycles, is briefly discussed above and is more thoroughly considered 





(such as busy mothers with numerous competing habits), but a strong impact in other 
scenarios (retired grandfathers).33  These complexities can be readily handled with 
existing econometric techniques, by including interaction effects.  However, the 
researcher must already know that they are there for theoretical reasons; in absence of 
specification, the assumption of universal domain applies.  A System Dynamics approach 
to modeling voting behavior does not suggest that these interactions will necessarily 
occur; rather, it provides a methodology to help the researcher think about them in the 
theory-building process and incorporate them when relevant.  
 
Building a Theoretical Framework 
Drawing inspiration from these sample models, and the analysis of their feedback 
processes, we can develop an overall framework that can help researchers develop and 
test new models of dynamic political behavior.  This framework can then provide 
structure and linkages to the existing literature, to help simulation modelers better ground 
and test their work and to avoid the unrealistic predictions that a pure feedback process 
would generate.   
 
Four Pathways of Influence on the Turnout Decision 
The literature on political participation provides a wealth of rationales for why an 
individual might engage in political behavior.  Without re-examining the literature 
                                                 
33 Interestingly, balancing processes also can change the interpretation of regression coefficients for 
dynamic processes.  The most “important” variable driving voting behavior, such as habit, would be 
statistically insignificant or of low magnitude when it is balanced, and suddenly jump to statistical 





research on political participation, we can draw on the earlier discussion in Chapter 2 and 
the models analyzed in this chapter to trace out pathways by which external or historical 
factors could influence that decision over time.   
In particular, four broad pathways are discussed in the literature that can directly 
influence on the individual decision to participate: 
1. Exogenous Factors  
a. Personal Traits.  An individual can participate due to inherent personal 
characteristics, such as an enduring sense of partisanship (Campbell et al. 
1960) that motivates action, civic duty (Blais 2000), or rationally applied 
policy preferences that determine the “value” of participation (Downs 1957; 
Fiorina 1981).  These characteristics are generally treated as exogenous and 
unchanging, though the information that triggers a sense of duty or valuation 
of an election are variable, as is discussed in item #2.  
b. Environmental Traits.  The decision to participate is clearly related to the 
political environment of the election – the most obvious example being the 
wide difference in turnout between presidential and non-presidential elections.  
Similarly, the closeness of the election and incumbency of the candidate can 
have significant impacts on turnout.  Like certain personal traits, the 
characteristics are also treated as exogenous and immutable (at least with 
respect to a given election.)   
2. Mobilization and Persuasion.  Political parties and other actors in an individual’s 
political micro-environment can actively (and often intentionally) influence the 





al.1995), evoking a sense of duty (Blais 2000) or personal expression (Schuessler 
2000) or by providing information about the costs and benefits of participation 
(Downs 1957).   
3. Personal Adaptation. An individual can influence his or her own future participation 
via the act of participating itself – by forming a habit (Green et al. 2003) or building a 
sense of internal efficacy (Finkel 1985), or gaining skills and information that lowers 
the costs of participation (Verba et al. 1995).   
4. Social Influence.  Individuals can influence each other’s choice to participate via 
group-level pressures and descriptive and prescriptive norms (Huckfeldt and Sprague 
1995; Gerber and Rogers 2009), often through the intermediary of political discussion 
(McClurg 2003), bonds of reciprocal trust (Putnam 2000), or passive information 
transfer (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). 
 
Naturally there are other factors that influence the participation decision – e.g., 
whether an individual grew up in a household that voted – but these factors arguably 
must have their impact on the individual decision to participate through one of these four 
channels.   
Even if we remain agnostic about the particular mechanism occurring within an 
individual’s head, these four pathways of influence can help organize an analysis on 
interdependent political participation.  Figure 5, on the next page, illustrates these four 
pathways, how they feed into the individual decision to participate (solid lines).  In three 
of the pathways, i.e. not including exogenous personal and environmental characteristics, 





individual’s participation (dashed lines).  For example, political campaigns can learn 
what types of appeals drive participation, individuals can build civic skills through 
current participation that enable future participation, or friends can target nonvoters for 
pressure before the next election.  
 
Figure 5: Four pathways of influence on the turnout decision 
 
Various dynamic cycles of participation and adaptation can be identified and 
contextualized within this framework:  mobilization is just one possible mechanism by 
which the individual decision to participate influences the individual’s institutional milieu 
(in this case, the mobilizer), which in turns shapes future participation decisions.34  
                                                 
34 Assuming that the mobilizer and individual are still in place for the next election cycle. For the 
individual, naturally the cycles of influence stop upon death or another “exit” from the potential voter pool 
(e.g,, felony conviction).  For the mobilizer, this points to the importance of political parties as durable 
mobilizers that can learn from previous cycles of mobilization.  If the mobilization were transitory 
(mobilization by a single, independent candidate), or there were no way to learn from previous cycles (no 





Similarly, cycles of norm formation and participation can be studied.  Descriptive norms 
are one mechanism by which the individual participation choice affects others’ decisions 
to participate and thus the social milieu for future participations decisions.  By 
embedding these individual processes within the overall theoretical framework, we can 
also gain insight into potential confounding variables that should be controlled for, and 
more complex interactions that may arise among multiple processes.   
 
Balancing Feedback 
While each of these feedback cycles clearly applies to a particular context, e.g., 
turnout affects efficacy, they also provide counter-arguments to each other.  To better 
understand this, one can separate the micro-context (feedback cycle) from the substantive 
variable that is updated by the cycle.  Consider updates that involve one’s social network 
(the micro-context).  In a circle of friends, social pressure can lead to voting, which leads 
to social expectation, and more future pressure.  It can also lead to voting which leads to 
efficacy and to lower costs to future participation.  It can lead to voting, which builds up 
political skills and resources to ease future participation. Or, finally, it can be a conduit of 
information that focuses individual attention to further supporting information in the 
future.  Whenever a particular cycle of interest is identified (e.g., social pressure leading 
to voting leading to more social pressure), there are numerous other potential cycles that 
cross the various research traditions and may amplify or balance the initial cycle.  Thus, 
one must be particularly careful in analyzing these scenarios to incorporate or exclude 
these alternatives. 





feedback mechanisms at work in a given interaction, and their net influence on political 
behavior, to avoid the obvious problems with unconstrained positive feedback discussed 
above.  For example, for theoretical reasons, social influence may be believed to have 
positive feedback (activists support each other), negative feedback (via a desire to be 
different than one’s peers), contingently cause discontinuities in behavior (by introducing 
a person to whole new group of political friends via a chance occurrence), or have strong 
attractors (regardless of initial conditions, social groups may segregate into all-
participants or no- participants).  The net influence on the political behavior may be a 
straightforward but non-linear extension of the single-step process, or a surprising 
emergent result that could not be intuited from the individual components.  In building 
models with dynamic interactions between actors, two key lessons from complex 
adaptive systems should be kept in mind:  
 
• start with small and simple models, and  
• small, simple models can result in behavior that is astoundingly complex and non-
obvious.   
 
While this general guidance from the System Dynamics literature is very useful, 
more is needed to develop specific dynamic political participation models.  In the next 
section, I outline a stepwise process for identifying, modeling, and testing these dynamic 







A Methodology for Analyzing Dynamic Processes 
While the theoretical model presented above can help contextualize a particular 
dynamic political process, it does not provide guidance on how to study that process and 
drive new testable insights from it.  In fact, as discussed in Chapter 2, the presence of 
such dynamic processes increases the complexity of studying political behavior – since 
the assumptions of stationarity and separability used in traditional econometric 
techniques are violated, and hence new techniques are required. 
In other words, to estimate dynamic models, a different approach may be needed.  
In this section, I present a three-step process for modeling, estimating, and testing 
dynamic models of political participation.  As noted in the previous chapter, only one of 
the primary dynamic cycles of political participation has received significant attention in 
the political science literature – the influence of current participation on future 
participation via the updating of (internal) personal characteristics such as habit and 
efficacy.  In this section, I use examples from the two relatively unexplored pathways for 
dynamic feedback (mobilization and social influence) to make the methodological 
approach more concrete.  In the next two chapters, I then apply this methodology in 
practice: to mobilization by political parties and to the influence of descriptive norms.   
 
Step 1:  Develop a Theoretical Model, Leveraging the Framework  
The theoretical framework above helps us tease out dynamic relationships at work 
in a simulation of interest and look for competing explanations.  First, however, we must 






Handling the Complexity of Dynamic Models  
In Operations Research, a long tradition of simulation modeling using System 
Dynamics has provided practical, widely accepted solutions to narrow problems such as 
queuing behavior and building egress.  In part, they have succeeded because of their 
narrow, practical focus, with self-imposed constraints.  However, in modeling dynamic 
political phenomena such as voting, there are no well accepted constraints or narrow 
definitions of the problem – as the study of the dynamics of political participation is still 
quite young. 
Theoretically, the realm of possibility for the simulation modeler of voting 
behavior is endless and overwhelming.  Researchers have too often been tempted into 
embracing the complexity of the processes they seek to understand – and generating 
models for which the observable implications are unclear, the assumptions are too 
numerous or too arbitrary to be widely accepted, or the resulting mechanisms are too 
specific to be generalized (e.g. Leombruni and Richardi 2005).  While there are a few 
simulation models of voter-politician interaction (Gainsborough et al. 2008), and of 
political conflict (Miller and Engemann 2004, Epstein 2006), none has achieved any 
significant following in political science, in part due to these concerns.   
Even with the parsimonious theoretical framework described above, it is all too 
easy to imagine the range of overlapping, potentially confounding influences on voting 
behavior that may make the model more accurate (in theory) but would also make it 
unmanageable and unfalsifiable.  To avoid this danger, the researcher should be aware of 
these dangers and strive to make the dynamic model as parsimonious as possible, i.e., 





any form of modeling, the researcher must rely on theoretical arguments to exclude large 
swaths of the universe of possible explanations.  Moreover, if the researcher can develop 
a dynamic model that closely tracks existing non-dynamic work, then the leap into the 
dynamic world, while perhaps less exciting, would be far easier for other researchers to 
follow and analyze (and attempt to falsify) on their own.   
 
Identifying and Contextualizing the Dynamic Process 
With the potential for open-ended, overly complex dynamic models, researchers 
can benefit from a series of questions to structure the initial creative, model-building 
process.  I suggest two stages: to identify and clearly specify the particular dynamic 
process, and then to analyze its practical and theoretical significance in the context of the 
wider dynamic environment. 
First, given an initial behavior of interest (voting) and a factor that appears to 
influence the behavior (Get-out-the-vote calls from the political party), one can ask the 
following questions: 
 
1. What “type” of factor is it?    Does it influence behavior through personal 
characteristics (e.g., information remembered about the elections), social pressure 
(e.g., friends expect you to vote), or direct mobilization (e.g., you are pressured or 
persuaded to commit to vote).  
 
2. How does this factor change over time? Once the “type” is identified, the 





example, phone calls by campaigns change across election cycles because the 
targeting criteria and data used by political parties changes.  Similarly, individual 
evaluations of voting’ value changes with personal experience of the voting process.   
 
3. Is there a feedback cycle between political behavior and the factor that 
influences it?   In particular, look to the micro-environment of the individual’s 
decision-making environment. Impersonal, institutional factors that influence voting 
(such as majoritarian versus proportional representation systems) are very unlikely to 
be changed by the individual decision to participate.  However, the climate of 
political discussion at one’s office place could change over time.  The latter is likely 
to show feedback cycles; the former is not.  If no such cycle exists, then existing tools 
and methods are (more likely to be) appropriate, and one can skip the rest of this 
process.  
 
Second, one can analyze the dynamic process in more detail, to search for 
alternative explanations and to determine if traditional empirical estimation is feasible.  
This process helps put the particular dynamic process in context, and provide an initial 
test for the unique value of further research on the process.  It can also help constrain the 
impulse to employ the kitchen sink approach of modeling – by tracing the unique 
contribution of this particular model, one can either reasonably put aside the tangled web 
of related issues for further research, or change the focus of the research to cover the 
most interesting (and presumed powerful) mechanism. Again, a series of questions, using 






1. How important is the feedback cycle?  Specifically, what is the expected change in 
(the probability of) the political behavior if the person went from receiving the 
minimum possible impact of the given factor to the maximum possible influence?   
For example, how much more likely is a person to vote if they are called by the 
political party every day, versus never?  That maximum marginal effect is also the 
upper bound on the impact of the feedback cycle over time.  If the maximum effect is 
not of practical interest, then neither is the feedback cycle, and traditional methods 
can be used to explore the rest of the model.  
 
2. What factors would mitigate the impact of the feedback cycle?  If the maximum 
effect of the variable is very large, then the simple System Dynamics model shown in 
Figure 2 suggests that a positive feedback cycle, in isolation, could dominate the 
political behavior.  Since this rarely happens in practice, something else must be 
mitigating the impact – such as an opposing feedback loop that balances out the 
positive one, either at the societal or individual level.  Boundary conditions on the 
interaction, resource constraints, and inflow/outflow of the population are potential 
factors.  If either strong path dependence or balancing feedback cycle is present, then 
traditional econometric methods are likely to be inappropriate. 
 
3. What competing explanations are possible, if a feedback cycle is surmised?  For 
any process of interest, competing explanations are always possible.  The framework 





studying a feedback cycle between mobilization by political campaigns and voter 
turnout, the framework warns us that participation is likely to have multiple effects on 
the individual – changing the individual’s assessment of the value of voting, 
providing information and skills for voting, and perhaps changing the person’s 
network of political discussants.  Each of these ‘other’ impacts of participation could 
amplify or negate the ‘direct’ impact that mobilization has on participation and 
participation has on mobilization.   
 
Step 2:  Implement Model in Computer Program 
Formalizing the Model 
Once a parsimonious theoretical model of the dynamic process has been 
developed, then empirically minded researchers can translate and test it.  With more 
traditional models, developing a “testable form” of the model often entails squeezing the 
behavior of interest into a single linearized statistical function, at the expense of more 
nuanced or readily interpretable representations.  With this linearized function, one would 
then use a technique such as generalized least squares or maximum likelihood estimation 
to estimate the model’s parameters and determine statistical significance.  However, for 
dynamic models, traditional econometric forms (e.g., linearized models for use with 
generalized least squares) are often insufficient – since the tools used to estimate their 
parameters rely on assumptions that may be violated.   
Instead of searching for a linearized representation of the dynamic theoretical 
model, look for the most natural mathematical formalization.  One possible formalization 





in the dynamical systems and System Dynamics arenas.  Difference equations, 
differential equations and discrete state transition matrices are often used to represent 
such processes.  For this purpose, the particular formalization is not relevant – as long as 
it effectively captures the theory and can be represented mathematically.   
Once that mathematical representation has been found, one can implement it as a 
computer program that takes model parameters as inputs and produces point predictions 
about political behavior as outputs.35   The resulting computer program is a simple 
simulation model.  
So, thus far, the process is exactly the same as is used when a researcher seeks to 
estimate a linearized econometric model, except that the mathematical (and therefore 
simulation) representation of the model need not be as rigidly constrained in its 
functional form.  The next step however, may appear a bit more exotic – more exotic than 
it really is.   
 
Estimating the model parameters 
In order to estimate the parameters of the computer (mathematical) model, an 
empirical researcher in political science would generally use maximum likelihood 
estimation techniques to find the values of those parameters that minimize prediction 
error relative to a known dataset.  With dynamic models, we must accomplish the same 
thing.  However, instead of using regression techniques, we can use optimization 
                                                 
35 To illustrate, difference equations could be readily implemented in a language such as R or MATLAB, in 
which the parameters are variables read from a file or otherwise specified at the start of the program.  The 
particular language employed and structure of the program is irrelevant – as long as it faithfully represents 





techniques to search though the space of possible parameter values - determining the 
parameters that minimize prediction error relative to a given dataset. 
The optimization process is well studied and has a long standing and extensive 
literature, though one not typically referenced in political science.  Techniques such as 
Newton’s Method, which uses gradients in parameter space to determine successive 
approximations of the “best” parameters, are reasonably well known (but have serious 
flaws when used for complex problems).  Other techniques that are less well known in 
political science but widely used in Operations Research include Simulated Annealing, 
Genetic Algorithms, Tabu search and quadratic programming.  Each technique has its 
benefits and limitations; two summaries of optimization algorithms can be found at 
Glover et al. (2003) and Mohan and Deep (2009).  For our purposes though, we need not 
constrain the particular optimization algorithm that is used – as long as it is appropriate 
for the particular mathematical formalization of the theoretical model.36 
Once an optimization algorithm is selected, the researcher would then connect 
optimization software (such as those implemented in libraries in R, Matlab, etc.) to the 
computer representation of the dynamic model.  With the help of a scoring function that 
uses a known dataset and a set of model parameters to test, one then can estimate the 
error generated by those parameters relative to the known dataset.  The optimization 
software executes the scoring function numerous times with different sets of parameters, 
searching for the parameter set that produces the smallest error.   
                                                 
36 Certain optimization techniques are only appropriate for particular functional forms – e.g., quadratic 
programming is appropriate for quadratic functions with linear constraints.  Other techniques such as 
genetic algorithms assume a particular structure to the parameter space, but can be used on any functional 





To some political scientists, this procedure may sound similar to maximum 
likelihood estimation, in which a log-likelihood function is optimized to estimate model 
parameters.  In some MLE scenarios, a closed form optimization of the log-likelihood 
function is possible.  In other cases, MLE also relies on numerical optimization.  While 
there are differences in the procedure (specifically in how likelihood is defined versus the 
simulation scoring function, and constraints made on the likelihood function), in both 
cases numerical optimization is used to estimate the best parameters for a given dataset.  
The similarity has its roots, as Oliva (2003) argues, because estimating a simulation 
model in this manner is actually a subset of the MLE technique.  In political science, 
however, this application of the MLE method to simulations is not widely used despite 
the widespread application of MLE for econometric estimations.   
 
Determining Confidence Intervals and Statistical Significance 
With point estimates of the model parameters in hand, researchers can then 
determine the confidence intervals around these estimates and test for statistical 
significance.  For a simulation model, this process entails a form of Monte Carlo 
simulation:  executing the simulation model repeatedly with the same input parameters to 
determine the variation in the output predictions.  Unlike a traditional Monte Carlo 
simulation however, the output is the parameter estimates, and the input is the known 
dataset.  The probability distribution of the dependent variable is unknown (and need not 
be assumed); one can use bootstrapping techniques to repeatedly sample from the known 
dataset, estimate the parameters on that subset, then generate an estimate of the 





probability distribution, one can determine confidence intervals, and test null hypotheses 
against a particular parameter having no effect on the model.   
From start to finish, this process allows empirical estimation (calibration) and 
hypothesis testing of dynamic models of arbitrary functional form.  To recap, the 
suggested methodology is: 
 
1. Implement the core model in a simulation, limiting the set of open parameters to only 
what is absolutely necessary. 
2. Use numerical optimization to calibrate the parameters of the model against existing, 
well-studied datasets. 
3. Use Monte Carlo simulations of the model (simulations where nothing varies except 
for random noise, or bootstrapping, etc.) to estimate the confidence intervals of those 
parameters. 
4. Test parameters against the null hypothesis of zero (i.e., a statistical significance test) 
or, better, against externally validated values when available.   
 
Steps 2-4 are effectively a maximum likelihood test, and replicate the maximum 
likelihood estimation and hypothesis testing process from normal statistical analyses in a 
manner adapted for dynamic models.  This places the seemingly exotic simulation model 
on the same playing field as a traditional econometric model, and clears the way for more 







Limitations of the estimation and hypothesis testing process 
There are two key limitations to keep in mind during the optimization process; 
both are shared with MLE, but can be more troublesome in a simulation environment.  
First, as with any econometric model, limiting the number of parameters used in the 
model is vital.  At a minimum, the optimization process becomes more difficult (and may 
not converge to any result) as the number of parameters increases. Moreover, 
interpretation of the simulation model’s parameters becomes exceedingly difficult, as is 
the case with econometric models (Achen 2005), but even more so in a simulation 
environment where the functional form is unrestricted and hence the interpretation of 
marginal changes in variables is less-standardized.37   
Second, broadly speaking there are two forms of optimization – deterministic and 
heuristic.  Certain optimization algorithms deterministically provide an exact solution, i.e. 
the global optimum, when the scoring function meets specific requirements (otherwise, 
they would provide no solution whatsoever).  Heuristic algorithms do not place such 
restrictions on the scoring function,38 but sacrifice the guarantee of finding the global 
optimum.  When a heuristic algorithm is used, within a simulation estimation or in a 
traditional MLE, then the confidence intervals around a particular point estimate contain 
both the variation in the underlying data and the variation caused by the inexactness of 
the optimization procedure itself.  In general, this means that tests of statistical 
significance would be harder to pass (i.e., the added “error” makes the tests more 
                                                 
37 Though, as with logit models, there are ways to estimate the practical significance of a particular model 
parameter under sensible scenarios using simulation models. 
38 Though certain algorithms are “better suited” for some types of problems than others, misapplication 





conservative).  While both forms of optimization could be used, traditional MLE usually 
employs a global exact optimization technique whenever possible.  Simulation-based 
parameter estimation would generally use heuristic optimization – because the same 
modeling challenges that lead a researcher to use a simulation model also make it 
difficult to optimize the model.  Thus the rough tradeoff between using a tractable 
econometric model and an intractable simulation model is this:  accuracy of estimation 
(econometric), versus the freedom to tackle otherwise intractable problems (simulation).   
 
Heterogeneity, Stochasticity and Flavors of Simulation Modeling 
Thus far, I have left the particular form of simulation model that one could 
employ open ended, to focus on the general tradeoffs in using simulations versus 
econometric models.  In the preceding chapter, I used System Dynamics models as 
examples, since they are easy to conceptualize and have served as a tried and true method 
of modeling complex dynamic systems for over fifty years.  However, each simulation 
technique has its limitations, and some are more appropriate than others to for a particular 
theoretical problem.   
When modeling voter behavior, a particularly challenging issue arises for all 
simulation modeling techniques – how to handle the heterogeneity of voters and their 
stochastic voting decisions.  Significant analytical squeezing, stretching, and simplifying 
are required to fit heterogeneity and stochasticity into a System Dynamics package.   
Similarly, while any functional form can be used to generate the core simulation model to 
formalize, estimate, and test the theoretical model developed in Step 1, common methods 





resulting mathematical model.   
Over the last fifteen years, a simpler way has appeared that allows for a more 
direct translation of the theoretical model into its mathematical form, without restricting 
the functional form.  That method, agent-based modeling, is predominant in the 
computational social science literature, and is slowly making inroads into mainstream 
political science.  Like any simulation model, the modeler specifies the components of 
the system, the rules by which the components interact, and executes the model to 
explore outcomes.  The outcomes are always logical deductions – there is nothing in the 
model that was not programmed in.   
Agent-based models differ from other simulation models more in how they are 
used than in their mathematical basis.  The modeler identifies individual agents (hence 
the name) who interact autonomously in the system according to specified rules. The 
rules are not bounded by the normal constraints of utility maximization or analytic 
tractability that are employed in econometric models, but instead can encapsulate any 
theoretically interesting process.  The agents are often heterogeneous and adapt their 
behavior over time (See Miller and Page 2007).  Agent-based models are thus well suited 
to complex systems of individuals interacting among themselves, and are structured so 
that the modeler can intuitively specify the underlying theory from the perspective of the 
individuals themselves.  Arguably, this helps the modeler to develop new and innovative 
theories, and analyze problems that otherwise would be too complex to analyze with 
other analytical tools.  
In subsequent chapters, I will continue to use the conceptual framework derived 





employ agent-based modeling in order to supply a simple, intuitive formalization of the 
theoretical concepts that can nevertheless be rigorously tested using the methods 
described above.39    
 
Step 3:  Test Against New Observable Facts 
In much of the empirical work in political science, a journal article stops when the 
model has been formalized and estimated, and statistical significance of parameters of 
interest has been established.  Numerous attempts have been made to require that the 
research process be extended – to test the estimated models against new (out of sample) 
empirical data and to determine whether the findings still hold.  However, considerable 
data collection and econometric work is often required to fulfill this goal, and, perhaps 
not surprisingly, a significant percentage of new research efforts do not include this step.   
In the case of dynamic models of political behavior, the problem of collecting 
additional data for out-of-sample testing is even more acute.  Currently, researchers have 
very few panel data sets from which to draw in order to conduct any form of dynamic 
modeling.  Finding an additional dataset, that contains similar coverage and 
operationalization of the core conceptual variables is indeed challenging. The 
methodology presented here is not designed to generate new panel datasets; it cannot 
solve the data collection problem.  However, it can help ease the constraint of limited 
data in another manner, by making it easier to generate new predictions of the model that 
are more readily and convincingly tested.   
                                                 
39 This approach is known as “systems thinking” in the literature (Meadows 2008), in which system-
dynamics insights are applied and tested more broadly than the particular mathematical setting (differential 





The simulation provides a test-bed for exploring the predictions of the theoretical 
model in novel contexts and conditions.  Under this approach, the simulation models 
would search for non-obvious implications of the model, such as new extensions that 
apply the model to a new problem for which there is data, and can serve as a test for the 
model’s underlying assumptions.  For example, an individual-level (agent-based) 
simulation model can allow researchers not only to compare the model’s predictions 
about individual behavior (i.e., against a hard-to-find panel dataset), but also to analyze 
aggregate patterns of voting, and how those patterns of voting change over time.  These 
novel predictions can then be compared to existing aggregate data (which is generally 
much easier to find than individual level panel datasets), and used to test the model’s core 
assumptions.  It is precisely this approach that I take in the next chapter, on the dynamics 







Chapter 4: Dynamics of Mobilization and Participation 
 
Introduction 
Dynamic interactions between political participants and their micro-environment 
are perhaps most overt in the case of voter mobilization – where, in each election cycle, 
political parties intentionally target individuals based on their prior participation.  In 
previous chapters, I presented a theoretical framework to contextualize dynamic political 
behaviors, and a stepwise process for identifying, formalizing, and testing models of 
those behaviors.  Along the way, I have used mobilization and voting as one example of a 
“feedback loop” between the individual and the micro-environment.  Here, I develop that 
argument in much greater detail, formalizing and testing a fully specified model, starting 
with a more thorough review of the literature on mobilization and participation. 
 
Theoretical Background 
Static and Short Term Models of Mobilization and Voting  
Within American political science, numerous well developed lines of research 
exist on political participation and mobilization, many of which are driven by 
fundamental concerns over democracy and inequality.  The most prominent research area 
seeks to answer the question: “who participates?”  The vast majority of research has 
focused on voter turnout (e.g., Downs 1957; Blais 2000; Zukin et al. 2006), with a 





thorough review of this literature is outside of the scope of this study (see Niemi and 
Weisberg 2010), but a few gross generalizations can be made.  While each type of 
political behavior has a different profile, researchers have found that those who are most 
likely to be politically active are well educated, wealthy, white (e.g., Verba et al. 1995), 
politically interested and engaged (e.g., Bartels 2000), asked to participate (e.g., 
Rosenstone and Hansen 1993), have a sense of duty (e.g., Blais 2000), and wish to be 
associated with a party and its social group (e.g., Schuessler 2000).  In other words, 
researchers have found that a variety of immutable personal traits and malleable 
attitudinal and behavioral characteristics lead to political engagement, in line with the 
theoretical framework presented above. 
A second, prominent line of research asks “who is asked to participate?” in 
activities ranging from voting to street protests.  Some researchers have found that those 
who are asked are simply those who are most likely to answer (i.e., that organizers are 
strategic: Rosenstone and Hansen 1993); while others have focused on whether 
individuals have the resources to answer (Verba et al. 1995), or whether they had 
participated previously (Abramson and Claggett 2001). Researchers have found that 
organizers consider many of the same personal characteristics that are involved in the 
individual choice to become politically active – though perhaps with different weighting.  
For example, Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) found that mobilizers consider many of the 
factors that determine individual participation – including education, race, prior 
participation.  Brady, Schlozman and Verba (1999) present a similar concept as “rational 
prospecting” of good targets for mobilization.  However, Gershtenson (2003) cautions 





circumstances.  Across the literature on mobilization, however, numerous authors have 
found that when mobilizers ask, potential voters do respond. 
As noted in Chapter 2, the impact of mobilization on political participation is well 
substantiated.  The initial research on the topic consisted of survey work and statistical 
studies of existing datasets measuring same-year mobilization and voting.  Rosenstone 
and Hansen (1993) analyzed changes over time for multiple political activities, ranging 
from writing letters to elected officials, to attending local political meetings, to making 
campaign contributions.  For example, they estimate that mobilization increases voter 
turnout by 7.8%40, and a similar increase in voting arises from dynamic personal 
characteristics, such as feelings of efficacy.  Their model, while widely cited, has not 
spawned an extensive theoretical and empirical literature.  In one of the few other survey-
based studies of mobilization, Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) examine political 
participation and find strong evidence that interpersonal mobilization increases voting, 
and mixed results for formal mobilization by political parties.  Goldstein and Ridout 
(2002) critique Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) broader claims, but confirm 
mobilization’s effect on individual voter behavior.41  Abramson and Claggett (2001) also 
find substantively the same role for mobilization and efficacy on voter turnout as 
Rosenstone and Hansen (1993).   
                                                 
40 Looking beyond voting, they found that mobilization increased campaign work by 4.8% and financial 
contributions to campaigns by 6.6%. 
41 Goldstein and Ridout (2002) strongly critique Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) on some of their more 
expansive claims about voter turnout in the US, but their findings on the role of mobilization and efficacy 





Experimental Studies  
A bevy of recent field work in American political science has moved beyond 
observational studies to demonstrate experimentally the impact of mobilization on voting, 
both on directly targeted individuals and their households (e.g., Green and Gerber 2004; 
Nickerson 2008).  The wave of modern field experiments on mobilization arose from 
Yale University, starting with the studies in 1998 by Gerber and Green (2000) on the 
effectiveness of diverse methods of voter contact.  The authors, in conjunction with the 
League of Women Voters, conducted a non-partisan campaign to encourage individuals 
to vote via phone, mail, and door-to-door canvassing.  They found that while voter 
turnout increased substantially after canvassing, no change occurred after the get-out-the-
vote telephone calls.   
Subsequent research has examined the role of multiple mailings (Green and 
Gerber 2004), the effectiveness of mobilization in subgroups of interest (e.g., youth and 
women; see Green and Gerber 2004) such as Asian Americans (Wong 2005). They have 
also looked for consistency across multiple urban locations (2000), and across partisan 
and non-partisan messages (i.e. legislative elections in New Jersey in 1999), again 
providing more generalized results.  Additional modes of contact have been considered, 
including personal phone calls, robo-calls, email (Green and Gerber 2004), and 
personalized letters.  Researchers have examined the role of the organizer, including 
whether the organizer is of the same race as the targeted individual (Michelson 2003).  
Message content has been examined - including messages emphasizing civic duty vs. 
high stakes of the election vs. community solidarity (see Green and Gerber’s 1998 and 





example of mobilization of other household members.  Overall, the issues studied range 
from very practical, detailed questions about mailing styles and TV ads (Vavreck  and 
Green 2006), to studies that touch on larger, more theoretically interesting questions of 
the role of social accountability (Gerber, Green and Larimer 2008) and descriptive norms 
of voter turnout (Gerber and Rogers 2009). 
This growing body of experimental literature verifies the impact of certain forms 
of mobilization on turnout, both on directly targeted individuals and their households.  
For particular campaign tactics, the results are relatively well established: door-to-door 
canvassing is by far the most effective (7% boost in participation). Other methods still 
can have an impact though, from personal calls (3% boost), to leaflets (1.5% boost), 
down to direct mail (0.5%) (note: robo-calls and email showed no impact; all statistics 
from Green and Gerber 2004).  The results also show that partisan messages, on the 
whole, are more effective than non-partisan messages.  Contacts with those who voted in 
the past are generally more effective than contacts with those who have failed to do so.  
Stepping back from these specific results, one can draw the general conclusions that 
mobilization’s impact has been well substantiated, but that one must be careful to 
differentiate between specific forms of mobilization, since their impact varies widely.  
 
Limitations 
While these studies are clearly relevant to the dynamics of mobilization, they 
generally employ statistical analyses of a single interaction between organizers and the 
mobilized.  The long term impact of current participation on the likelihood of future 





importance for understanding political mobilization.  After one such analysis of short-
term recruitment effects, Abramson and Claggett (2001) warn: “Since past recruitment 
efforts may have induced past participation, the total effect of recruitment, past and 
present, on current participation may be larger” (p913).   
Unfortunately, research into multi-election cycle dynamics is limited by a scarcity 
of appropriate data.  The empirical foundation of much of the electoral research in the 
United States, the American National Election Studies (ANES 2008), provides a wealth 
of cross-sectional data, and only a few years of panel studies.  Given the long lags 
between data collections (two years), it is difficult to isolate the effects of multiple rounds 
of mobilization from other life events.  Researchers Verba et al. (1995) and Gerber, 
Green and Shachar (2003) present two exceptions by using specially targeted survey and 
field experiments, respectively.  Their work however, analyzes only two cycles of 
mobilization and participation, again due to challenges in data collection.  Quantitative 
research into multi-round mobilization and participation remains limited.  While multi-
round mobilization has not yet been tackled in survey work or field experiments, there is 
no a priori reason why creative solutions could not be found to employ experimental 
methods with sufficient funding and a consistent research design over multiple election 
cycles. 
Below, I present a model that specifically seeks to estimate the total effect of 
recruitment, past and present, on voting and demonstrates how the approach outlined 
above can tackle such complex dynamic interactions.  This study diverges from existing 
research in three ways.  First, I consider multiple rounds of mobilization and 





how explicitly modeling the limited resources facing political campaigns shapes the 
campaigns’ production functions (and hence, who is mobilized).  In the terminology of 
systems dynamics, these form an important constraint on the positive feedback in place 
between mobilization and participation.  Finally, I consider how the accuracy and 
efficiency of mobilization affects the pool of participations over time.  I employ panel 
data from the American National Election Studies, and base the model of voter turnout on 
work by Abramson and Claggett (2001), Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), Goldstein and 
Ridout (2002) and Verba et al. (1995).   
 
Step 1:  Develop the Theoretical Model 
Given the growing body of literature on mobilization and voting, and the 
methodological and data limitations noted above, I start with a somewhat novel approach 
to building and testing a dynamic model of this process.  First, I start with existing 
models of single-step voter mobilization and turnout.  Then, I delve deeper into the 
dynamics of mobilization, looking at how the positive feedback between mobilizers and 
mobilized requires further theoretical elaboration and causes problems of estimation and 
interpretation.  Finally, I examine how a simulation built to estimate the dynamic model 
can be extended into multiple cycles of mobilization and voting – providing new, testable 






A Simple Cycle of Mobilization and Participation 
Voter mobilization and participation are messy, complex processes.  Each 
political organizer and each potential voter behave differently, and their interaction 
depends on each party’s individual characteristics, the means and goal of the mobilization 
effort, and the overall shifting political context.  Happenstance obviously plays a major 
role, as well.  For this analysis, I will first step back from the details of these processes 
and present a stylized theoretical model of mobilization; after the outline is clear, I will  
return to the gritty details to see how they influence the overall picture.  This model 
centers on a three-stage “cycle of mobilization”, describing a simple positive feedback 
process within the general theoretical model presented above: 
 Step 1: Organizers select whom to ask, based on their political agenda, the 
inherent and exogenous traits of the targeted individuals (race, gender, etc.), and 
the mutable personal characteristics of these individuals (experience, level of 
interest in politics, etc.). 
 Step 2:  Individuals decide whether or not to act, based on their own political 
agenda, the overall political climate, their exogenous traits (race, gender, etc.), 
their mutable personal characteristics (experience, etc.), and whether they were 
asked to participate and by whom. 
 Step 3:  The act of participation changes the individual, providing skills and an 
increased (or decreased) sense of efficacy.  Organizers also adapt, learning of 
individual participation via voter files and adjusting future mobilization drives 
accordingly. 











Sense of Efficacy) 
Do mobilizers ask? Does person act?
Effect of experience or 
inaction on individual
 
This cycle is repeated, and individuals’ traits evolve over their lifetimes. A simple 
graphical representation of this cycle, a simplification of the overall framework provided 












Initial Mathematical Representation 
This theoretical model can be more rigorously represented, and the assumptions 
made more explicit, by expressing it in mathematical form.  I presented an initial 
formulation of the decision to vote in Chapter 3, using the following notation to 
summarize Rosenstone and Hansen’s (1993) voting model: 
 
Pr_Votei,t = probit(Bo + B1 Ci + B2 Xi,t + B3 Mobilizedi,t) 
 





Where:  Ci represents the variables that are effectively constant over the period 
(e.g., education),  Xi,t represents exogenous personal characteristics that may vary over 
time – but in a manner unrelated to mobilization or prior voting behavior (e.g., age, 
income).   
Building on this formulation for voting, we can develop a more fully articulated 
set of equations for each of the three stages of the cycle of mobilization and participation.  
First, some additional notation is helpful.  I will refer to the vector of relevant mutable 
historical characteristics (prior participation) for individual i at time t as Hi,t.  We will 
discuss mobilization in detail as a feedback mechanism, which is represented as Mi,t.  
Finally, exogenous personal traits, Xi,t (discussed above), and environmental traits, such 
as the overall level of participation and interest in the campaign, Lt will also be included.  
In summary, we have: 
Ci:  the vector of constant personal traits for individual i  
Xi,t: exogenous personal characteristics for individual i at time t 
Lt:  the political climate or level of participation at time t 
Hi,t:  mutable historical characteristics, such as prior participation for i at time t 
Mi,t: mobilization of individual i at time t 
 
Using this notation, we can define the functions that make up the cycle as follows: 
• A mobilization function, Mi.t = m(Ci, Xi,t, Hi.t, Lt), which determines whether 
individual i is asked to participate at time t.   
o m is a binary function; either an individual is asked to participate or is not.   





o ∂mi,t / ∂ Ci > 0, ∂mi,t / ∂ Xi,t > 0, ∂mi,t / ∂ Hi,t-1 > 0.  Each static and mutable 
characteristic within the vectors Ci, Xi,t and Hi,t is measurable and can be 
expressed on a numeric scale, where increasing values indicate increased 
likelihood to be mobilized. That is, some individuals are more likely to be 
asked than others, according to their meaningful personal characteristics. 
• A participation function, Pi.t = p(Ci, Xi,t, Hi,t, Mi,t, Lt), which determines whether the 
individual i participates at time t.   
o p is also a binary, stochastic function, which is monotonically increasing in Ci, 
Xi,t, Hi,t and Lt.  I.e., individuals decide whether or not to act, taking 
solicitations, their personal characteristics, and the overall political climate 
into account, but their actions are not dictated by these parameters.   
• An update function, Hi,t+1 = u(Ci,, Xi,t, Hi,t, Mi,t, Pi,t, Lt) which determines how an 
individual’s endogenous characteristics change given participation (or the lack 
thereof) and the passage of time. Individuals are shaped by their experiences, 
updating their personal habits (Gerber et al. 2003), or feelings of efficacy (Finkel 
1985), etc. 
o u is monotonically increasing in Pi.t with interest and skills decaying over 
time.  Both prior participation, Pi,t and the vector of historical characteristics, 










The models employed by existing research on mobilization each can be readily 
expressed in this notation.  For example, Goldstein and Ridout (2002)’s model can be 
written as:42 
Mi,t = logit(Bo +  
Ci   [B1 Genderi + B2 Educationi + B3 Blacki + B4 Southi ] + 
Xi,t [B5 Agei,t +  B6 Agei,t
2+ B7 Incomei,t + B8 Unioni,t + B9 Partisanshipi,t ] +  
Hi,t [B10 Pi,t-1 ] + 
Lt   [B11 HouseCompetitivenesst + B12 SenateCompetitivenesst  
       + B13 PresidentialCompetitivenesst +  B14 GubernatorialElectiont ] 
 
Pi,t = logit(Bo +  
Ci   [B1 Genderi + B2 Educationi + B3 Blacki + B4 Southi ] + 
Xi,t [B5 Agei,t +  B6 Agei,t
2 +  B7  Incomei,t + B8 Partisanshipi,t + B9 Marriedi,t   
      + B10 InterestInPoliticsi,t + B11 Efficacyi,t ] + 
Hi,t [B12 Pi,t-1 ] + 
Mi,t [B13 Mobilizedi,t ] 
Lt   [B14 HouseCompetitivenesst + B15 SenateCompetitivenesst  
       + B16 PresidentialCompetitivenesst  
       + B17 GubernatorialElectiont + B18 ContestedPrimaryt + B19 PerceptionOfClosenesst ]   
 
Hi,t =  Pi,t-1  (i.e., participated in last election) 
 
Their model can be condensed into the simpler cycle of mobilization and 
participation:  
Mi,t =  logit(Bm + Bcm Ci + Bxm Xi,t + Bhm Hi,t + Blm Lt) 
Pi,t =  logit(Bp + Bcp Ci + Bxm Xi,t + Bhp Hi,t + BM Mi,t + Blp Lt) 
Hi,t =  Pi,t-1   
 
Where (Bcm, Bxm,Bhm,Blm), and (Bcp, Bxp,Bhp,Blp) are vectors of coefficients for the 
relative weight of variables for constant personal characteristics, mutable but exogenous 
personal characteristics, mutable historical personal characteristics, and the overall level 
                                                 
42 One could classify various variables such as education as Constant or mutable but Exogenous, depending 
on the time frame of the analysis and the empirical change in the population over time.  In addition, the 
concept of overall Level of participation, and its components such as Senate Competitiveness could be 
disaggregated into separate temporal and spatio-temporal elements.  I leave those complexities for further 
analysis, and instead focus on the core cycle of participation over time that occurs regardless of these 





of participation in the mobilization and participation process, respectively, and Bm and  
Bp are constants that establish the y-intercepts. 
Abramson and Claggett (2001) follow the same format, with small changes in the 
set of personal characteristics under consideration.  Abramson and Claggett (2001) and 
Goldstein and Ridout (2002) both use a lagged dependent variable to analyze 
participation. This technique is common in political science to handle estimation 
problems with time series cross-sectional data (Beck 2001; Beck and Katz 1995).43 Since 
it is well documented that mobilization is correlated with prior participation, serious 
estimation bias can occur without this control.44  Their model is: 
Mi,t = logit(Bo +  
Ci   [B1 Genderi + B2 Educationi + B3 Blacki + B4 Southi ] + 
Xi,t [B5 Agei,t +  B6 Incomei,t + B7 Unioni,t + B8 Partisanshipi,t + B9 EmploymentStatusi,t  
         + B10 Log(YearsInCommunity) + B11 Homeowner + B12 ReligiousAttendance  
      + B13 IdeologicalExtremity  + B14 GroupMember]  +  
Hi,t [B15 Pi,t-1 ] + 
Lt   [B16 ElectoralVotest + B17 SenateElection t + B18 PresidentialCompetitivenesst  
                     +  B19 GubernatorialElectiont ] 
 
Pi,t = logit(Bo +  
Ci   [B1 Genderi + B2 Educationi + B3 Blacki + B4 Southi] + 
Xi,t [B5 Agei,t +  B6 Incomei,t + B7 Unioni,t + B8 Partisanshipi,t + B9 EmploymentStatusi,t  
         + B10 Log(YearsInCommunity) + B11 Homeowner + B12 ReligiousAttendance  
      + B13 IdeologicalExtremity  + B14 GroupMember + B15 PoliticalEngagement  
      + B16CandidateAffect]  +  
Hi,t [B17 Pi,t-1 ] + 
Mi,t [B18 Mobilizedi,t  ] + 
Lt   [B18 ElectoralVotest + B19 SenateElection t + B20 PresidentialCompetitivenesst  
                      +  B21 GubernatorialElectiont ] 
 
Hi,t =  Pi,t-1 
                                                 
43 This standard approach is not without controversy (e.g., Wilson and Butler 2004; Beck and Katz 2004; 
Wawro 2002); among other issues, it assumes a geometric adjustment of y to x (i.e., with an extended 
impact on y over time; see Beck and Katz 2004).  The issue is beyond the scope of this work but deserves 
further attention. 
44 Abramson and Claggett (2001) demonstrate the bias by re-estimating their equation without a lagged 
dependent variable; the impact of mobilization on participation, as the change in predicted probability, 





Which, after dropping insignificant terms (following their own presentation of the 
model), becomes: 
Mi,t = logit(Bo +  
Ci   [B1 B2 Educationi] + 
Xi,t [B3 Agei,t +  B4 Partisanshipi,]  +  
Hi,t [B5 Pi,t-1 ] 
Pi,t = logit(Bo +  
Ci   [B1 Educationi  + 
Xi,t [B2 Agei,t + B3 Unioni,t + B4 ReligiousAttendance  
       + B5 PoliticalEngagement + B6CandidateAffect] +  
Hi,t [B7 Pi,t-1 ] + 
Mi,t [B8 Mobilizedi,t ] 
 
Rosenstone and Hansen’s model, first analyzed in Chapter 3, can be specified as: 
Mi,t =  probit(Bo + (Bo + B1 Income +  B2 Education …+ (B3 * Hi,t)) 
Pi,t =  probit(Bo + B1 Income +  B2 Education + B3 Unemployment + B4 Age + B5 Efficacy  
+ B6 Partisanship + B7 Candidate_Support + B8 Years_In_Community 
+ B9 Church_Attendance + B10 Homeowner + B11 Employed  
+ B12 Closeness_Of_Election + B13 Registration_Restrictions + B14 Gender + B15 South 
+ B16 Race + B17 Mobilized) 
Hi,t =  Pi,t-1   
 
Mobilization Over Time 
Each of these models has a notable deficiency, however.  From a System 
Dynamics perspective, they incorporate a feedback loop that has not been carefully 
analyzed.  In particular, they employ a single-step model in which mobilization is both 
correlated with lagged participation (it is a key determinant in mobilization) and also 
plays a similar, but independent, role as lagged participation does – creating a first-order 
serial autocorrelation (mobilization is strongly correlated with lagged mobilization since 
the same personal characteristics, observed and unobserved, affect both).  In Chapter 1, I 
introduced this problem with a simplified version of the mobilization model; here, I 
discuss the implications in more detail with the full model. 





models, raises two concerns.  First, the models are generally presented without this 
acknowledgement, which hides the multistage dynamics that all first-order serial 
autocorrelation models have.  Second, depending on its parameters, a first-order serial 
autocorrelation model would imply that the impact of prior mobilization exponentially 
grows over time (unlikely), or has a long-term, but time-decaying, effect.  The 
relationship becomes even more complex when we consider the impact of prior 
mobilization on prior participation, and of prior participation on other feedback cycles, 
such as habit and personal efficacy, identified in Chapter 3.  In short, the net impact of a 
single instance of mobilization is greater than the simple regression estimation employed 
by these authors would imply – the regression coefficient provides the effect for the first 
year, but not for subsequent time periods.  Alternatively, from the perspective of a single 
election – current and prior years of mobilization both influence voter turnout at the same 
time, directly and via proxies such as prior participation.  One such relationship is 
displayed in Figure 7: 
 























Given these relationships, interpreting the regression coefficient on mobilization 
in these models is a challenging task.45   Rather than try to untangle the various 
influences (known and unknown) that could be at work, I will present an alternative 
means of estimating these influences below, using simulation modeling.  Other 
challenges with these models still need to be discussed first, however. 
Given that prior mobilization, prior participation, current mobilization, and 
current participation are all correlated with each other and with an enduring set of known 
and unknown variables, one would expect significant multicollinearity to arise in the 
estimation process.  Statistically significant relationships, when found, would be a 
powerful and conservative test of the real strength of the relationship (the real 
relationship would be crisper, since it must overcome multicollinearity to be considered 
statistically significant). 
Finally, consider what these models imply about the logic of political campaigns 
in the aggregate.  Prior participation is modeled as a determinant of current mobilization.  
Thus, if citizens were especially excited about a particular presidential election, and 
turned out more than normal, these models predict that in the next (midterm) election 
mobilizers would magically spend more money. They would also be more successful at 
mobilizing individuals than normal, simply because prior year turnout was high.   
The logical problem becomes even more apparent if we consider what would 
happen if the very specific functional form used in these models was incorrect – and the 
true relationship between current mobilization and prior mobilization is something 
different than a one-period lag (via prior participation).  Drawing on the discussion in 
                                                 





Chapter 3 on feedback processes, a variety of dynamics could occur, depending on 
whether mobilizers employed a moving average of individual’s prior participation history 
over time to guide their outreach, or additional information about voters’ participation 
over time simply increased their value to mobilizers, leading to an unconstrained 
feedback loop.  In these alternative functional forms, if mobilizers have any impact on 
participation, then as participation increases, so does the strength of mobilization over 
time, and so does participation, etc.  Up to 100% of the population could eventually be 
mobilized by their political parties.46  Substantively, this is also incorrect.  The solution to 
this logical problem is to consider more carefully the mobilization strategies of political 
parties; doing so also solves the problem of positive feedback over time.  
 
A balanced budget amendment 
Existing models of political party mobilization do not explicitly incorporate a 
budget constraint – i.e. an upper limit on how many people political parties are willing to 
pay to contact.  Moreover, they provide no rationale for why an organizer would select 
one person over another given this constraint.  The resulting models can provide useful 
insights; but are not, conceivably, applied in practice.   
Instead, political parties have budget constraints, and so political organizers must 
employ a decision rule, implicit or explicit, that guides their choice of whom to mobilize, 
given their limited resources and their goal to secure political gains.  In the practitioner 
literature (e.g., Guzzetta 2006), a range of pragmatic rules are suggested.  Practitioner 
                                                 
46 For some functional forms, mobilization would steadily increase over time to a fixed limit, as discussed 
in Chapter 3.  With or without a limit on the final level of mobilization, the problem is the same – 





views on targeting for maximal effectiveness range widely from “swing voters” or “core 
voters” to focusing on particular (politically loyal) ethnic groups.  Treatment 
responsiveness, i.e., the determinants of an individual’s change in turnout propensity due 
to a campaign contact (treatment), is a key question for field campaigns, but has 
insufficient systematic study in the field.   
In the initial version of the model, I will assume that political parties employ a 
simple rule: target those individuals who are most likely to increase the number of votes 
in support of the campaign.  It can be expressed in terms of the “lift” provided by 
mobilization.  This targeting process will always be inaccurate, however, leading to 
potentially inefficient mobilization, and thus some noise should be incorporated.  The 
specification uses a scoring function to determine who is contacted for mobilization:47 
Mi,t =  TopN[Ri,t * (Pi,t|m=1 - Pi,t|m=0) + ui,t] 
  
Where, 
Ri,t  = the likelihood that the individual i would prefer the candidate over her opponent 
Pi,t|m=1 - Pi,t|m=0  = the lift from mobilization, or the change in the probability that the individual will 
actually turnout to show that support 
TopN = an indicator function that is 1 for individuals with the N highest values of the scoring 
function, and 0 for the rest.  N is determined by the campaign’s budget.  
ui,t =  stochastic error in calculating each individuals’ lift 
 
That is, mobilizers target those who are most likely to change their behavior in 
support of their candidate due to the request to participate, subject to error.  If we 
recognize that mobilizers are usually only interested in members of their own party, and 
                                                 
47 For many non-electoral campaigns, such as boycotts and street protests, there is very little chance that 
any particular person will spontaneously decide to engage in the exact action sought by the organizer.  
Pi,t|m=0 = 0 and Pi,t|m=1 is constant for everyone.  These campaigns can still be analyzed in this framework, by 





that changes in party affiliation (and support in the ballot box) are relatively uncommon, 
then we can simplify this equation as follows: 
 
Mi,t =  TopN[(Pi,t|m=1 - Pi,t|m=0) + ui] 
 
Where each political campaign’s pool of mobilizable individuals entails members 
of their party.   
 
Step 2:  Formalizing and Testing the Model 
Econometric Model 
The three-step theoretical model requires additional elaboration before it is tested 
empirically. Namely, the specific determinants of the participation function, P, and the 
history update function, H, are required.   
In previous sections, I demonstrated how existing models of mobilization and 
participation can be expressed in this three-step structure.  In particular, Abramson and 
Claggett (2001) use a standard set of personal and demographic variables in their model 
of mobilization, including age, partisanship, education, and income.  They also control 
for one known dynamic process – changing levels of efficacy.  Rather than diverge from 
the current literature, I will use Abramson’s and Claggett’s (2001) participation function 
directly in this model, so as to focus on (and provide a clearer comparison with) the true 
innovations of the model. 





participation as a simple mechanism by which historical experience affects current 
participation.  There are significant problems with interpreting this model, especially 
when mobilization is included, because of its correlation with lagged participation.  In 
keeping with the current literature, I will also use a one-period lag for participation as my 
update function,48 but I will leverage tools from simulation modeling to provide a much 
clearer interpretation of the resulting parameters.  I also described above how problems 
can occur in the positive feedback cycle between mobilization and participation (in the 
first-order autocorrelation model as well as in other formulations); I break that positive 
feedback cycle by constraining the budget that mobilizers have to invest in their 
mobilization campaign.   
The resulting three equations are substantially similar to the exiting literature, but 
will be analyzed and interpreted within a simulation framework.  This allows us to focus 
on the novel features of the model – an explicit analysis of the dynamics of mobilization 
and participation over time, and a more realistic decision function for mobilizers under 
budget constraints.  As will be shown below, the results are significantly different, 




                                                 
48 For the purposes of benchmarking the simulation model against known (if flawed) results.  As described 
in Chapter 3, this process allows one to verify the method before leveraging the flexibility in modeling 





The full specification is:49 
Mi,t =  TopN[ (Pi,t|m=1 - Pi,t|m=0) + ui] 
Pi,t =  logit(Bo +  
Ci   [B1 Educationi  + 
Xi,t [B2 Agei,t + B3 Unioni,t + B4 ReligiousAttendance  
                      + B5 PoliticalEngagement + B7CandidateAffect] +  
   Hi,t [B8 Pi,t-1 ] + 
Mi,t [B9 Mobilizedi,t ] 




These three equations, and in particular the mobilization function, are difficult to 
estimate using standard regression techniques because of the budget constraint placed on 
mobilization.  As discussed in Chapter 3, an alternative means to estimate them can be 
found in the literature on optimization (Oliva 2003) – in which a simulation model is 
developed that implements the functions, and their parameters are estimated in a manner 
analogous to maximum likelihood estimation (MLE).  To recap, the procedure uses 
optimization techniques to search the space of possible parameter values, determining the 
parameters that minimize prediction error relative to a given dataset.  In return for 
gaining the ability to estimate otherwise inestimable models, one sacrifices deterministic 
outcomes and the guarantee of finding the globally (versus locally) optimal parameters.  
In this case, because I can compare the results of the procedure against an existing model 
estimated with traditional techniques, I can gauge the risks in this tradeoff.  
 
                                                 
49 Employing the second, simplified version of Abramson and Claggett’s participation function – with 






I implemented the simulation using the R programming language (R Development 
Core Team 2012).  The simulation code is included in the Appendix, and has three main 
components: 
1. The voter participation function. 
2. The mobilization function described above, selecting individuals who would show the 
greatest “lift” from mobilization, subject to random error.   
3. The scoring function that compares the predicted values against historical values in 
the supplied dataset. 
 
Following Abramson and Claggett (2001), I employed the 1990-1992 ANES 
panel to estimate the model – the most recent ANES panel dataset in which the necessary 
information on both participation and recruitment by political parties is available.  In 
order best to leverage their work as a baseline for the simulation model, the encoding of 
variables follows directly from Abramson and Claggett (2001), and is described in the 
Appendix.  The mobilization budget (i.e., N in the equation above), was set at the 
observed number of individuals in the ANES 1992 data that were mobilized in practice 
(25% of the population). 
The structure of the simulation itself is straightforward.  At the center of the 
simulation is the participation function, using exactly the same assumptions and 
functional form as in standard regression techniques.  The mobilization code consists of 
calling the participation function with and without mobilization of each individual (to 
calculate the “lift” from mobilization), and selecting the top N individuals based on lift 





function above; a trivial copying of one value to another.   
These three functions are then surrounded by control logic that accepts a set of 
parameter values (Bo…B9), and the dataset of individual demographics and characteristics 
from the ANES 1990-1992 panel as input, and outputs the predicted voting behavior of 
each individual.  Finally, the optimization routine applies sets of parameter values to this 
control logic, comparing the output to the observed voting behavior from the ANES 
1990-2 panel, and adjusting the parameters until the optimal fit is found between the 
predicted and observed voting behavior.  
 
Test 1: Estimating Model Parameters and Testing Statistical Significance 
In order to estimate the parameters and generate confidence intervals around each 
estimate, I employed the “Flexible Modeling Environment” (FME) package in R 
(Soetaert and Petzoldt 2010; see discussion in Chapter 3) to control the optimization 
process, and the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm for the optimization itself.  The 
Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm is a commonly used algorithm for non-linear least-
squares optimization, in which an initial parameter set is used to determine the localized 
change in model error from marginal changes in each parameter (i.e., the gradient of 
model error, in parameter space).  Levenberg-Marquardt uses a combination of a strict 
gradient descent and the Gauss-Newton algorithm (roughly, projecting the lowest error 
point in parameter space and jumping to it), to iteratively traverse the parameter space 
and find the error-minimizing parameter coefficients.  The FME package then conducts 
additional simulations around the error-minimizing coefficients to determine the degree 





To test the sensitivity of the optimization to its starting parameters, and to assess 
the risk of converging to a local, rather than global, maximum, I conducted the 
optimization first using the Abramson and Claggett (2001) (logit regression) parameters, 
which one would expect to be close to the error-minimizing true parameters.  I then 
conducted the optimization using sets of arbitrary starting points.  The estimated 
parameters were not significantly different in each case, pointing towards the stability of 
the procedure. The results are provided in Table 4, below. 
 







Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept   -2.75 0.35 -7.93 0.00 
Age 0.16 0.02 0.00 5.04 0.00 
Education 0.37 3.63 0.40 9.13 < 2e-16 
Union member 0.10 1.00 0.18 5.42 0.00 
Religious attendance 0.05 0.65 0.22 2.95 0.00 
Political engagement 0.32 1.42 0.18 7.75 0.00 
Presidential candidate affect -0.07 -0.01 0.00 -2.18 0.03 
Mobilized 0.05 0.47 0.16 3.04 0.00 
Turnout in 1990 0.36 3.58 0.47 7.66 0.00 
 
I calculate the impact of each of these parameters by analyzing the average 
marginal change in the probability of voting across the individuals in the original dataset, 
as advocated by researchers such as Hanmer and Kalkan (2009).  This entails calculating 
predicted probabilities for each individual in the data, with the maximum and the 
minimum value for each variables, rather than using a single stylized individual with 





The results provide evidence in support of the budget-constrained mobilization 
model, with dynamic interactions between the mobilizer and the mobilized: one finds that 
the impact of recruitment by political parties on voting is statistically significant at the 
1% level, and we cannot exclude the null hypothesis of no effect.  The average change in 
the predicted probability of voting, across the individuals in the ANES dataset, due to 
voter mobilization is 5%.   
This result on its own would indicate that the simulation optimization technique 
can gain traction on (i.e., effectively optimize) the budget-constrained model of 
participation.  However, given the tradeoffs in using a simulation approach versus as 
standard MLE or regression, how similar are the results to prior estimations?  
 
Test 2: Comparing Results Against the Benchmark, Non-Simulation Model 
To verify the validity of the initial data processing and simulation estimation, I 
replicated Abramson and Claggett’s work with a standard logit analysis of the 
unconstrained single-lag voter participation model.  Following Abramson and Claggett 
directly, I estimated the participation function in isolation, using the observed 
mobilization data in the 1992 ANES dataset instead of the mobilization equation.50    
The results were generated using the Zelig package (Imai, King, and Lau 2010) in 
the R statistical language, and are provided in Table 5, on the next page.51 
                                                 
50 Abramson and Claggett estimate mobilization and participation separately, with no empirical connection 
between the two, as do all other known researchers in the field.  Either way, however, a standard logit 
analysis could not estimate the budget constrained mobilization function.   
51 In addition, I performed a simulation optimization of the original (unconstrained) Abramson and Claggett 
model – as a narrow test of the MLE simulation estimation versus the logit estimation.  Very minor 













Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
(Intercept)   -2.08 0.34 -6.19 0.00 
Age 0.15 0.02 0.01 3.64 0.00 
Education 0.30 2.63 0.42 6.28 0.00 
Union member 0.08 0.73 0.26 2.81 0.00 
Religious attendance 0.07 0.76 0.28 2.72 0.01 
Political engagement 0.29 1.16 0.20 5.73 0.00 
Presidential candidate affect -0.16 -0.01 0.00 -2.70 0.01 
Mobilized 0.06 0.55 0.24 2.25 0.02 
Turnout in 1990 0.34 2.94 0.28 10.64 < 2e-16 
 
The parameter coefficients are not strikingly different between the Abramson and 
Claggett model and the revised simulation model.  Most notably, the coefficient on 
recruitment is 15% smaller in the simulation estimation than in the original (non-budget 
constrained) model.  This translates into an average difference in predicted probability of 
20% from the baseline; these differences are well within the standard error of the two 
estimation processes.  All other substantive variables are similar in coefficient and 
predicted probability.   
These similar results should not be surprising – the only differences between the 
two models are the estimation technique and the use of a budget constrained mobilization 
function.  The estimation technique should produce the same results – and indeed, 
appears to – since the optimal parameters are still optimal whether a logit regression or a 
MLE-type optimization was used to find them.  The budget constraint itself should have 





the observed number of people mobilized in the 1992 ANES dataset.  Finally, the 
individuals selected by the budget constrained mobilization function, according to their 
‘lift’, should be very similar to the observed pattern of mobilization (if the assumption of 
selection via lift is correct).  Indeed they are, but not perfectly so, given random noise in 
the process.  Thus, the results of this test support the approach used for estimating and 
modeling mobilization and participation but provide no stunning results otherwise.  More 
importantly, they provide a platform for a proper estimation of mobilization’s total (direct 
and indirect) impact. 
As discussed above, it is in subsequent election cycles that the assumptions 
underlying a non-budget constrained mobilization process produce illogical results; I 
explore multiple election cycles below.  However, before conducting a novel analysis of 
multiple cycles, I needed to ensure that the model used in that analysis is solid.  This 
comparison between the benchmark model and the simulation helps substantiate that 
conclusion that when the benchmark model was converted into a budget constrained 
simulation model, its core characteristics were not changed, and we can safely expand 
into more novel terrain.   
 
Test 3: Estimating the Total Effect of Mobilization, including Indirect Impacts  
In addition to the direct impact that mobilization can have on participation in the 
first year, mobilization can have subsequent, indirect impacts on participation. The first 
part is captured by the estimation process; the latter is not.  As I discussed above, 
mobilization can influence participation via a variety of routes, including building the 





(Finkel 1985) – and thus having a lasting, indirect impact on participation in future years.  
For example, consider an individual who would not otherwise vote.  For whatever reason, 
that person is contacted by one of the political parties, and strongly encouraged to vote.  
Assuming that person successfully turns out to vote, s/he will have begun an internal 
habit of voting (due to increased comfort with the process, an increased sense of efficacy, 
etc.), and will be more likely to continue to vote in the future – a process triggered by the 
original act of mobilization.  Similarly, mobilization can influence future participation by 
making individuals more likely to be mobilized in the future: by making them more likely 
to participate in the current year, they are more likely to be targeted for future 
mobilization, more likely to participate in the future, etc.  Whereas mobilization can 
directly add new individuals to the voter pool, the indirect impacts work by retaining 
existing voters (Traugott 2004).  
The direct impact is conceptually straightforward: it is provided by the coefficient 
on current-year mobilization and the marginal change in predicted probabilities it causes.  
Exactly how that marginal change should be calculated is not as obvious, however.  As 
discussed above, I analyze the marginal change in predicted probabilities for each 
individual in the dataset, rather than using a single stylized individual with “average” 
values for each independent variable.  In so doing, an underlying assumption about the 
data generating process was exposed. Specifically, calculating marginal changes in 
predicted probabilities across the entire population, whether with the fine-tuned approach 
advocated by Hanmer and Kalkan (2009) or with an “average” individual, is unrealistic in 
the case of a budget-constrained mobilization process: because only a subset of specific 





individuals and achieve an average marginal impact on voting; rather they target specific 
individuals who are likely to give the greatest “bang for the buck”.  The impact on those 
individuals is significantly greater.  In fact, running the predicted probability analysis 
again for the overall population and for the subset mobilized, one finds: 
• The average direct impact of mobilization across the entire population:  6% 
• The average direct impact of mobilization across the subset of individuals  
who are likely to be mobilized: 9%.  
 
Since indirect impacts of mobilization are only relevant for those individuals who 
are actually mobilized, I employ the larger calculation of direct impact, below, based on 
that subset of individuals.  This is essential for providing a more accurate (and lower) 
estimate of the indirect impact. 
While the indirect impact was easily calculated in the illustrative linear model 
presented in Chapter 1, the simulation model provides a more robust way to analyze 
indirect impacts on an otherwise intractable budget constrained version. To calculate the 
indirect impact of mobilization, I first executed the simulation model without 
mobilization, and determined the probability of participation for each individual, Pi|m=0 in 
the following election cycle. I executed the simulation again with mobilization, and found 
the total impact of mobilization for each individual mobilized, Pi|m=1 - Pi|m=0. I subtracted the 
direct impact of mobilization from the total impact of mobilization (direct and indirect), 

















Figure 8: Direct and indirect impacts of prior mobilization on voting 
 
A summary of the results is displayed in Figure 8.52  For voting behavior, the 
average direct impact of mobilization on the individuals who were actually mobilized was 
9.3%,53 and the average total impact of mobilization, direct and indirect, per individual 
mobilized was 13.3%.54  The average indirect impact of mobilization thus was 13.3% – 
9.3% = 4.0%.  The total impact of mobilization, after one takes indirect effects into 
account, is 43% greater than expected.55    
                                                 
52 I am grateful for the help of Ozan Kalkan in estimating a GEE version of this model (and verifying the 
results using that alternative econometric approach) for the 2009 Political Methodology conference. 
53 This is the lift assuming that individuals had absolutely no prior experience voting.  If the analysis is run 
with the level of individual participation given in the ANES 1992 panel, then the direct impact of 
mobilization is significantly less (6.8) and thus the indirect impact is significantly greater (6.5%, or 95% 
larger than expected).  The difference comes from the assumed prior state of the world.  In a world where 
no mobilization has ever occurred (and thus future participation levels have not been affected), 
mobilization has a larger direct than indirect impact.  Where mobilization has already occurred, the indirect 
effects are larger. That is, the estimate given in the text is a conservative figure for the actual indirect 
impact of mobilization. 
54 Averaged across all of the simulations with mobilization, the participation rate was 73.7%, and without 
mobilization the rate was 70.0%   Since mobilization was only applied to 25% of the population, the total 
impact per person mobilized was (73.4-70)/0.25.   
55 This is again a conservative estimate.  The model, as designed, examines one possible route for indirect 





If nothing else, these results indicate that the role of mobilization has been 
substantially underestimated in current, single-round, empirical analyses of mobilization 
and participation. If mobilization were simply a minor factor in overall turnout and 
political participation, then a 40% increase in its actual impact would be an interesting 
footnote, but nothing more.  However, the level and effectiveness of mobilization are two 
of the few factors that systematically vary between election cycles (Rosenstone and 
Hansen 1993), and thus provide a potential explanation for both the decline in American 
voter turnout from the 1960s to 1990s and the apparent recent up-swing.  The role of 
mobilization in the rise and decline of turnout over time deserves reconsideration.   
Perhaps most interestingly however, the indirect impact has profound effect on 
other political behaviors and on long term voting behavior over time, as I discuss in the 
next section. 
 
Step 3: Extending the Model into New Observable Facts  
Moving beyond the basic analysis that was used to estimate model parameters and 
test for statistical significance, numerous options are available for extension and further 
testing.   
 
Extension 1: Incorporating Other Political Behaviors 
Abramson and Claggett’s (2001) analysis, along with that of Rosenstone and 
Hansen (1993) and Verba et al. (1995), each demonstrate how the study of voter 
                                                                                                                                                 
efficacy or social networks were included in the model, then one would expect mobilization to have an 





mobilization can be extended into other political behaviors. Notably, the ANES 1990-2 
panel, used by Abramson and Claggett (2001) and the analysis presented above, provides 
data on two other behaviors of interest:  campaign contributions and volunteering for the 
campaigns.  A quick replication of the estimation process on budget constrained 
campaign contribution and volunteering models verifies statistical significance for the 
central variables (mobilization and lagged participation), in keeping with prior 
(unconstrained) models.  Replicating the analysis of the indirect effects of mobilization 
also shows interesting results.  
Even larger indirect impacts occur for campaign contributions and campaign 
volunteering than for voting behavior.  Figure 9 displays the results for political 
volunteering; the average direct impact of mobilization on volunteering is 29.8%, and the 
total impact is 50.6%.  The indirect impact is 50.6%-29.8% = 20.8% – the total impact is 
70% greater than expected.  For campaign contributions, the total impact of fundraising 


















Extension 2: A Multi-Cycle Simulation Model  
In addition to increasing aggregate levels of participation, mobilization may play 
a troubling role in fostering unequal participation.  Numerous authors have examined the 
normative and positive consequences of unequal political participation to the health and 
legitimacy of democracy, particularly for unequal voter turnout (e.g., Macedo et al. 
2005).  If the political process significantly under-represents particular groups or 
viewpoints, then political instability and violence among disaffected groups is one of the 
extreme outcomes.  
Building on the simulation developed in previous sections, I extend the simulation 
to cover multiple future elections.  Specifically, I add one step at the end of the 
simulation’s logic:  
 
4. Using the ANES data, I execute a loop that repeatedly applies the mobilization 
function, the prediction model, and the update function to each individual in the 
dataset, for a given number of cycles.   
 
In the previous version, an optimization algorithm fed sets of parameters to 
mobilization, participation, and update functions in order to find the optimal values.  In 
this case, the optimization algorithm is replaced by a few lines of code that take the 
optimized parameters, and the initial ANES dataset, and apply the mobilization, 
participation, and update functions repeatedly, updating mi,t and pi,t each round.  This 





of the population, but has a number of limitations.  For example, real wages are assumed 
to be stagnant; education, partisanship, and the demographic profile of the population are 
similarly static.  Further research should be considered on each of these factors, but is 
outside of the scope of this work. 
I sought to simulate an adult lifetime, with roughly 25 opportunities to participate 
in midterm or presidential election-year mobilizations.  Each execution of the model thus 
created a panel data set with the 1,097 individuals in the ANES data, 26 time slices 
starting with the original ANES data and continuing through 25 subsequent biannual 
elections.56  Since the model is stochastic, I executed the Monte Carlo simulation 100 
times for each form of political participation. The resulting dataset contained 300 
simulation runs, each with 1097 individuals, 26 elections, and two dependent variables 
for each election (mobilization and participation).  I first ran the simulation for voting 
behavior and voter mobilization then expanded to incorporate campaign contributions 
and political volunteering as well.  The outcomes are most striking for these latter two 
political behaviors, with interesting differences from voting behavior. 
Multiple cycles of mobilization for campaign contributors and political volunteers 
are concentrated in a relatively small, unrepresentative, portion of the population.  As 
rounds of appeals and campaign contributions proceed through time, a distinct group of 
individuals appears who are mobilized the majority of the time, and participate at 
significantly higher rates than the rest of the population.  The size of this group is 
relatively small – but, its impact is considerable.  Roughly 33% of individuals in the 
                                                 
56 Births and deaths (entry and exit) were not modeled in this analysis, and should be considered in future 





population are mobilized more than 95% of the time.57  On average, these individuals 
account for 89% of all of the instances of donations made to the political parties.  In any 
given cycle, this high-mobilization, high-participation group accounts for between 82% 
and 94% of all of the individuals making contributions.  Table 6, on the next page, 
illustrates how this narrow segment of the population is repeatedly asked to make 
contributions, and how mobilization successfully garners their participation.  The first 
graph shows the distribution of mobilization; the second graph shows the distribution of 
participation when mobilization occurs; and the third graph provides contrast, indicating 
how participation would have been distributed if no mobilization had occurred.  When 
repeated appeals for contributions are removed, as shown in column three, the significant 
disparity between frequent and infrequent participants disappears.   
For campaign volunteering, roughly 7.6% of the individuals, roughly half of the 
number of individuals who are mobilized in a given cycle, are mobilized more than 80% 
the time.  These individuals account for 38% of the participation-events.  That is, over the 
25-cycle period, when an individual volunteers for a political campaign, 38% of the time 
that individual is from this coterie of activists.  As with campaign contributions, the 
narrow group is entirely a product of the cycle of mobilization and participation, and does 
not occur without mobilization.  Examining the issue from the other direction, over 60 % 
of individuals are mobilized less than 10% of the time.  This group, a majority of the 
population, accounts for only 12.5% of the participation-events.   
                                                 
57 Nearly all of those individuals who are called upon to make a contribution in a given cycle are called 
upon repeatedly.  The quantity of money donated, another obvious source of inequality, is not modeled here 
because of the ANES data used for the analysis.  Mobilization is well known to concentrate on major 
givers, and this dynamic process would be expected to further exacerbate the disparity; this issue should be 






Table 6: Impact of Mobilization on Campaign Contributions 
 
 
For voting, the impact of multiple rounds of mobilization is rather different.  
Because voting is a significantly more common activity than volunteering or making 
campaign contributions, the group of individuals targeted by Get Out The Vote efforts is 
intermixed with those who would have participated regardless, due to their other personal 
characteristics (income, education, etc).  Cycles of mobilization still target a narrow 
section of the population; for example, 13% of the population is mobilized over 50% of 
the time.  This group does not dominate the pool of participants, however – they are 
individuals with moderate levels of prior turnout probability who are successfully pushed 
up into the larger pool of high-probability individuals.  The outcome is a slight increase 
in inequality, since the resulting distribution consists of low probability individuals and 
an enlarged pool of high-probability individuals, but nowhere near the stark results found 
for other political behaviors. 
Frequency with which 
Individuals are Mobilized 







In order to test the robustness of these findings, one can examine what would 
happen if the impact of mobilization had been over-, or under-, estimated by a significant 
margin, e.g., 50%. To test this scenario, I repeat the entire analysis at varying levels of 
mobilization-effectiveness.  The results are substantively the same.  As the impact of 
mobilization decreases, the gap between high-participation and low-participation 
individuals decreases, but the specializing effect of mobilization clearly separates the 
smaller, high-participation group from the rest of the population.  As the effectiveness of 
mobilization increases, the gap widens.  The next two sections consider other variants on 
the assumptions and parameters used in the benchmark model. 
 
Extension 3: The Effect of Inaccurate Targeting on Mobilization 
One could object to the presumption that political mobilizers can effectively 
target individuals, i.e. that they have sufficient data on the population of potential 
activists and the methodological tools to target them.  To simulate the effect of inaccurate 
targeting, I examined the case where the starkest results should be expected – 
mobilization for campaign contributions, in which well-targeted mobilization created the 
greatest divisions between participators and non-participators.  In this version of the 
simulation, the organizers are unable to accurately assess the best individuals to target, 
because of random noise in the “lift” function.  A sample of the results, where I injected 
Gaussian noise with a standard deviation set to 50% of the entire range of mobilization 
scores, is shown in Figures 10 and 11, on the next page.  Inefficient mobilization leads to 






amount of noise in the process, however, mobilization (and participation) favor a group 
of high-participation individuals.   




The assumption of accurate targeting is increasingly valid, at least in high-stakes 
political campaigns in the United States.  The breadth and depth of consumer, 
demographic and behavioral data that is becoming available about individuals is 
shocking, if not disturbing.  Companies such as Artisotle, Catalist and TargetSmart 
provide this data, along with comprehensive voter files, to targeting firms for pennies per 
individual.  While the accuracy of some of the information is questionable, overall there 
is more than sufficient data to generate a detailed profile on each individual.  This flood 
of data is being harnessed by new behavioral targeting technologies employing machine 
learning techniques, including micro-targeting.   
Micro-targeting uses the detailed demographic and behavioral data to generate 
individual turnout (and support) propensity scores for each individual in a target 
population, across a set of potential contact methods and messages (Issenberg 2010).  
These scores are then used by political and advocacy campaigns to prioritize whom to 
Figure 10: Normal Mobilization 
for Campaign Contributions 
Figure 11: Noisy Mobilization 





contact, how to contact them, and when.  The seed data used to generate micro-targeting 
models is often gathered from preliminary field experiments.  After the campaign is 
conducted, and assuming sufficient data gathering was conducted, results of the field 
campaign are then fed back into the micro-targeting models for greater accuracy and 
intelligent targeting of the next round of field experiments.  According to anecdotal 
reports, micro-targeting, and associated field experiments, were used for hundreds of 
millions of contact efforts in the 2008 elections (Issenberg 2010).   
The result is an increasingly accurate targeting process, aimed specifically at 
individuals with the greatest potential lift from mobilization.58   As recently as a decade 
ago, detailed consumer and demographic data on individuals was simply unavailable; 
instead, organizers had to rely on census block and precinct level data, and pick “the best 
neighborhoods” to target, often focusing on groups of individuals who seemed to be the 
most likely supporters.   
 
Extension 4: An Alternative Mobilization Function - Likely Supporters 
Goldstein and Ridout (2002) provide another possible critique of the “efficiency” 
assumption used in the benchmark model.  They argue that historically organizers have 
not efficiently targeted high “lift” individuals in their Get Out The Vote campaigns, and 
actually targeted those individuals who were already the most likely to cast a vote for the 
candidate.  This inefficiency is due to fears that the mobilization effort will either 
                                                 
58 Another arena in which accurate targeting is possible is political protest.  The “data” used for targeting in 
this case is fundamentally different.  As Verba et al. (1995) note, mobilization around political protest 
comes overwhelmingly from friends and family.  Protest spreads through networks of individuals who 
know each other.  Along these networks, the “organizer” is often acutely aware of the interests and relative 
likelihood of participating for his or her friends and family.  The assumption of accurate targeting does not 





energize opponents or, alternatively, fail to turn out the campaign’s strongest supporters.  
The resulting mobilization function is: 
Mi,t = TopN[ Ri,t * Pi,t|m=1 + ui] 
 
Where, 
Ri,t  = the likelihood that the individual i would prefer the candidate over her opponent 
Pi,t|m=1 = the probability that the individual will actually turnout to show that support (with a vote). 
TopN = an indicator function that is 1 for individuals with the N highest values of the scoring 
function, and 0 for the rest.  N is determined by the campaign’s budget.  
 
Unfortunately, Goldstein and Ridout (2002) do not employ this function in their 
analysis, perhaps because of the challenges it poses for statistical estimation; they instead 
use the more tractable logit function provided above, which lacks a budget constraint.  As 
with noise injected into the mobilization process, this alternative mobilization function 
lessens the magnitude of the observed effects, but not the substantive findings of this 
paper.59     
 
Opportunities for Further Analysis 
Stepping back from the detailed simulation results, these findings raise a number 
of interesting questions about political mobilization and participation.  The lock-in effect 
of multiple cycles of mobilization and participation could have a dramatic effect on other, 
low-frequency, political activities such as political protest.  Participants in these activities 
                                                 
59 For campaign contributions and volunteership in particular, “likely supporters” are similar to the 
individuals with the greatest “lift”.  In part, this result is a direct consequence of the fact that a logit model 
is employed; in both cases, the number of individuals who would normally participate is low, and high 
propensity individuals are also high response.  Over the multiple rounds of mobilization and participation, 





are a small subset of society, often interacting within that group during the protest.  
Moreover, once in the cycle, one would expect activists to bond as a community under 
shared experiences.  A community bond and commonality of experience can be a 
powerful force leading activists to make the personal sacrifices necessary for collective 
action.  Small coteries of like-minded activists may provide insight into a host of 
collective models.  Lohmann (2000) and Marwell and Oliver (1993), for example, both 
have detailed theories on how small groups of individuals spark larger political 
movements.  
If this analysis is correct, what would the results auger for grassroots mobilization 
campaigns?  Among other factors, they indicate that it would behoove organizers to 
consider long run implications of mobilization.  Political campaigns seeking to elect a 
candidate naturally focus on whom they can push to vote or make a campaign 
contribution, given the person’s current responsiveness, and rarely consider changing the 
person’s future responsiveness.  However, organizers somewhat insulated from the 
immediate rush of a particular campaign, particularly in unions, religious organizations, 
and national political parties, could benefit from an understanding of how the delayed, 
indirect impacts of mobilization can lead to greater support for future campaigns.  
Creative solutions would be needed to utilize short-term opportunities for mobilization at 








Political campaigns expend vast resources to mobilize their supporters.  
Organizers know that some individuals will turn out for their candidate regardless of the 
campaign’s mobilization efforts, while others need encouragement and assistance to 
show up.  In the final days of electoral campaigns, organizers will often focus their Get 
Out The Vote efforts on those marginal voters for whom a direct appeal will most 
increase their likelihood of turning out to cast a favorable ballot.  Here, I provided a 
simple three stage model, building on Chapters 1 and 3, that helps delineate dynamics of 
this mobilization process over time, and estimates its parameters.  
I then examined the implications of this dynamic model of mobilization and 
participation.  Across the disparate political behaviors of voting, campaign volunteering, 
and political contributions, I find that multiple cycles of participation and mobilization 
generate a coterie of participants.  These participants are repeatedly called to action and 
repeatedly respond.  In the case of campaign contributions and volunteering, the 
mobilized individuals dominate the pool of participants, raising serious normative 
questions.  Moreover, I argue that this effect will increase because of recent 
improvements in behavioral targeting, i.e., micro-targeting using detailed individual-level 
consumer data. 
If the above theory is correct, then the implications for collective political action 
are significant.  Numerous interesting avenues for future research can be examined within 
this framework, including the long-term impact of episodes of heavy mobilization, 
socialization, neighborhood effects (Gimpel et al. 2004), household effects (Jennings and 





Given the normative issues raised here, further research should also be considered on the 
demographic profile of mobilized participants, and strategies to mitigate the potential for 












Chapter 5:  Dynamics of Social Conformity and Participation 
 
Introduction 
Potential voters continually interact with each other: socially, at work, and 
through everyday casual encounters.  A growing literature discusses how various forms 
of interpersonal interaction – political discussion, personal conflict, and norm setting – 
can shape the voting decision.  In this chapter, I examine the role of social conformity on 
the decision to turn out to vote, using the theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3.  I 
develop a full model of social conformity among voters, estimate its parameters versus 
empirical data, and project novel testable predictions of the model.  In the process, I 
analyze the influence of conformity in the empirical and theoretical context of other, 
often confounding, social influences.  
The core argument, like in Chapter 4, is that static models of voting are imperfect 
predictors of individual behavior over time, and a parsimonious dynamic model can 
better capture the underlying process. The result is greater empirical accuracy and 
conceptual clarity, resulting from a slightly more complex model that requires the novel 








Since the 1950s, the preponderance of research in political science has examined 
the isolated individual, and how personal characteristics shape political behavior (e.g., 
Campbell et al. 1960 or Downs 1957; see Zuckerman 2005 for an excellent history).  
Intuitively, however, the individual is embedded in a social context, and social 
relationships can play an important role in political behavior, from shaping political 
opinions to spurring political participation.  As one scholar notes (Zuckerman 2005), core 
lessons concerning the influence of social interactions on individual action date back to 
classical Greek philosophy and are found throughout the Bible.  Scholars in political 
science underwent periods of “rediscovery” in the 1930s and 1950s, providing renewed 
attention to the social interactions.  One such rediscovery is underway now, with a slew 
of interdisciplinary research centers (e.g., CASOS 2012), publications (e.g., Diani and 
McAdam 2003), and conferences (e.g., University of Michigan 2011; INSNA 2012) 
examining the social logic of politics.   
Three lines of quantitative research have recently blossomed on the manifold role 
of social networks in political behavior.  In political science, research into social 
networks and voting behavior has recently grown quite rapidly (e.g., Fowler 2005; 
Nickerson 2008).  A related branch of research, with roots in geography, studies 
autocorrelation across a network of spatial interaction, and is examining issues of spatial 
concentration in political behavior (Gimpel et al. 2004), such as political contributions by 
ethnic minorities (Cho 2003).  A complementary, but largely disjoint, research tradition 





comparative political science and sociology; for example, Diani and McAdam’s edited 
volume (2003) examines relational approaches to understanding social movements, 
including the diffusion of protest cycles across various networks (Oliver and Myers 
2003).  The political science literature generally employs statistical, simulation, and 
formal modeling; the spatial autocorrelation literature primarily employs (statistical) 
spatial regression; the sociology literature is rich in detailed case studies and qualitative 
theory.  This chapter follows the spirit of the burgeoning political science literature, but 
draws connections and lessons from all three traditions on the core question – how social 
conformity affects the likelihood of political participation.  
 
Social Networks and Conformity in Political Science 
In the political science literature on social networks, researchers have posited that 
a variety of types of social influences affect political behavior, ranging from political 
discussion, to casual observation, to organizational membership; the empirical results 
have been mixed, if not contradictory.  One of the most common types of social influence 
considered is the role of political discussion in prompting individuals to participate.  
McClurg (2003) finds that informal, politically oriented, discussion has a major (positive, 
monotonically increasing) impact on participation.  Alternatively, mere observation of 
peers’ political expressions can drive participation: Huckfeldt and Sprague (1995) posit 
that informal observation, including of neighbor’s lawns signs and bumper stickers, has a 
strong causal role in political participation, and find significant empirical support.  
Putnam (2000) focuses on the role of memberships in formal organizations, arguing that 





motivates participation in the voting booth.   
Within these models, often multiple mechanisms are considered for a single form 
of social interaction such as political discussion, ranging from the avoidance of conflict, 
to the diffusion of political information, to social conformity. The empirical and 
theoretical challenges of discriminating between and testing for these mechanisms can be 
seen in the debate over “cross-pressuring” ties, or diversity of political opinions within 
one’s social interactions.  Putnam (1995a; 1995b; 2000) posited, and found support for, a 
simple positive relationship between increased social ties and turnout, across various 
diverse social contexts, based on his model of social capital.  Other scholars have 
critiqued this finding, stating that the impact of social interactions is conditioned on 
whether there is diversity (or conflict) across those interactions.  Kotler-Berkowitz (2005) 
finds that diversity in social contacts increases turnout, employing a model of information 
and opportunities for participation.  Other empirical scholars have found empirical 
support for exactly the opposite result, that diversity decreases turnout, based on a model 
of political conflict and dissonance.  According to Alesina and Ferrara (2000), individuals 
prefer to interact with others who are similar, and, when confronting diversity, tend to 
withdraw and not form the formal organizations that are considered necessary for 
political interaction.  According to Mutz (2002), cross-pressures lead to lower 
participation, because a conflicted social environment leads to political ambivalence and 
raises impossible-to-meet social accountability pressures.   
Stepping back from the particular research studies conducted to date, we can 
identify a set of underlying mechanisms that can be examined across the various forms of 





confrontation could be applied to informal observation of lawn signs, as well as direct 
political discussion.  Kotler-Berkowitz (2005) focus on information gleaned from social 
interaction.  Putnam (2000) discusses, among other mechanisms, a generalized sense of 
trust built though positive social interactions.  Gerber and Rogers (2009) discuss 
“descriptive norms”, or the tendency to mimic the actions of others around you - due to 
expectations of appropriate behavior or perhaps to a desire to avoid conflict.  Schuessler’s 
work on Expressive Choice  (2000), while not directly applied to issues of social 
interaction, provides another potential explanation – that social interactions provide the 
opportunity (and expectation) to express one’s personal identity in political terms.  Each 
of these is based on a fundamentally different understanding of how individuals make 
decisions in a social environment.  
It may be that further theoretical elaboration will resolve such diverse findings 
and provide the necessary micro-foundation that explains each in turn.  The study of 
social interactions in political science is still quite new however, and there has yet to be a 
thorough and convincing analysis of when the various possible mechanisms are relevant, 
and how they interact.  Two formal modeling efforts provide some insight into the 
underlying complexities, however.  Siegel (2009) provides a set of formal network 
models, in which the network context differentially responds to increased 
interconnections.60  Without an understanding of the particular network structure in 
which a person is embedded, he found that it is difficult or impossible to forecast the 
                                                 
60 Similar to Cho and Rudolph (2008)’s observation, Siegel (2009) argues that the addition of a new social 
tie can increase or decrease participation depending on the existing ‘base’ rate for the individual.   Adding a 
tie to a non-participating individual dilutes the aggregate motivation to participate, and vice versa for a tie 





specific impact that social interactions will have on behavior.  Fowler’s (2005) model of 
turnout in a “small world” (Watts and Strogatz 1998) examines a narrower set of 
theoretical possibilities, using the network parameters estimated from Huckfeldt and 
Sprague’s data (1995, 2000) and finds a similar dependence of the network’s behavior to 
its specific network characteristics. Abstract models of localized influence, as in the 
Voter Model used in physics, find similar conclusions – delving in great detail into the 
role of network structure in the properties of system convergence (and unit level 
conformity) over time.  
In this Chapter, I seek to address these challenges in my study of the role of social 
conformity in voting behavior, by controlling for the influence of other social processes 
identified above, and analyzing conformity in the specific context of two empirically 
observed social networks.  
 
Participation and Spatial Autocorrelation 
Spatial econometrics analyzes how spatial dependence, the interaction between 
“nearby” units, can cause artifacts in traditional estimation techniques and how these 
artifacts can be mitigated (e.g., Anselin 2003).  While the technique has a significant 
history in geography and in econometrics, it is still somewhat new to political science, 
and warrants a brief overview before discussing its application to voting behavior.  
Spatial econometrics is used when the value of the dependent variable in a regression 
model for a given unit is correlated with that of other nearby units – and thus normal 
regression techniques will generally underestimate the variance in the data, calculating 





(Ward and Gleditsch 2008; Beck et al. 2006).61  By explicitly modeling the spatial 
autocorrelation, one can produce more accurate inferences about the causal role of 
independent variables and one can gain an understanding of the structure of the spatial 
interaction itself.   
Issues of spatial dependence and spatial interactions are increasingly being 
applied to political science phenomena (Ward and Gledistch 2008; Franzese and Hays 
2007; Gimpel et al. 2004).  For example, this approach has been used to study 
neighborhood effects in interstate violence (Gartzke and Gleditsch 2004), and the spatial 
distribution of lynchings in the US South (Tolnay et al. 1996); in both cases spatial auto-
correlation was found to be present.  Of particular relevance here is the study of 
autocorrelation across networks of interaction (Doreian 2001; Leenders 2002a, 2002b).62   
In these analyses, the pattern of interaction between units can be expressed as a (non-
spatial) network – a computer network, social network, etc.  For example, Gould (1991) 
applied a network autocorrelation model to mobilization in the Paris Commune, a 
“process in which a district's resistance level is a function of a set of exogenous variables 
and of the resistance levels of all the other districts, weighted by the strength of its links 
with them…This specification implies that each district simultaneously influences and is 
influenced by each other district in the network (p721).” 
                                                 
61 Other models of spatial dependence include autocorrelation in the error term and in the independent 
variables.  See Anselin 2003 for a review. 
62 Spatial autocorrelation models and network autocorrelation models employ the same underlying 
mathematical techniques; they differ in how the “neighborhood” of interacting units is defined. In spatial 
autocorrelation, neighboring units are usually geographically contiguous.  In network autocorrelation, units 
can interact across social connections, electronic connections (e.g. a computer network), or geographically 
contiguous locations.  For a discussion of the mathematical linkages between spatial autocorrelation and 
network effects, see Doreian (2001). Physical proximity is often used as a proxy for social networks due to 






Voting behavior can present similar estimation problems that can be mitigated by 
spatial and network auto-correlation techniques.  In a traditional statistical analysis of 
voting, voters are treated as independent of one another, though temporal autocorrelation 
for each person across election cycles is often considered.  If, in reality, voters condition 
their behavior on the characteristics or behavior of other voters, the assumption of 
independence causes statistical artifacts.  While a small number of political scientists 
have analyzed this problem with respect to spatial autocorrelation (see Gimpel et al. 2004 
for an early example), the same problems arise with social interactions between voters – 
network autocorrelation.  For example, if one potential voter gets into a political 
argument with another potential voter, then each of the verbal combatants may become 
more (or less) inclined to go vote.  If the interpersonal spark that turned political interest 
into political action is not incorporated into the analysis, then personal variables (such as 
partisanship) will appear more significant than they should.  In a dataset containing a 
sparse random sample of a large population, in which individuals are sampled without 
their political discussants, then this interaction would be an omitted variable influencing 
the included variable of partisanship.  In a denser dataset where political discussants are 
likely to be included, then network (spatial) autocorrelation and misestimation occurs. 
One challenge facing researchers who employ spatial or network autocorrelation 
techniques is to specify, beforehand, the correct unit of interaction – researchers must 
already have an understanding of whether interactions occur over neighboring streets, 
census blocks, cities, or counties, for example.  Further, the substantive meaning of a 
positive spatial autocorrelation result can be challenging in the context of voting. 





equilibrium of the interaction (Anselin 2003), after an unspecified number of cycles of 
interaction.  Similarly, the common form of interaction is assumed to be a diffusion 
process – values of interest from one unit spreading out to influence other units based on 
distance – which requires careful thought to apply to interactions between voters (see 
Cho and Rudolph, 2008 for one example). 
While understudied and still imperfectly adapted to voting behavior, spatial and 
network autocorrelation models provide a valuable tool to check the assumptions of 
existing voting behavior models (e.g., Gimpel et al. 2004). They also help untangle 
existing debates in the field.  Cho and Rudolph (2008) provide a possible rationale from a 
spatial perspective on the apparently contradictory results of cross pressures:  the impact 
of cross-pressures could depend on the “base” level of participation in a local region.  A 
low or high “base” could occur because of personal characteristics of the individuals, or 
localized dynamics within a tightly knit group, or both.  Whatever the base participation 
level may be, it influences voters in the region and surrounding regions to regress toward 
that mean. 
   
Limitations 
Three problems arise in applying research on social influence to political science 
phenomena such as voting.  First, as noted above, there are potentially multiple, 
overlapping processes.  While authors have demonstrated the statistical significance of 
various processes, disentangling their interactions is a daunting task.  Second, network 
structure has a major impact on the outcome of social interactions, and researchers need 





of social interaction.  The spatial autocorrelation literature provides a mathematical basis 
for expressing that network structure; Siegel (2009) vividly demonstrates how changes in 
the underlying network structure affect results of otherwise identical theoretical models. 
Too many authors employ a generic “networks approach” or “social approach” and 
attempt to generalize their findings from a particular network configuration into more 
general social ties.  
A third problem arises in the application of social influence models without 
additional theoretical checks and balances; in the terminology of Chapter 3, a simple 
feedback loop can result, in which the predicted outcomes are wildly unrealistic.  As with 
mobilization and other dynamic processes, one must look outside of the core interaction 
for concurrent constraints on the model that limit unrealistic outcomes.  In the case of 
social interactions, “extraneous” factors (the social requirements of one’s job, family, and 
entertainment), provide grist for political discussion and interaction and fundamentally 
shape the social interaction process and underlying network structure.63   
In this paper, I seek to explore one particular mechanism of social influence on 
participation, recognizing the necessity of accounting for diverse, and potentially 
overlapping, concurrent mechanisms.  The top level result has strong similarities to the 
spatial autocorrelation literature – in specifying a social transition process – but also 
provides a (theoretical) micro-foundation that allows for ready elaboration and testing 
without the methodological tools and assumptions of the spatial autocorrelation literature.  
                                                 
63 A related critique of social network research focuses on these “other” factors.  The critique states that 
social processes are merely predicated on some prior, non-social and presumably more “solid” event or 
personal characteristic – such as ethnicity, gender, or early partisanship.   While accurate, this argument is 
not compelling on its own – since causally prior events always exist.  It is in the social interaction that we 





I pursue an analysis of localized conformity which is related to the larger discussion in 
the literature about the importance of a norm of civic duty in voting behavior (Blais 2000, 
Knack 1992);  I see this individual level analysis as providing a micro-foundation to this 
higher level analysis.  Similarly, this work is strongly related to that of Green, Gerber and 
Larimer (2008) finding that social expectation affects individual level voting; unlike their 
experimental work, I posit a specific mechanism for the individual-to-individual 
interaction, and extend the model to consider unanticipated consequences for society. 
In the process of developing and testing the model, I seek to address each of three 
limitations in the existing literature identified above.  To address the challenge of 
multiple, overlapping processes, I employ a simulation model, first presented in Chapter 
3, which analyses descriptive norms alongside alternative social processes, in an intuitive 
manner that allows for their individual impact to be considered.  To address the 
importance of known network structure, I employ datasets that provide the actual 
structure of social interaction for two groups of voters.  In the next two sections, I also 
address the issue of social feedback loops, and develop models that build in additional 
constraints for a more realistic portrayal of voter behavior.  
 
Step 1:  Develop the Theoretical Model 
The primary goal of this chapter is to develop an understanding of how social 
conformity affects voting behavior.  However, given the diverse and overlapping social 
processes described in the literature, I will first develop a clearer understanding of how 





of social processes can also provide a foundation for analyzing dynamic cycles at work in 
multiple social interactions, in the spirit of Chapter 3’s theoretical framework.  
 
Cycles of Social Interaction and Participation 
Similar to the cycle of mobilization, we can highlight the dynamic, adaptive, 
nature of social interaction and voting in a stylized cycle – a three-stage “cycle of social 
influence” – of which a cycle of social conformity is one process: 
 Step 1: Individuals interact with their social environment, in a particular 
context of interest, such as workplace political discussion or informal observation 
of lawn signs. 
 Step 2:  Individuals decide whether or not to act, based on their own political 
agenda, the overall political climate, their exogenous characteristics (race, gender, 
etc.), their endogenous traits (experience, etc.), and their social experiences as 
filtered through a particular psychological mechanism (rational evaluation based 
on available information, conformity to descriptive norms, avoidance of conflict, 
etc.).  
 Step 3:  The act of participation changes the individual and her social 
environment, via changes in the social network (new friends or enemies) and 
personal characteristics (partisanship, political information and interest). These 
updated characteristics and environment shape social interactions in the next 
cycle, which in turn leads to increased (or decreased) participation. 






Figure 12, below, provides one way to visualize this generic cycle. 
 
Figure 12: A general dynamic process of social interaction   
 
This framework helps contextualize current models of social-political interaction, 
from descriptive norms (Gerber and Rogers 2009) to social capital (Putnam 2000).  For 
example, McClurg’s (2003) work demonstrates how political conversation (Step 1) 
increases the likelihood of an individual’s participation (Step 2), controlling for the social 
milieu and exogenous personal characteristics, which then would influence future 
political conversations (Step 3).  
 
Theoretical Model 
Here, I will focus on one such cycle of social interaction, which is driven by 
social conformity.  The underlying theoretical mechanism is straightforward, in which 
individuals have a tendency to model their behavior on the behavior of their peers.  This 
process is also known as descriptive norms in the literature, as individuals try to follow 
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their understanding of socially appropriate behavior, which they determine by (a 
description of) what others are actually doing.  Descriptive norms have been the subject 
of significant research in social psychology (Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno 1991; Reno, 
Cialdini, and Kallgren 1993), and recently have been shown to have substantively 
significant effects on voter turnout in experimental research by Gerber and Rogers 
(2009).   
Descriptive norms of political participation would be based on an individual’s 
perception of whether others intend to participate.  I assume that this perception is formed 
through observation, especially through direct political discussion with other individuals.  
While an individual may, at some level, be aware of the national turnout rate, feelings of 
social accountability and expected behavior weigh most heavily on an individual when 
they are tied to the person’s direct peer group; i.e., in the common usage, they are tied to 
a person’s social network.  I will refer to this perceived vote intention of peers as the 
“local participation rate”, to distinguish it from the overall participation rate; all local 
participation rates are relative to a particular individual observing them. 
With this definition of descriptive norms, based on the local (perceived) rate of 
voter participation, we can delineate a dynamic interaction that occurs between the 
individual and his or her social network: 
 Step 1: Individuals observe the local participation intention of their social 
network, through direct political discussion with their peers. 
 Step 2:  Individuals decide whether or not they intend to vote, based on their 
own political agenda, the overall political climate, their exogenous characteristics, 





 Step 3:  The decision to participate changes the individuals and their peers, 
leading to an increased (or decreased) likelihood of presenting others with the 
intention to participate during the next cycle.  All individuals in the system are 
thus updated, creating new local participation rates for the next round.  
 Cycle: Repeat Steps 1-3. 
 
An updated version of Figure 12, specific to this cycle is given in Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13: Specific dynamic process, of descriptive norms and intent to participate 
 
This specific cycle expresses the key mechanism of interest – the two-way 
process of conforming to one’s peers.  In the next section, I translate this cycle into a 
mathematical form that can be estimated and tested. However, it is important to 
remember that this process is just one of many possible social cycles that could be 
occurring at a given time (per Figure 12); I will return to examine descriptive norms 
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Initial Mathematical Representation 
To formalize this cycle and make the assumptions more explicit, I start with a 
basic representation of descriptive norms and voting behavior.  
Assume that each individual i, i:1..N, has a turnout intention, T, which can range 
from 0, no intention to vote, to 1, perfect certainty.  That intention to vote is determined 
by two factors: the individual’s desire to conform to the perceived local participation rate 
of her peers, LPR, and the person’s inherent but exogenous desire to vote (or not), X.  
Assume that the individual has disutility in deviating from her exogenous turnout 
intention X, and, simultaneously, disutility in deviating from the turnout intention of her 
peers, the LocalParticipationRate, and that the level of discomfort increases with the 
square of the distance from these two ideal points (i.e., the discomfort increases and 
accelerates with greater social and personal deviations from these ideals). This utility 
function can be represented as: 
U(T) =  1 – γ1(T - X)
2  – γ2(T - LPR)
2  
 
And the utility maximizing level of turnout intention can be determined as: 
∂U/∂T = 0 =  2γ1(T - X) - 2γ2(T - LPR)
 
T(2γ1 + 2γ2) =  2γ1X  + 2γ2LPR
 
T=  2( γ1X  + γ2LPR) / (2γ1 + 2γ2) 
 
Cleaning up the notation, this model can be represented as:64,65 
T=  α1 X  + α 2 LPR 
                                                 
64 In an environment where all individuals interact with each other, and can strategically change their 
preference to maximize utility, this simple scenario can be represented as an assurance game, with well-






With the Turnout Intention (T) as the individual’s optimal (intended) probability 
of turning out to vote, Local Participation Rate (LPR) is a function of the turnout 
intention of one’s peers, and X as the exogenous turnout intention of the individual if 
there were no social influences.  Assuming that the individual weighs all social ties 
equally, LPR can be calculated as the average perceived turnout intention of the peers.   
Turnout intentions, and local participation rates, would change over time as the 
individuals interact with one another.  In each interaction, the individual would learn the 
current turnout intentions of their peers (which they had formed in the prior period), and 
adjust his turnout intentions accordingly.66  Their peers would do the same, creating a 
new set of intentions and local participation rates at the end of each interaction.   
 
Highlighting the Feedback Process 
The relationship between the individual’s turnout intention and that of her peers 
drives the dynamic interaction illustrated in Figure 13. One’s voting intentions affect 
one’s peer’s intentions, which reflect back to the individual affecting future voting 
intentions.  Putting aside the individual’s exogenous interests in voting (X), this core 
cycle can be represented as: 
T ~ LPR 
                                                                                                                                                 
65 Note, one can use the same approach to model political attitudes more generally, in which each 
individual has a vector of political attitudes (e.g., turnout intention, party allegiance, etc.) that adjust 
according to the individual’s desire to conform to the local attitudes of his peers.    
66 In this stylized model, I assume that people can change their own attitudes to fit the norm, but cannot 
significantly change the people with whom they interact.  I assume that most interactions are exogenous, at 
least in the short term – they are required by work, by where one lives, and by the family the person is born 





This simple model has been well explored in the literature, and from a practical 
perspective it often predicts unrealistic outcomes, such as utterly homogeneous behavior.  
In this extreme, the feedback cycle between individuals and their peers leads both sides to 
converge on the same behavior (such as everyone votes or no one votes.).  Johnson and 
Huckfeldt (2005) provide a useful summary of this type of model and its unrealistic 
results in a political context.   
In order for the model to realistically predict voting behavior, either this feedback 
cycle must have no practical significance (i.e., a cycle is present but has little 
importance), or some other constraint must exists on the social feedback process.  The 
individual’s exogenous characteristics (X) are one such constraint and limit the 
homogenizing influence of social conformity.  Political science research on social 
influences generally includes controls for such ‘extraneous factors’, for good theoretical 
reasons and to focus on the unique impact of the social influence of interest.  By adding 
them to their models, researchers also avoid unrealistic edge solutions.  My model also 
employs theoretically relevant control variables, with the pleasant side-effect of making 
the core social process more realistic.   
Another constraint on the homogenizing power of social conformity is network 
structure, or the specific types of connections that are present between individuals.  
Johnson and Huckfeldt (2005), Centola and Macy (2007) and others find that models of 
pure diffusion or pure norms can resist corner solutions under particular forms of social 
network structures.  For example, the grouping of individuals into relatively insular 
cliques can result in heterogeneity across cliques, even if it is suppressed within cliques.  





Indirect Impacts Over Time 
A cycle of dynamic (social) interactions over time sets up the opportunity for a 
complex pattern of serial autocorrelation, in which prior social interactions have an 
enduring impact across multiple future interactions and voting cycles; a similar statistical 
challenge as arose with cycles of mobilization in Chapter 4. The serial autocorrelation is 
unlikely to be a simple first-order process, because the impact of prior social interactions 
is mediated through a very specific social structure that generates each cycle’s local 
participation rate.  The direct and indirect (time-delayed) impact of social interactions is 








Figure 14: Impact of prior social interaction on political participation 
 
Two indirect impacts are identifiable.  First, the indirect impact via one’s peers is 
shown on the top line, as has been the focus of the discussion thus far.  Second, we would 
expect that turnout intention would be serially correlated, in which prior turnout 
intentions provide inertia (or the basis for habit) for future turnout intentions.  This 
second indirect impact is very similar to the pathway considered in Chapter 4, as 
mobilizers build the habit (or inertia) of voting in their targets. 
Indirect Impact Via 
























While these processes set up potentially complex statistical relationships, they can 
be estimated using the same tools employed to estimate the mobilization model – the 
optimization of a simulation model that captures the underlying econometric functions.  
 
Step 2:  Formalizing and Testing the Model 
Econometric Model with Controls 
The next step in developing the econometric model is to specify factors beyond 
the local participation rate that influence voting and might bias the estimation of social 
conformity’s role if not included.  Like other researchers, I will (partially) control for 
personal traits that are exogenous to the participation choice, drawing from the rich 
literature on individual determinants of political participation cited above.  For example, 
some of the variables incorporated in the literature include personal resources (age 
income, education), engagement (interest, efficacy, ideological extremity), and 
demographic factors (race, gender).  A range of underlying theoretical models provide 
rationale for these variables, including resource mobilization models (Verba et al. 1995), 
Michigan-style social-psychological models (Campbell et al. 1960), or rational choice 
models of relative costs and benefits (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981; etc.).  These 
ontologically individual models provide overlapping and often competing interpretations; 
for my purposes however, it is unnecessary to adjudicate between these interpretations.  
The variables are effectively nuisance parameters for this social model of descriptive 
norms; the resulting functional form follows Seigel (2009), employing nuisance variables 





The resulting econometric model of turnout intention is: 
Local Participation Ratei,t  = ∑j:1..K(TurnoutIntentionj,t-1)  / (K) 
 
TurnoutIntentioni,t = Logistic(Bo  
+ B1Local Participation Ratei,t  
+ Personal Factors [= B2Racei + B3Marital Statusi,t + B4Genderi  
                 + B4Employment  Statusi,t + B5Household Incomei,t + B6Agei,t + B7Educationi,t                      
                 + B8Political Interesti,t + B9Partisan Extremityi,t + B10 Ideological Extremityi,t]  
+ History    [ = B11 TurnoutIntentioni,t-1]) 
Hi,t =  TurnoutIntentioni,t-1 
 
It requires one statistical estimation process, for turnout intention. This estimation 
requires an unusual dataset, however.  It should have direct information about the prior 
turnout intention of one’s peers,67 and prior turnout intention of the individual, along with 
current turnout intention for the individual.  It should also include information on other, 
potentially competing, social processes. 
 
Competing Social Processes 
Further improvements can be made by untangling the overlapping impacts of 
various social processes.  First, social capital is commonly discussed, and can be 
operationalized as participation in organized social groups (per Putnam 2000).  Second, 
network heterogeneity can be operationalized as the number of individuals in a person’s 
local network that disagree with the individual on their choice of political candidate.68  
As above, I will not assume a particular model of how diversity affects participation.  
                                                 
67 Since knowledge is one’s peers intentions is necessarily based on PRIOR events, the prior turnout 
intention of one’s peers can be measured as the CURRENT understanding of the PRIOR turnout intention 
of one’s peers. 
68  Note also that the operationalization of diversity impacts the empirical outcome. As Mutz (2002) points 
out, cross-cutting pressures have often been examined as cross-cutting group memberships, but she finds 
that direct metrics of social pressure often lead to contradictory results.  Following Mutz, I employ a direct 





Researchers have found positive (Kotler-Berkowitz 2005), negative (Mutz 2002), or 
neutral effects from network heterogeneity.  Instead, I treat the competing processes as 
nuisance variables, to be revisited in future research focused on discriminating between 
these multiple processes.  Third, increased information arising from social contact, and 
subsequently lower costs to participation, can be operationalized as the number of 
political discussants an individual has (following McClurg 2002).  Unfortunately, the 
South Bend dataset does not facilitate analysis of this competing process, as the 
researchers required that respondents provide a fixed number of discussants (3), and is 
not included in this analysis.  Finally, Chapter 4 provides evidence that mobilization can 
also provide an effective trigger for turnout, and thus should also be included as a control.   
The resulting model, incorporating both immutable personal traits and potentially 
confounding processes of social influence and mobilization is: 
 
TurnoutIntentioni,t  = Logistic(B0 
+ B1Local Participation Ratei,t  
+ B2Racei + B3Marital Statusi,t + B4Genderi + B4Employment Statusi,t 
 + B5Household Incomei,t + B6Agei,t + B7Educationi,t + B8Political Interesti,t  
+ B9Partisan Extremityi,t + B10Ideological Extremityi,t  
+ B11Social Group Membershipsi,t + B12Network Heterogeneityi,t  
+ B13Mobilizationi,t 
+ B14 TurnoutIntentioni,t-1) 
 
From Turnout Intentions to Voting Behavior 
While Turnout Intention is theoretically interesting for its feedback effects, the 
practical significance of this research for political scientists hinges on an additional 
relationship: 






Political scientists are most interested in how social conformity affects the 
likelihood that an individual will actually turn out to vote, rather than whether they plan 
to turn out to vote.  Thus, the second model of interest is: 
 
Pr(Vote) = Logistic(B0 
+ B1Local Participation Ratei,t  
+ B2Racei + B3Marital Statusi,t + B4Genderi + B4Employment Statusi,t  
+ B5Household Incomei,t + B6Agei,t + B7Educationi,t + B8Political Interesti,t  
+ B9Partisan Extremityi,t + B10Ideological Extremityi,t+ B11Social Group Membershipsi,t  
+ B12Network Heterogeneityi,t + B13Mobilizationi,t 
+ B14 TurnoutIntentioni,t-1) 
 
And thus the dataset used to estimate these models would ideally have data on 
actual voting behavior, as well as on turnout intentions. 
 
Data Sources  
Following Siegel’s (2009) analysis, I assume that the underlying network 
structure over which social interactions occur is of great practical significance of those 
interactions.  Rather than attempting to model the range of possible network structures, I 
examined datasets that provide detailed information voters and their discussants.  Data on 
these social interactions and on voter turnout is scarce, but some suitable datasets are 
available.   
Huckfeldt and Sprague have two datasets that provide detailed social data for 
South Bend, Indiana (circa 1984) and St. Louis-Indianapolis study (circa 1996-1997).  
The South Bend data (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1985) is a three-wave panel study of 2,158 
individuals around the 1984 presidential elections, capturing demographic and attitudinal 
variables before, during and immediately after the national conventions.  The 





discussed politics; they then conducted follow-up interviews with 924 of their discussion 
partners.  The St. Louis-Indianapolis Study (Huckfeldt and Sprague 2000; Huckfeldt and 
Sprague 2002) has interviews with 2,612 individuals, and follow-up interviews with 
1,740 of their political discussants.  Individuals were drawn from the list of registered 
voters, and cross-sectional waves of interviews occurred before, during, and after the 
elections; topics included standard demographic and attitudinal questions plus additional 
questions on political and community involvement and perceptions of the political 
preferences of frequent discussants.  Both data sets have been used by a series of 
researchers, such as Fowler (2005), to analyze network influence and can provide a 
baseline for comparison against existing models.   
For this study, I analyze both datasets, working around their limitations to ask two 
related questions: how does the perception of others’ voting intentions affects one’s own 
voting intentions, and how does the perception of others’ turnout behavior affects one’s 
own turnout behavior?  Both datasets include the desired information about personal and 
demographic factors that are treated as exogenous factors in the model including race, 
marital status, gender, income, age, education, partisanship, and ideological extremity. 
They also include information that allows us to control for alternative explanations of 
social influence, including mobilization, network heterogeneity and membership in social 
groups (political capital).  The South Bend data contains self-reported voting behavior for 
the individual and his discussants, as well as two prior measurements of turnout 
intentions for the individual; the St. Louis dataset contains both self-reported voting 
behavior and intentions for the individual and the individual’s discussants, but 





The coding of each variable for each of the two datasets is available in the 
Appendix. In employing these datasets, I seek to measure the influence on voting 
behavior of each individual’s perception of their discussant’s behavior, and not the 
discussant’s own statement of their behavior or validated turnout data.  While these two 
are generally quite similar (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), perceptions are more 
appropriate for descriptive norms, and I employ only the primary interviewees’ 
perceptions of their peers’ behavior, and not their peers’ self-reported behavior.  
Working with the strengths of each dataset, the two sources are mapped onto two 
empirical tests of the theoretical model, as follows: 
• With the South Bend panel dataset, I analyze the impact of the perceived turnout 
intentions of one’s peers on one’s own voting behavior, controlling for one’s own 
prior turnout intentions. 
• With the St. Louis pre-election data, I analyze the impact of the perceived turnout 
intentions of one’s peers on one’s own turnout intentions. 
 
Note: in addition to these two datasets, I analyze a related dataset in the 
Appendix, for further verification of the results.  The data is drawn from the two post-
election cross sections from the St. Louis study (Huckfeldt and Sprague 2000), and 
provide information on the role of peer turnout intentions on individual voting behavior.  
Unlike the South Bend panel, those post-election cross sections for St. Louis do not 
include a control variable for the individual’s prior turnout intentions, and are thus not 






Simulation Implementation  
I implemented two simulations, one focusing on conformity of turnout intentions, 
and one on conformity of turnout behavior, built around the St. Louis and South Bend 
datasets, respectively.  As in Chapter 4, the simulations follow the underlying models’ 
equations precisely, with the addition of a scoring function that compares the individual-
by-individual predictions of the models to the original South Bend and St. Louis data.  
The simulation is then optimized with respect to the scoring function, to determine 
optimal parameters that minimize error against the observed data.  This approach allows 
for accurate estimation of models with significant violations of standard regression 
assumptions (such as circular and non-linearizable feedback loops), but sacrifices the 
certainty that the resulting parameters are global, rather than local, optima.  The resulting 
process is analogous to a non-deterministic Maximum Likelihood Estimation (see 
Chapter 3 for a more detailed description).  As in Chapter 4, I implemented the 
simulations using the R programming language (R Development Core Team 2012).   
 
Test 1: Estimating Model Parameters and Testing Statistical Significance 
For each of the two simulation models, I use the “Flexible Modeling 
Environment” (FME) package in R (Soetaert and Petzoldt 2010) to estimate the 
parameters of the model and generate confidence intervals around each estimate. I use the 
FME package’s implementation of the Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm for the 
optimization itself.   
After the estimation (optimization) process is complete, I calculate the impact of 





voting across the actual individuals in the original dataset, as advocated by researchers 
such as Hanmer and Kalkan (2009).  This entails calculating predicted probabilities for 
each individual in the dataset with the maximum and the minimum value in each of the 
variables, rather than using a single stylized individual with “average” values across all 
other variables, as has been common practice in the field.  The estimation of the first 
model on the St. Louis dataset, examines how one’s turnout intentions conform to the 
turnout intentions of one’s peers, and is presented in Table 7.   
 
Table 7: Simulation estimation of the impact of the Local Participation Rate on 






Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept NA -1.08 0.67 -1.60 0.11 
White -0.03 -0.25 0.31 -0.80 0.42 
Married 0.03 0.23 0.20 1.16 0.25 
Female 0.04 0.35 0.18 1.99 0.05 
Employed -0.05 -0.47 0.23 -2.03 0.04 
Age 0.09 0.01 0.01 1.42 0.15 
Household Income 0.05 0.01 0.00 1.13 0.26 
Education 0.05 0.38 0.45 0.84 0.40 
Political Interest 0.08 0.62 0.26 2.38 0.02 
Partisan Extremity 0.27 0.62 0.10 6.24 0.00 
Ideological Extremity 0.03 0.10 0.08 1.23 0.22 
Group Membership 0.08 0.13 0.08 1.66 0.10 
Mobilization 0.00 0.01 0.19 0.03 0.97 
Heterogeneity (% Agree) -0.07 -0.58 0.25 -2.34 0.02 
LPR (% Plan to Vote) 0.06 0.49 0.26 1.90 0.06 
 
In this model, the turnout intentions of one’s peers have a statistically and 





intending to vote by 6%.  
The second model, on social conformity in actual voting behavior, provides an 
alternative measure of the impact of social conformity, and is presented in Table 8.  
 
Table 8: Simulation estimation of the impact of the Local Participation Rate on 






Error t value Pr(>|t|) 
Intercept NA -3.49 0.60 -5.78 0.00 
White -0.05 -0.96 0.26 -3.63 0.00 
Married -0.03 -0.52 0.24 -2.19 0.03 
Female -0.01 -0.10 0.20 -0.53 0.60 
Employed 0.03 0.44 0.24 1.78 0.08 
Age 0.20 0.05 0.01 6.36 0.00 
Household Income 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.38 0.70 
Education 0.11 1.76 0.51 3.43 0.00 
Political Interest 0.13 1.74 0.25 6.93 0.00 
Partisan Extremity 0.04 0.21 0.09 2.22 0.03 
Ideological Extremity -0.10 -0.55 0.12 -4.57 0.00 
Group Membership 0.08 0.20 0.07 2.79 0.01 
Mobilization 0.02 0.25 0.18 1.36 0.17 
Heterogeneity (% Agree) 0.03 0.54 0.23 2.38 0.02 
Prior Turnout Intention 0.19 2.43 0.26 9.39 0.00 
LPR (% Voted) 0.08 1.15 0.28 4.18 0.00 
 
This model also indicates a statistically and practically significant role for social 
conformity – leading to an 8% bump in reported voter turnout.  In terms of the underlying 
theory of social conformity, both pieces of evidence are encouraging.   
The higher impact, by 33%, witnessed in the second model is intriguing – 
indicating that voting behavior is more influenced by conformity pressures than turnout 
intentions.  One might suspect that the populations surveyed in the two datasets, from 





social conformity pressures.  However, the post-election cross sections from St. Louis 
focusing on voter behavior offer very similar results to the 1984 South Bend data (results 
provided in the Appendix).  Alternatively, one could argue that the intention to vote may 
be less influenced by social pressures than self-reported voting behavior.69  In part, this 
could be because of differences in the timing of the turnout intention and voting behavior 
datasets; the turnout intention data is collected before (sometimes, many months before) 
the election, and the voting behavior datasets are collected after the election.  It is likely 
that most discussion of whether one should vote or not occurs directly before the election, 
rather than in the previous months.  
 
Test 2: Comparing Results against the Benchmark, Non-Simulation Model 
As in Chapter 4, I will use the simulation model to extend the analysis into future 
periods and generate testable hypotheses that would not have been feasible using a 
standard regression model.  Those extensions are discussed in the next section.  However, 
I first want to ensure that the novel simulation implementation aligns with the more 
standard methods employed in the literature.   
As a benchmark, I employed a logit regression; this is an imperfect vehicle 
because of the assumed presence of network autocorrelation, but it is nevertheless an 
appropriate benchmark as it (or uncorrected probit analyses) is used in the existing 
research on similar models (e.g., Huckfeldt et al. 2000). Estimations were performed 
                                                 
69 One might also ask whether the inclusion of the control variable for prior voting intention – possible in 
the South Bend panel study but not in the cross-sectional St. Louis dataset – is behind the change in 
predicted probabilities. When this control variable is removed, the following estimation results occur (with 
a logit regression implementation):  Ave Predict Probability Change = 20%, Coefficient Estimate: 1.77, 
Std. Err 0.33.  That is, the effect of social conformity increases further, rather than falling in line with the 





using the R statistical package, with the Zelig library (R Development Core Team 2012; 
Imai, King, and Lau 2010).  The table below provides a test of the model in which the 
Local Participation Rate is a predictor of turnout intentions.   
 
Table 9: Logit regression of the impact of the Local Participation Rate on Turnout 




Change Estimate Std. Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept  NA -1.62 0.77 -2.09 0.04 
White -0.03 -0.27 0.33 -0.81 0.42 
Married 0.02 0.17 0.23 0.73 0.46 
Female 0.05 0.44 0.21 2.16 0.03 
Employed -0.03 -0.25 0.26 -0.97 0.33 
Age 0.10 0.01 0.01 1.53 0.13 
Household Income 0.06 0.01 0.01 1.25 0.21 
Education 0.01 0.10 0.51 0.20 0.84 
Political Interest 0.05 0.43 0.30 1.41 0.16 
Partisan Extremity 0.30 0.69 0.11 6.36 0.00 
Ideological Extremity 0.06 0.17 0.09 1.79 0.07 
Group Membership 0.10 0.17 0.08 2.01 0.04 
Mobilization 0.01 0.07 0.22 0.33 0.74 
Heterogeneity (% Agree) -0.04 -0.37 0.28 -1.30 0.19 
LPR (% Plan to Vote) 0.08 0.63 0.30 2.07 0.04 
 
In this logistic regression, the key variable of interest – the local participation rate 
– is statistically significant at the 95% level, and corresponds to an average change in the 
predicted probability of intending to vote of 8%.  This is comparable to the 6% lift seen 
in the simulation model, but noticeably higher.  The change in impact may be caused by 
bias of the logistic regression (due to violation of regression assumptions on data with 





optimization process cannot guarantee results that are the global maxima).   
Table 10 provides the results of a similar logistic regression, in which I estimated 
the impact of the local participation rate on self-reported turnout behavior.  
 
Table 10: Logit estimation of the impact of the Local Participation Rate on Turnout 






Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
Intercept NA -3.39 0.77 -4.39 0.00 
White -0.04 -0.53 0.31 -1.69 0.09 
Married -0.02 -0.34 0.30 -1.12 0.26 
Female 0.00 -0.03 0.25 -0.12 0.90 
Employed 0.03 0.35 0.30 1.18 0.24 
Age 0.20 0.04 0.01 4.26 0.00 
Household Income 0.06 0.01 0.01 1.53 0.13 
Education 0.05 0.65 0.59 1.11 0.27 
Political Interest 0.10 1.19 0.29 4.11 0.00 
Partisan Extremity 0.04 0.18 0.12 1.46 0.14 
Ideological Extremity -0.08 -0.37 0.14 -2.58 0.01 
Group Membership 0.08 0.17 0.09 1.94 0.05 
Mobilization 0.02 0.30 0.23 1.29 0.20 
Heterogeneity (% Agree) 0.03 0.33 0.30 1.12 0.26 
Prior Turnout Intention 0.19 1.94 0.25 7.86 0.00 
LPR (% Voted) 0.15 1.60 0.36 4.50 0.00 
 
The local participation rate is again statistically significant.  The average change 
in the predicted probability of voting, for the individuals in the original dataset, is 15%, 
markedly higher than the 8% lift seen for the simulation model.  As mentioned above, we 
would expect some differences between the two methods for two reasons. First, the 
underlying econometric assumptions differ, and we have strong reason to believe they are 





is less exact for the simulation model, compared to the ideal case of a logistic regression 
in which its assumptions all hold.   
In both cases, however, social conformity pressures are a significant, positive, 
predictor of individual turnout, even after controlling for a host of individual and 
alternate social factors.  These results line up with the simulation model, providing a 
measure of confidence that the methodology is solid, and affords further extension into 
new observable facts.  
     
Test 3: Estimating the Total Effect of Social Conformity, including Indirect Impacts 
In addition to the direct impact of social conformity on one’s voting intention and 
voting behavior, conformity can indirectly impact future actions via two routes.  These 
routes are illustrated in Figure 14, at the beginning of Step 1 of this analysis.  They can be 
summarized as follows: 
• Social conformity first influences the individual to vote (or plan to vote), as a direct 
impact.  That personal decision then is relayed to one’s peers, and becomes part of 
their social conformity pressures.  Their decision to vote (or plan to vote) then is 
relayed back to the individual, becoming part of an updated set of social conformity 
pressures, and again influencing the individual’s decision, but in an indirect manner.  
• Social conformity first influences the individual to vote (or plan to vote), as a direct 
impact.  That personal decision shapes the individual’s longer term habits, and 







I estimated the first type of indirect impact using the St. Louis pre-election 
dataset, since it provides the most detailed information about the main respondent’s 
discussants and their own turnout intentions.  This indirect impact can be calculated by 
determining how important conformity, applied to one’s peers (by one’s peers’ peers, 
including oneself), is to one’s own decisions.  The estimation process is: 
1. Estimate the simulation model of turnout intention and its determinants using the 
main respondents in the data, as presented in the previous section.  
2. For each discussant in the data, apply the estimated model to predict their turnout 
intention with and without the influence of social conformity.   
3. For each main respondent in the data, determine the average turnout intention of their 
discussants, with and without the influence of social conformity.  The result is each 
individual’s Local Participation Rate (with and without conformity pressures on the 
discussants).   
4. For each main respondent in the data, apply the estimated model to predict their 
turnout intention, given the two possible Local Participation Rates (when their peers 
are under the influence of social conformity, and when they are not.)  
5. Calculate the average change in turnout intentions due to social conformity pressures 
on one’s peers – which is the indirect impact of that conformity on the individual.   
 
The resulting indirect impact of conformity on turnout intentions, an average 
increase in 0.4% in intentions, is very modest, and does not warrant much future 
attention.  However, when the same analysis is applied to voting behavior on the post-





significant, and could determine the outcome of a presidential election.   
It is somewhat more challenging to calculate the other type of indirect impact, in 
which the prior local participation rate affects prior turnout intentions and those turnout 
intentions affect current participation above and beyond the current participation rate 
(i.e., through habit or inertia).  Ideally, one would trace the same individuals through the 
initial social conformity process, through the formation of turnout intentions, to later 
rounds of social conformity pressures, to the final decision to vote.  However, neither the 
South Bend nor St. Louis datasets alone provide the full set of information required: an 
estimate of the local participation rate’s impact on turnout intention, and the impact of 
prior intentions on current intentions.   
Instead, we can roughly estimate the average indirect impact using the results of 
the analyses of the two individual, but separate, datasets.  The process is as follows: 
1. Estimate the impact of the Local Participation Rate on turnout intentions – using the 
St. Louis, pre-election dataset.  These results are presented in Table 7. 
2. Estimate the impact of prior intentions on voting behavior – using the South Bend 
dataset. These results are presented in Table 8. 
3. Calculate the combined impact of both factors.   
 
The resulting indirect impact, a 1.14% increase in turnout due (=6% * 19%) is 
also practically significant, and could be consequential in a presidential election.  No firm 
conclusions should be  drawn from this analysis though, given the rough procedure used 
to estimate the impact.  The results do warrant further attention though, if a suitably 





In total, social conformity’s direct and indirect impact on voting behavior, if 
supported by further tests, could be very substantial – adding up to an 11% boost in 
overall turnout.   
 
Step 3: Extending the Model into New Observable Facts  
Extension 1: A Multi-Cycle Simulation Model, in a Fragmented Society 
Social conformity has an important role in shaping individual turnout intentions 
and turnout behavior, as evidenced in the prior section.  However, we have only 
considered the short term impact thus far – of direct and indirect (2-cycle) changes in 
behavior.  How might social conformity affect behavior in the long term?  
Given the literature on models of pure conformity and the extreme outcomes they 
predict (described in the introduction to this chapter), clearly other dynamics are at work 
in the case of voting.  Johnson and Huckfeldt (2005) and Siegel (2009) both demonstrate 
the importance of network structure to how individuals interacting over a network adapt 
their behavior over time in response to conformity pressures.  Unfortunately, the two 
datasets used in the analyses thus far, the South Bend and St. Louis studies, do not 
provide a complete network of discussants.70 Instead, the St. Louis and South Bend 
datasets are both “snowball” studies, in that the researchers initially queried a set of 
individuals, then asked for their political discussants, and interviewed as many of those 
discussants as was feasible. The researchers then stopped, and did not interview the 
discussants of the discussants, or the discussants of those discussants, etc.  These second, 
                                                 
70 Nor do there appear to be any other publically available, full-network, datasets of voter behavior and 





third, and higher order discussants influence the voting decisions of their peers, but are 
not included in the dataset, and the network of social influence is thus “incomplete”. 
Given this limitation, we can nevertheless analyze the multi-cycle impact of social 
conformity by studying specific scenarios supported by the data.  Namely, though 
information on discussion partners is lacking, we can construct a stylized society of 
fragmented groups of individuals, who communicate with like-minded individuals from 
the data, and no one else.71  We would expect that environment to have two impacts on 
the model: on the expected local participation rate, and indirectly on behavior.  The local 
participation rate would tend towards 0 or 1, as individuals constructed their political 
discussion networks to avoid disagreement. Second, we would expect that the indirect 
effects of conformity, i.e., mirroring one’s views through one’s peers and one’s peers’ 
peers, would have little impact:  in homogeneous groups, the individuals start the process 
already conforming to their peers’ behavior.   
A simple extension of the simulation model provides a test of this thought 
experiment. I classify the individuals in the dataset into deciles of turnout probability, 
according to the estimated parameters for the simulation model of turnout.  I randomly 
draw individuals from each decile.  Then, I draw political discussants from the same 
decile, up to the number of discussants that the selected individuals indicated on the 
survey, and setup a group of intercommunicating, but otherwise fully isolated, individuals 
                                                 
71 Such a society could arise, in theory, if individuals actively shape their discussion networks to avoid 
disagreement, select neighborhoods of likeminded individuals, and receive their news about broader social 
expectations from carefully chosen online and traditional media outlets.  Whether this is, in fact, occurring 





for each set of discussants.  Finally, I simulate multiple electoral cycles with and without 
the influence of social conformity.72  
The South Bend panel dataset provides the richest base for this extension of the 
model, since it provides information on both the formation of turnout intentions before 
the election and then afterwards on the decision to vote, given the intentions of one’s 
peers.  I initialize the population of the simulation with the South Bend dataset, for the 
1984 elections.  For each subsequent election, I first assume that an individual’s 
probability of voting in the prior election carries over to become the pre-election (and 
pre-social influence) turnout intention of that person in the next round, then I estimate 
conformity’s influence, and I determine the likelihood that the individual will vote in that 
election. I repeat this process ten times, taking this isolated-version of the South Bend 
population through a simulated journey to 2024.  The result can be seen in Figure 15, on 
the next page. 
                                                 
72 To simulate a world without social conformity playing a role, one cannot drop the term associated with 
conformity – that would simulate a world in which none of one’s peers ever participated.  Instead, one 
should assume that one’s peers have the same participate rates as the individual would have had based on 
her non-social independent variables.  Using the simplified notation from Step 1, start with   T= logit(αo +  α1 
X  + α 2 LPR).  Then, set LPR to the participation rate that the individual would have had normally, ie 
logit(αo +  α1 X ).   Substituting into the original equation T= logit(αo + α1 X  + α 2 logit(αo +  α1 X )).  This places 
turnout intentions at the level of participation from a “neutral” social environment, rather than a completely 





Figure 15: Average change in turnout over time in "Isolated" Populations, due to social conformity 
 
Figure 15 demonstrates that long-term changes in turnout intentions do occur 
among these isolated populations, and they vary depending on the level of initial 
participation each isolated populations starts with.  However, these changes are very 
slight.  The average across all groups is small – only a 1.4% increase across all time 
periods, and a less than 1% increase for the first time period.  The average impact found 
using the original South Bend dataset was significantly greater, at 8%. 
The change in turnout intentions across the groups also varies considerably.  With 
each group, discussants were drawn from the population of individuals whose initial 
predisposition to vote was within the same decile.  The homogeneity of those groups 
varied substantially, though.  The higher-deciles of turnout were nearly homogeneous, 
with a variance in the initial probability of participation of 6x10-5%; the lowest decile of 
turnout was somewhat less homogeneous. The highest groups showed nearly no change 
in turnout intentions.  The 1st and 2nd decile of initial turnout, with a greater internal 





under the average impact found using the original South Bend dataset.73   
This result fits with one’s expectations – within (relatively) homogenous groups, 
dynamic social pressures have little practical significance. Instead, the structure of the 
group itself (homogeneous) has already incorporated the power of conformity.  This 
result only holds for truly homogeneous groups, however. The power of conformity 
applied by an otherwise homogenous group on a heterodox member could still be very 
powerful, as I will explore shortly.   
 
Extension 2: Everyone Else is Voting (Or Not)!    
Cialdini’s, Kallgren’s and Reno’s (1991) work on peer comparisons and 
consumer behavior, and subsequent work on voter behavior (Gerber et al. 2008), points 
towards another interesting extension of the model. In their seminal work in the field, 
Cialdini, Kallgren and Reno informed individuals of the average energy consumption of 
their neighbors.  They found that individuals that had previously consumed more than the 
average significantly decreased energy consumption.  Those that consumed less than the 
average would increase their consumption (i.e., conform to the reference value given by 
the experimenters), unless a simple message of social approval was given (e.g., 
“Congratulations!”).   
                                                 
73 Two other factors could also be at work with this variation across the groups. First, in the South Bend 
dataset, the majority of the individuals have over a 90% predicted probability of voting (the underlying 
turnout is based on self-reports, which are known to be excessively high).  Individuals who fall into the 
highest deciles by initial turnout probability have the smallest capacity to increase further due to social 
effects over time.  However, this cannot be well separated from their social context; they have the greatest 
capacity to decrease their probability of turnout, if they were placed in a contrary social milieu that 
discouraged participation.  Second, the underlying model employs a logistic curve, which is most 






That research spurred the development of the private company OPower, which 
provides these messages to consumers as a service to public utility companies.  OPower 
applies an even rosier comparison – if the individual consumes less than the average, the 
companies’ materials will shift the comparison from averages to instead reference 
another group that is consuming even less than the individual.  The result is the 
construction of a socially positive reference group:  the individual is (almost) always 
compared to a group that is doing better than themselves, and the individual faces a norm 
that pushes them to improve regardless of their starting point. 
This research has three potential parallels in voting behavior. First, political 
parties and their PACs can attempt to encourage (or suppress) targeted segments of the 
population who they expect to vote in their favor with this form of intentionally 
constructed “peer” pressure. Second, a less devious version of this process occurs 
naturally when individuals move to areas dominated by opposing views.  That is, when a 
non-voter is immersed in a context with people who unfailingly vote, this extreme form 
of peer pressure would result.74  Campbell (2006) explores a similar premise for civic-
minded individuals moving into cities with heavy political polarization.  A third context 
might be experimental field studies by political scientists, if Institutional Review Board 
(IRB) issues could be resolved (see Gerber et al. 2008 for a less controversial but related 
line of experimental research). 
                                                 
74 One could similarly analyze social pressure on voter preferences – e.g., the immersion of Democrat in a 
strongly Republican context.  We’d expect both strong peer pressure in the short term, and the pressured 
person to adjust their network to avoid such stark conflict.  Both topics – voter preferences and self-





What would be the effect of such extreme peer contexts?  Figure 16 provides the 
result on an initial examination.  In this extension to the model, each member of the 
South Bend dataset was placed in both a simulated “100% voting” and “0% voting” 
context. As before, the individuals were divided into deciles to better identify the 
variation in responsiveness to peer pressure across the population.  
 
 
Figure 16: Average change in turnout over time for individuals placed  
in all-voter vs. no-voter contexts 
 
Comparing Figure 16 and Figure 15, clearly these extreme peer pressures have 
significantly more effect than pressures that occur in relatively homogeneous groups.  
The average impact across all individuals by the end of the simulation is an impressive 
9.2% change in turnout.  Those individuals who always vote – in the upper deciles of 
initial turnout – are unmoved, even by this extreme peer pressure.  More interestingly 
though, consider the results for those groups that are most effected by peer pressure – 





dataset.  These voters are normally the least decisive about voting, and tailored peer 
pressure can trigger a tremendous 30% change in turnout.  A 30% change in the turnout 
of a targeted group, if predisposed to vote for one candidate or another, could naturally 
have a very significant impact on the outcome of elections.   
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
This analysis indicates that a commonsense mechanism of social influence, peer 
pressure, can have a strong impact on voter turnout, even when a wealth of more complex 
models found in the literature is considered.  That impact can range from a minor 1% 
increase in turnout among relatively homogeneous groups, to an average increase of 8% 
across a broad dataset of potential voters, to a 30% increase among carefully targeted 
populations.  The impact of peer pressure occurs both immediately, as some others have 
already identified (e.g., Gerber and Rogers 2009), and over time through indirect 
channels, as has yet to be well analyzed in the literature.   
While pursuing these empirical results, I provided a stylized theoretical model, in 
which one could identify and analyze alternative dynamic social interactions.  These 
dynamic interactions each contain a social feedback loop, that researchers can analyze 
using the tools presented in Chapter 3.  In this Chapter, I provided a demonstration of 
those tools, developing a simulation model to encapsulate the dynamic process of peer 
pressure, optimization techniques to estimate the model’s parameters and test for 
statistical significance, and then extensions to the simulation to explore the model’s 





Numerous avenues of future research appear promising, given this base.  One path 
entails examining additional implications of the current model.  For example, an 
alternative specification of the Local Participation Rate could be investigated, that 
incorporated the frequency of interaction with each discussant, or the ideological fervor 
of the discussant (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995, Cho and Rudolph 2008).  Two such 
metrics would be: 
∑ discussant_participates * frequency_of_contact_with_discussant     
or  
∑ discussant_participates * discussant_ideological_or_political_extremity 
 
Another interesting avenue of research entails leveraging related models on norm 
formation.  Bendor’s and Swistak’s (2001) work in the evolution of norms in an 
evolutionary game theory context is particularly promising.  The framework outlined here 
could be combined with formal evolutionary game theory to study more rigorously the 
interaction between individual exogenous characteristics and norm formation in a 
population.   
Finally, in the discussion of indirect impacts of the model, I mentioned a number 
of limitations in light of the scant available empirical data.  With appropriate panel data 
and a more complete understanding of the full social network of interacting individuals, 






Chapter 6:  Discussion 
 
The preceding chapters sought to accomplish four tasks:  identifying an 
understudied theoretical mechanism, that of dynamic interactions; describing the 
theoretical and statistical challenges that can arise when they are present; offering a 
methodology that can help tackle these challenges; and applying the methodology to two 
such interactions, between individual voters and political campaigns and between voters 
and their political discussants.  In this chapter, I step back from the analyses themselves 
and ask how well each of these tasks has been accomplished, and what tradeoffs were 
made along the way to introduce and study this underappreciated mechanism.  Then, I 
consider the broader implications of the dynamic interactions, and consider potential next 
steps for this line of research.  
 
Review of the Methodology and Major Findings 
Problem 
In Chapters 1 and 2, I identified a theoretical mechanism that applies to a 
surprisingly broad swathe of current research in voting behavior:  dynamic interactions 
between individuals and the micro-context of their decision to vote, in which a single 
factor both influences, and is influenced by, the act of voting.   I illustrated how these 
interactions can occur in four areas of political science research on voting – analyses of 





growing base of experimental work on habit formation, and the diverse literature on 
political party mobilization.  These interactions setup “feedback cycles” that pose both 
theoretical and statistical challenges if not analyzed appropriately.   
Drawing on well-established work on auto-regressive processes and on System 
Dynamics, I outlined three major statistical issues that can occur: 
1. Underestimating the net indirect impact of these mechanisms on voting behavior, 
by ignoring their indirect impacts, 
2. Unintentionally incorporating unrealistic assumptions about long term trends in 
voting behavior, 
3. Biasing the estimation process and offering misleading results, under specific 
conditions of non-stationarity or complex autoregressive relationships. 
 
While researchers may be able to employ advanced econometric techniques to 
mitigate some of the problems, these issues raise another practical concern: 
4. Modeling processes with dynamic interactions using current methods requires 
challenging econometric techniques, hard to find panel datasets with sufficient 
detail, and/or unintuitive model formulations.  All of these limit the exploration 
and understanding of these processes in practice. 
 
Methodology  
In Chapter 3, I proposed a methodology to confront these four challenges: 
employing simulation models to instantiate dynamic processes in an intuitive format that 





requirement for extensive panel data.   The methodology consisted of three broad steps: 
1. Developing a Theoretical Model  
a. The researcher would identify a dynamic process of interest, including the 
specific feedback process and the means by which that feedback process was 
constrained or shaped to avoid unrealistic predictions.  
b. This step could potentially leverage the theoretical framework presented in 
Chapter 3 on the dynamics of voting behavior, which provides an overall 
context for many of the dynamic processes evident in the current literature on 
voting behavior. 
2. Implementing the Model in a Computer Simulation 
a. The researchers would then instantiate the theoretical model in mathematical 
form, and convert that mathematical form into a computer simulation.  The 
simulation should be a direct representation of the mathematical model, with 
no new assumptions or additional variables; the simulation serves as a 
wrapper, feeding parameters and input data to the mathematical 
representation, executing the mathematical functions, and recording the 
output.     
b. While any mathematical and simulation vehicles could potentially be 
appropriate, I argued that agent-based models offer a great degree of 
flexibility and intuitiveness, especially when modeling individual-level 
phenomenon such as voting.  
c. The researchers would then estimate the model parameters by using 





known dataset, like the ANES, in a process similar to Maximum Likelihood 
Estimation. 
d. Finally, researchers would determine confidence intervals around, and the 
statistical significance of, these parameter estimates by using Monte Carlo 
simulations to approximate their distribution functions.   
3. Testing the Model Against New Observable Facts 
a. Finally, with the calibrated simulation model in hand, researchers would 
explore the model’s behavior in detail to find novel predictions and 




Dynamics of Mobilization 
In Chapter 4, I then applied this methodology to the issue of dynamic interactions 
between individual voters and political campaigns attempting to mobilize them.    A 
feedback cycle is established as the political campaigns both increase turnout, and target 
their mobilization efforts based on prior turnout.    Some existing models of mobilization 
and voting behavior have explicitly incorporated this process, especially Abramson and 
Claggett (2001), but have not analyzed its long terms impact.   In the extreme, this 
dynamic interaction drives the model to predict that eventually political campaigns seek 
to mobilize everyone in the population.    
I argue that a more realistic, but still parsimonious, model of mobilization 
incorporates the fact the political campaigns have limited resources, and only seek to 





especially the budget constraint, set up complex autoregressive relationships and a 
functional form that is difficult to estimate with standard econometric techniques.  The 
theoretical model can be readily translated into a simulation model, however, and 
estimated using parameter optimization against empirical datasets, such as the ANES. 
The result of the estimation process yields parameter estimates (and predicted 
probabilities) that are quite similar to the less-complex econometric models used in the 
existing research, providing some initial evidence in support of the simulation model.   
The independent variable of interest – budget constrained voter mobilization – has both 
statistical (1% level) and practical (5% average increase in the probability of voter 
turnout) significance.    Moreover, the simulation model generates intriguing new 
predictions about political behavior and mobilization that warrant further attention and 
testing: 
1. The indirect impact of mobilization. If mobilizers are successful at prompting an 
individual to vote, they change the likelihood that the individual would be mobilized 
again, and thus participate again. This indirect impact adds an additional 43% to the 
direct impact of mobilization on turnout.  For the population that is likely to be 
mobilized, that corresponds to an additional 4 percentage point increase in turnout.75  
2. This model can be applied to other political behavior such as campaign contributions 
and political volunteering, with more striking results. The indirect impact of 
mobilization on volunteering is a 21 percentage point increase in participation, which 
is an additional 70% of mobilization’s direct impact.    
                                                 
75 The average increase due to mobilization across the entire population is considerably lower. However, in 





3. Over multiple election cycles, mobilization appears to increase the participation 
levels of a narrow, unrepresentative, portion of the population.  In mobilizing 
campaign contributions, for example, 33% of the population receives over 95% of the 
requests to contribute, and they account for 89% of the donations made.    
 
These findings raise interesting questions about the strategic investments that 
political parties make in mobilization and building their base of participants over time. 
They also extend the model’s predictions into novel territory, facilitating empirical 
testing using new datasets, such as field experiments on mobilization and survey data on 
political contributions and volunteership.  
 
Dynamics of Social Conformity 
In Chapter 5, I analyzed the changing pressures for conformity between 
individuals and their political discussants.   As individuals decide whether or not to vote, 
they take into account the behavioral expectations of their peers – in short, if all of one’s 
friends vote, you are more likely to do so as well.   The communication, and the setting of 
expectations is two way, however – as individuals formulate their own turnout intentions, 
they communicate those intentions to their peers, who adjust their own behavior and 
intentions, and who then feedback their (updated) intentions back to the first individual.  
The result is a form of feedback loop, as intentions flow from the individual to peers and 
back to the individual (as well as from peers to their other peers, back to them, back to 
the individual, etc., throughout all layers of the discussion network).    





traditional econometric techniques falter.76   The feedback cycle also presents serious 
problems for empirical analysis, in that detailed information about individual voters, their 
turnout, political discussions with others, and the turnout of peers is required.   Using two 
such suitable datasets, I developed two related models – one on changes in individual 
voting behavior at election time given the (perceived) behavior of others, and one on 
changes in individual turnout intentions given the (perceived) intentions of others, before 
the election.   In each case, I used the theoretical framework from Chapter 3 to identify 
two potentially confounding alternative dynamic processes, and control for them:  
mobilization, and disagreement / conflict among one’s peers.    Both models were 
instantiated as agent-based simulations, and estimated using the optimization procedure 
provided in Chapter 3. 
The results of the estimation process broadly confirmed the simulation models – 
on both models, conformity pressures were found to be both statistically (1%, 10% 
levels), and practically (8%, 6% average change in predicted probability of turnout) 
significant.    The models were also readily extended to generate novel testable 
predictions: 
1. The indirect impact of conformity pressures on voting behavior can increase turnout 
in the next round of discussion by 1.7 percentage points.    
                                                 
76 There are also specialized techniques for handling network autocorrelation, which can 
accurately estimate the net impact of network effects at equilibrium.  In Chapter 5, however, I sought to 
explicitly model the step-by-step process of network updating, and used simulation modeling instead to 





2. In a society of insular, relatively homogenous groups, peer pressure per se has little 
effect; since the individuals enter the groups because their preferences are already 
aligned. 
3. Irregular voters can be highly susceptible to peer pressure – real or experimentally 
constructed – in which pressures to conform can change individual turnout rates by 
up to 30%. 
 
Benchmarking this model against standard econometric techniques, however, 
leads to a puzzling problem.  While the results (parameter estimates and predicted 
probability changes) are similar, there are notable differences.   And, these differences 
reveal a limitation to the methodology that should be considered further. 
 
Assessment of the Methodology 
In employing a new technique – simulation modeling and parameter optimization 
– to study dynamic processes, one would expect tradeoffs against existing methods.   
Many of the expected tradeoffs were outlined in the initial chapters, and warrant a review 
based on the experience of applying the methodology in Chapters 4 and 5.  The 
methodology offers these benefits:  
1. Researchers can model processes that are would otherwise be difficult to express as 
normal econometric models, such as budget constraints on the mobilization process 
that affect who is targeted, especially constraints that change from year to year.  





assumptions of most econometric models, such as complex path-dependent (and non-
stationary) processes. 
3. Researchers can directly convert their intuitive theoretical model of a dynamic 
process into a simulation model that instantiates the same theoretical concepts. This is 
particularly valuable when the theoretical model is about interacting individuals, with 
heterogeneous autonomous people interacting with each other over time.  The 
development of the simulation does not require a long “formalization” process in 
which the characteristics of people and their interactions are abstracted away.   In an 
agent-based model, the theoretical concepts can become the analytical model directly.  
 
However, at the same time: 
1. By not requiring a detailed formalization process, researchers employing simulation 
models in this manner also are not required to ground their models in well-established 
methods and clearly articulate the underlying assumptions of their models.    I have 
presented a practical approach to counter this, by explicitly starting with existing 
(non-simulation) models of voting behavior and benchmarking the results against 
known empirical results.  
2. Until a significant body of well-understood and tested simulation models is developed 
for voting behavior that can be used for benchmarking, researchers are stuck 
benchmarking their models against existing econometric models.  The further one 
moves into models that are econometrically intractable, the more difficult that 
becomes. 





meaning that estimated parameters may be inaccurate.  While techniques exist to 
mitigate this problem (e.g. cross-validation using untouched data, verification with 
different initial parameters and algorithms), they cannot remove this problem 
altogether.  
4. Expertise in programming (rather than advanced econometric techniques) is currently 
required. Thus, it is unclear whether this methodology currently provides a net benefit 
for political scientists without advanced technical skills.  New simulation modeling 
tools are being developed (e.g., NetLogo and RePast) that allow non-programmers to 
develop and explore these types of models.  However, no non-technical systems 
appear to exist yet that can facilitate the parameter estimation and hypothesis testing 
process.    
 
In the Chapter 5, both the benefits and the risks of this approach were particularly 
well on display.  First, the simulation estimation found statistical and practical 
significance on a dataset that one would strongly expect has network-autocorrelation 
problems, and was able to sidestep these problems to generate an intuitive and testable 
model.  Second, the estimation process generated parameter predictions that were similar 
to, but noticeably different from a simplified econometric model used to “benchmark” it.  
Because the simulation estimation process cannot guarantee optimal parameter values, it 
is unclear whether the difference between the two models was due to a faulty 
econometric model (violation of the assumptions), an "ineffective" simulation  
optimization (unable to find true parameters), or some combination of the two.  The 





are the same, but is clearly not as useful when the outcomes are different than the 
benchmark.  It can provide supportive evidence, but cannot falsify the simulation model.  
 
Assessment of the Findings and Next Steps 
The two analyses conducted here, on mobilization and social conformity, both 
provide insights into their specific processes and raise interesting questions about the 
dynamics of political participation more generally.   
In terms of mobilization and conformity, as discussed above, the indirect impacts 
of these factors are both statistically and practically significant – ranging from a 1.7% to 
a 4% increase in turnout, enough to swing the result of an election.   The long term 
impact of targeted mobilization, the creation of cadres of often-mobilized activists, raises 
questions about whether political campaigns are effectively using their mobilization 
funds to build their parties in the long term, and whether the unevenness of participation 
undermines the concept of a participatory democracy.  The long term impact of peer 
pressure, however, is much more complex.  Targeted use of peer pressure or intentionally 
constructed peer comparisons can lead to significant increases in turnout – even up to a 
30% increase. However, in an increasingly fragmented society, where individuals 
surround themselves with likeminded peers and media outlets, external peer pressure has 
a rapidly diminishing impact. 
More broadly though, these findings, and the models that produced them, provide 
a foundation for a host of new research questions, ranging from the role of “shocks” to 





time, to the effects of individual migration from high-turnout areas to low-turnout areas 
(and vice-versa).  These models can be directly extended and tested in these new 
contexts, allowing the researcher to build on the simulation modeling and calibration that 
has already been conducted and to focus on the more exciting parts of research – 






Appendix A: Estimation Code for the Dynamics of Mobilization Simulation  
This appendix provides the simulation used to estimate the Dynamics of 
Mobilization model from Chapter 4.  The simulation is written in the R programming 
language, with user-defined parameters to establish the characteristics of individuals as 
well as the mobilization, participation, and update functions.  The central algorithm of the 
model is as follows: 
 
# Define the Budget Constrained mobilization and voting model: returns each 
# individual’s predicted probability of voting.  Takes two input variables: the vector of  
# current parameters, and the dataset of ANES individuals. 
 
Constrained_Model <- function(p,x) 
{ 
 # Calculate lift from mobilization 
 y_m0 = logistic(p[1] + p[2]*x$Age + p[3]*x$Education + p[4]*x$Union.member  
+ p[5]*x$Religious.attendance  
 + p[6]*x$Political.engagement + p[7]*x$Presidential.candidate.affect  
 + p[8]*0 + p[9]*x[,historyvar])  
 
y_m1 = logistic(p[1] + p[2]*x$Age + p[3]*x$Education + p[4]*x$Union.member 
+ p[5]*x$Religious.attendance  
 + p[6]*x$Political.engagement + p[7]*x$Presidential.candidate.affect  
 + p[8]*1 + p[9]*x[,historyvar]) 
 
 # Select individuals for mobilization with the greatest lift 
 diffValue = y_m1 - y_m0 
 mob <- as.numeric(diffValue > quantile(diffValue,c(1-0.25))) 
  
 # Determine probability of participation, based of mobilization & other factors 
 y = logistic(p[1] + p[2]*x$Age + p[3]*x$Education + p[4]*x$Union.member  
+ p[5]*x$Religious.attendance + p[6]*x$Political.engagement  
+ p[7]*x$Presidential.candidate.affect  
+ p[8]*mob + p[9]*x[,historyvar]) 
  
# return the results, to inform the optimization algorithm 







# Define the vector of residuals between observed and predicted data  
# (this algorithm requires raw residuals, and internally calculates the sum of the squared  
# residuals) 
Residuals <- function(p) (dtaC$Turnout-Constrained_Model(p,dtaC)$y) 
 
# Call the optimization routine from the FME packages; uses the Levenberg-Marquardt 
algorithm, with arbitrary but non-zero starting parameters  
P <- modFit(f=Residuals,p=c(-1,1,1,1,1,1,1,1), method="Marq") 
 
# Print out the results for review 
print(P) 
 
# That’s it. The optimization process returns the estimated error-minimizing parameters,  
# then calculates re-simulates the model around those parameters to determine confidence  








Appendix B: Variable Coding, ANES 1990-1992 Panel 
 
Chapter 4 employed the ANES’s 1990-1992 panel dataset, and a participation 
model based on Abramson and Claggett’s (2002) analysis of the same.  For consistency, 
whenever possible the same codings were used here as in Abramson and Claggett (2002).  
In some cases, insufficient information was provided in their text and has been expanded 
upon here. 
 
Variable Codings, identical to Abramson and Claggett (2002) where relevant: 
 
Age: Actual age in years.  
 
Education: 8 years of education or less were coded 0, 9-12 years of education but no 
diploma was coded .2, a high school diploma or equivalent was coded .4, some post-
secondary education but no four year college degree was coded .6, a college degree or 
more, but no advanced degree was coded .8, and an advanced degree was coded 1.  
 
Employment Status: Respondents who reported working 20 or more hours per week were 
coded 1 and all others were coded 0.  
 
Family Income: Family income was set at the midpoint value, in thousands of dollars, of 
the family income category that the respondent reported. Respondents who fell into the 





to report their income and for those who the interviewer believed did not report their 
income correctly we used the midpoint value, in thousands of dollars, of the income 
category that the interviewer thought best described the respondent's family income.  
 
Group member: Respondents who reported that they belonged to any organization or took 
part in any activities that represented the interests and viewpoint of the group that they 
felt particularly close to were coded 1, otherwise they were coded 0.  
 
Ideological extremity: Respondents who placed themselves at the extreme liberal or 
conservative ends of the 7 point ideology scale were coded 3, those who placed 
themselves at the liberal or conservative position of the scale were coded 2, those who 
chose the slightly liberal or conservative positions were coded 1 and those who placed 
themselves at the middle position or who claimed that they hadn't thought about their 
position were coded 0.  
 
Mobilized: Indicates whether individual was contacted the political parties or “someone 
else” to “talk to you about supporting specific candidates in this last election”. 
 
Political engagement: Was derived from a principal component analysis of five variables: 
attention to the campaign, whether the respondent follows what is going on in 
government and public affairs, internal (politics too complicated) and external (additive 
index based on people like me don't have any say and public officials don't care what 





an additive index of interviewer's pre-election assessment of the respondent's political 
knowledge (coded into the 0-1 interval) and whether the respondent knew that the 
Republican party was the most conservative party, which party controlled a majority of 
seats in the House and Senate prior to the election, what job or office Dan Quayle, 
William Rehnquist, Boris Yeltsin, and Tom Foley held, and which branch of government 
was responsible for deciding if a law was constitutional and which nominated Federal 
judges.  
 
Presidential candidate affect: Was derived from a principal component analysis of four 
variables: whether the respondent cared about who would win the presidential election, 
whether the respondent's pre-election presidential preference was strong or not, the 
maximum pre-election feeling thermometer rating that the respondent gave for Bush, 
Clinton or Perot, and the difference between the respondent's highest and lowest rated 
presidential candidate on the pre-election feeling thermometers.    
 
Race: Blacks were coded 1 and all others 0.  
 
Religious attendance: Those who reported that they attended church or synagogue more 
than once a week, once a week, almost every week, once or twice a month, a few times a 
year and never were coded 1, 0.8, 0.6, 0.4, 0.2 and 0 respectively Those who reported that 
they never attend religious service except for weddings, baptisms or funerals were also 






Sex: Female was coded 1 and male 0.  
 
South: Coded 1 if the respondent lived in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, North or South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas or Virginia and 0 
otherwise.  
 
Strength of Party Identification: Pure independents and apoliticals were coded 0, leaning 
independents .33, weak partisans .67, and strong partisans 1.  
 
Turnout in 1990: Indicates the self-reported behavior of the individual in the 1990 
elections. 
 
Union member: Respondents who reported that they or some member of their household 







Appendix C:  Analysis of St. Louis Post-Election Data 
In addition to the two datasets used in the main text, another similar dataset is 
available to test the role of peer turnout on one’s own voting behavior.  In the main text, I 
employed the cross-sections of the St. Louis dataset that occurred before the 1996 
elections, to test turnout intentions, and the panel over time of the South Bend dataset that 
occurred around the 1984 elections, to test turnout behavior.  
I did not employ the cross-sections of the St. Louis dataset that occurred after the 
1996 elections, in order to simplify the overall presentation.  The St. Louis post-election 
dataset allows one to test the role of peer turnout on one’s own turnout.  It is similar to 
the South Bend dataset, but is slightly inferior in that it does not provide a control 
variable for the individual’s prior turnout intentions.  I replicated the analysis from the 

































Error z value Pr(>|z|) 
(Intercept) NA -4.19 0.84 -4.96 0.00 
White -0.03 -0.38 0.37 -1.02 0.31 
Married 0.01 0.10 0.25 0.40 0.69 
Female 0.02 0.16 0.23 0.69 0.49 
Employed -0.01 -0.08 0.29 -0.26 0.79 
Age 0.20 0.03 0.01 3.52 0.00 
Household Income 0.06 0.01 0.01 1.46 0.14 
Education 0.15 1.39 0.60 2.30 0.02 
Political Interest 0.07 0.72 0.33 2.21 0.03 
Partisan Extremity 0.27 0.76 0.13 6.05 0.00 
Ideological Extremity 0.00 0.01 0.10 0.13 0.90 
Group Membership 0.09 0.18 0.09 1.91 0.06 
Mobilization 0.06 0.60 0.25 2.39 0.02 
Heterogeneity (% Agree) 0.00 0.05 0.30 0.18 0.86 
LPR (% Voted) 0.13 1.12 0.32 3.52 0.00 
 
 
The cross-sectional St. Louis post-election dataset offers similar results as the 
South Bend panel study which was collected nearly 12 years later.   Most importantly for 
the analysis, the average change in the predicted probability of voting are quite similar – 
with a 13% predicted change on the St. Louis dataset, and a 15% change on the South 
Bend dataset (both results are statistically significant at the 1% level).  Other variables, 
that were not statistically significant in one or more of the datasets (Mobilization, Percent 
Agree), do show significant variation across the two analyses. That should not be 






Appendix D:  Analysis of Imputed Data on Social Conformity 
In the main text, I dropped cases that were missing any of the independent 
variables, and then used that trimmed dataset for the analyses: simulation estimation, 
benchmark logistic regressions, and calculation of indirect effects.  In the St. Louis 
dataset, 401 of 1344 individuals with data for the dependent variable were dropped; in the 
South Bend dataset, 503 of 1510 individuals were dropped.  
This greatly simplified the simulation process, and the presentation of the 
simulation results.  However, this approach is not ideal when confronting missing data.   
A more appropriate method is to apply multiple imputation, in which a model is fitted to 
the available data and applied to estimate the missing information, and the process is 
repeated multiple times to gauge the stability of resulting values (King et at. 2001).      
I applied multiple imputation to the original South Bend and St. Louis datasets, 
using the Amelia II package in R (Honaker et al. 2011).   I then replicated the benchmark 
logistic regressions on these imputed datasets.  The results were substantially the same as 
for the trimmed datasets, both in coefficient estimates and statistical significance, and are 

















Table A.2: Logit regression of the impact of the Local Participation Rate on 
Turnout Intentions, with Multiple Imputation of St. Louis Dataset 
 
Variable Estimate Std. Error t-stat p-value 
Intercept -2.22 0.60 -3.67 0.00 
White -0.08 0.23 -0.34 0.73 
Married 0.05 0.19 0.29 0.78 
Female 0.30 0.17 1.78 0.07 
Employed -0.10 0.21 -0.51 0.61 
Age 0.02 0.01 2.37 0.02 
Household Income 0.01 0.00 1.99 0.05 
Education 0.28 0.40 0.70 0.48 
Political Interest 0.48 0.24 2.06 0.04 
Partisan Extremity 0.67 0.09 7.61 0.00 
Ideological Extremity 0.20 0.08 2.65 0.01 
Group Membership 0.14 0.07 2.10 0.04 
Mobilization 0.09 0.18 0.52 0.60 
Heterogeneity (% Agree) -0.37 0.26 -1.41 0.16 
LPR (% Planning to Vote) 0.62 0.30 2.07 0.04 
 
The parameters of interest on the imputed and non-imputed datasets are nearly 
identical. For example, the coefficient on LPR is 0.63 vs. 0.62 on the two datasets, 0.07 
vs. 0.09 for mobilization, 0.62 on both for discussant network diversity.   The standard 





















Table A.3: Logit regression of the impact of the Local Participation Rate on 
Turnout Behavior, with Multiple Imputation of South Bend Dataset 
 
Variable Estimate Std. Error t-stat p-value 
Intercept -3.77 0.54 -7.00 0.00 
White 0.00 0.21 -0.02 0.99 
Married -0.10 0.21 -0.46 0.64 
Female 0.01 0.17 0.04 0.97 
Employed 0.03 0.23 0.15 0.88 
Age 0.03 0.01 5.35 0.00 
Household Income 0.01 0.01 1.84 0.07 
Education 0.04 0.41 0.10 0.92 
Political Interest 1.06 0.20 5.24 0.00 
Partisan Extremity 0.26 0.09 2.76 0.01 
Ideological Extremity -0.14 0.10 -1.39 0.17 
Group Membership 0.13 0.06 1.99 0.05 
Mobilization 0.15 0.17 0.89 0.38 
Heterogeneity (% Agree) 0.52 0.22 2.37 0.02 
Prior Turnout Intention 1.59 0.19 8.43 0.00 
LPR (% Voted) 1.77 0.24 7.43 0.00 
 
 
As with the St. Louis dataset, the parameters of interest on the imputed and non-
imputed data are very similar. For example, the coefficient on LPR is 1.77 vs. 1.60 on the 
two datasets, 1.59 vs. 1.94 for prior vote intentions.   In both cases, these analyses 
indicate that the results presented in the main body of the paper would not have 







Appendix E: Variable Coding, St. Louis Dataset 
Dependent Variable:  
Variable Meaning: Vote Intention  
Original Variable(s): V3, NUV2.   
Coded Variable(s):  WillVote 
Coding:  1 whenever the individual indicated a specific preference, and 0 when the 
individual specifically intended not to vote, and NA otherwise. To counteract social 
desirability influences, and to retain as much of the sample as possible for analysis, when 
individuals indicated that s/he did not know whether sh/e would vote, the individual was 
coded as unlikely to vote (0).  
 
Main Independent Variable:  
Variable Meaning: Local Participation Rate (Perceived, Intended Turnout) 
Original Variable(s): V3, NUV2.   
Coded Variable(s):  PercentVoting 
Coding:  Gives the percent of the individuals’ political discussants that the individual 
believed would vote.  To retain as much of the sample as possible for analysis, when 
individuals indicated that s/he did not know whether a discussant would vote, that 
discussant is counted as a likely non-voter. 
 
Other Independent Variables:  





Original Variable(s): D14 
Coding:  1 for white, NA for Don’t know or Refused, 0 otherwise.  
 
Coded Variable(s):  Married; Dummy variable for whether individual is married  
Original Variable(s): D1 
Coding:  1 for married, NA for Don’t know or Refused, 0 otherwise.  
 
Coded Variable(s):  Female; Dummy variable for whether individual is female 
Original Variable(s): D2 (Gender) 
Coding: 1 for female, NA for Don’t know or Refused, 0 otherwise. 
 
Coded Variable(s):  Employed; Dummy variable for whether individual is employed 
Original Variable(s): D7 (Employment Status) 
Coding: 1 for employed, NA for Don’t know or Refused, 0 otherwise. 
 
Coded Variable(s):  Age (in 1996) 
Original Variable(s): D13 (Year of Birth) 
Coding: 1996 – Year of Birth, unless Don’t know or Refused (coded as NA) 
 
Coded Variable(s):  HouseholdIncome; Household Income, in Thousands 
Original Variable(s): D16-20 
Coding:  >75k:   87.5  >50k:   62.5  >35k:   42.5 






Coded Variable(s):  Education, [0,1] variable for highest level of schooling 
Original Variable(s): D11 (Years of Schooling) 
Coding:   8 years of education or less were coded 0,  
9-12 years of education but no diploma was coded .2,  
A high school diploma or equivalent was coded .4,  
Some post-secondary but no four year college degree was coded .6,  
A college degree or more, but no advanced degree was coded .8,  
An advanced degree was coded 1. 
 
Coded Variable(s):   PoliticalInterest; Respondent’s General Level of Interest in Politics 
Original Variable(s): P1 
Coding:  # Coded as:  very = 1; somewhat = .5;  not = 0 
 
Coded Variable(s):  PartisanExtremity;  [0,1] Level of Partisan Intensity  
Original Variable(s): PT2B,P3, P4, P5 (Self-identification on partisan spectrum) 
Coding:  Absolute Value of:  4 - (ANES 1-7 scale of intensity) 
 
Coded Variable(s):  IdeologicalExtremity;  [0,1] Level of Ideological Intensity  
Original Variable(s):  P8B, P9, P10, P11 (Self-identification on ideology spectrum) 
Coding:  Absolute Value of : 4 - (ANES 1-7 scale of intensity) 
 





Original Variable(s): PO1 (Contact By Political Parties) 
Coding:  Yes = 1; No= 0; Don’t know or refused = NA;  
 
Coded Variable(s):  GroupMembership 
Original Variable(s):  O1A, O1B, O2, O3, O4, O5 
Coding:   Count of the number of times the individual said they were a member of a 
particular type of organization (each question, O1A, O1B, O2, O3, O4, O5, corresponds 
to a membership). 
 
Coded Variable(s):  SizeOfNetwork 
Original Variable(s): N[1…5] (Respondent names a political discussant) 
Coding:  Count of individuals named 
 
Coded Variable(s):  FrequencyOfPoliticalTalk 
Variable Meaning:  How often discuss politics 
Original Variable(s): N[1…5]J  
Coding:   Maximum value, across political discussants, of the following per-discussant 
coding:  Never 0; Rarely 0.33; Sometimes = .66; Often = 1 
 
Coded Variable(s):   PercentAgree, Level of Political Agreement with Network 
Original Variable(s): N1J, N2K, N3K, N4K, N5K 






Appendix F: Variable Coding, South Bend Dataset 
Note – the coding of the St. Louis and South Bend datasets are nearly identical. 
All of the independent variables, except for prior voting intentions, are available in both 
datasets and employed similar or identical wording.    The text below provides the 
variable names used in this dataset, along with the (duplicated) descriptions.   
The data collection occurred in 3 waves, as given in the first letter of most 
variable names: A, B, or C. Where information on a particular topic was available in 
more than one wave, the first answer (wave) that a particular respondent gave was used.  
 
Dependent Variable:  
Variable Meaning: Self Reported Voting Behavior 
Original Variable(s): C27, C28.   
Coded Variable: Voted_84 
Coding:  1 whenever the individual indicated a specific preference, and 0 when the 
individual specifically intended not to vote, and NA otherwise. To counteract social 
desirability influences, and to retain as much of the sample as possible for analysis, when 
individuals indicated that s/he did not know whether sh/e voted, the individual was coded 
as unlikely to have voted (0).  
 
Main Independent Variable:  
Variable Meaning: Local Participation Rate (Perceived, Intended Turnout) 





Coded Variable(s):  PercentVoted 
Coding:  Gives the percent of the individuals’ political discussants that the individual 
believed would vote.  To retain as much of the sample as possible for analysis, when 
individuals indicated that s/he did not know whether a discussant would vote, that 
discussant is counted as a likely non-voter. 
 
Other Independent Variables:  
Variable Meaning: Pre-Election Turnout Intention  
Original Variable(s): B187 
Coded Variable(s):  WillVote 
Coding:  1 whenever the individual indicated a specific preference, and 0 when the 
individual specifically intended not to vote, and NA otherwise. To counteract social 
desirability influences, and to retain as much of the sample as possible for analysis, when 
individuals indicated that s/he did not know whether sh/e would vote, the individual was 
coded as unlikely to vote (0).  
 
Coded Variable(s):  White; Dummy variable for whether individual is White  
Original Variable(s): A139, B230, C217 
Coding:  1 for white, NA for Don’t know or Refused, 0 otherwise.  
 
Coded Variable(s):  Married; Dummy variable for whether individual is married  
Original Variable(s): A101, B201, C177 






Coded Variable(s):  Female; Dummy variable for whether individual is female 
Original Variable(s): RSex 
Coding: 1 for female, NA for Don’t know or Refused, 0 otherwise. 
 
Coded Variable(s):  Employed; Dummy variable for whether individual is employed 
Original Variable(s): A105, B50, C181 
Coding: 1 for employed, NA for Don’t know or Refused, 0 otherwise. 
 
Coded Variable(s):  Age (in 1985) 
Original Variable(s): A134, B225, C212 (Year of Birth) 
Coding: 1985– Year of Birth, unless Don’t know or Refused (coded as NA) 
 
Coded Variable(s):  HouseholdIncome; Household Income, in Thousands 
Original Variable(s): A142,B249, C232 
Coding:    >50k:   70.0  >40k:   45.0 
         >30k:   35.0 >20k:   25.0 >15k:   17.5 
         >10k:   12.5 >5k:      7.5 <5k:     2.5 
 
Coded Variable(s):  Education, [0,1] variable for highest level of schooling 
Original Variable(s): A102,B202,C178 
Coding:   8 years of education or less were coded 0,  





A high school diploma or equivalent was coded .4,  
Some post-secondary but no four year college degree was coded .6,  
Four years of college degree was coded .8,  
More than a college degree was coded 1. 
 
Coded Variable(s):   PoliticalInterest; Respondent’s General Level of Interest in Politics 
Original Variable(s): A30, B137, C2 
Coding:  # Coded as:  very interested / yes / a great deal = 1; somewhat / some = .5;  not 
interested / no / only a little / none at all = 0 
 
Coded Variable(s):  PartisanExtremity;  [0,1] Level of Partisan Intensity  
Original Variable(s): A72-A75; B236-B239 
Coding:  Absolute Value of:  4 - (ANES 1-7 scale of intensity) 
 
Coded Variable(s):  IdeologicalExtremity;  [0,1] Level of Ideological Intensity  
Original Variable(s):  A65-A67, B233-B235, C220-C222 
Coding:  Absolute Value of : 4 - (ANES 1-7 scale of intensity) 
 
Coded Variable(s):  Mobilization 
Original Variable(s): A33,A34,B139,B140, C16   
Coding:  Boolean indicating if political parties, or “anyone” has  “come around to talk to 






Coded Variable(s):  GroupMembership 
Original Variable(s):  B30, B31, B32, B33, B34, B42, B43,  
Coding:   Count of the number of times the individual said they were a member of a 
particular type of organization  
 
Coded Variable(s):   PercentAgree, Level of Political Agreement with Network 
Original Variable(s): C170, C171, C172 
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